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The fourth edition of the Production Gap Report by the Stockholm Environment Institute highlights a significant discrepancy between national net-zero promises and actual fossil fuel production plans, projecting that production in 2030 will far exceed levels consistent with global warming limits of 1.5°C and 2°C.

The report finds that while the EU and UK have made progress in aligning TACs with scientific advice since 2015, they missed the 2020 legal deadline to end overfishing. Analysis of 2023 TACs shows that 25% still exceed scientific advice. The report highlights a systemic lack of ambition for data-limited stocks (precautionary advice) and bycatch stocks compared to target stocks. It also criticises the lack of transparency in the TAC-setting process and the poor implementation of the landing obligation, which risks further overfishing. Key recommendations include setting TACs below scientific advice to account for ecosystem needs and climate change, and improving public access to the decision-making process.

The report argues that current carbon dioxide removal (CDR) governance systems are flawed because they often treat carbon removal as equivalent to emission reductions, leading to 'mitigation deterrence'. It examines regulatory tools like emissions trading systems (ETS), tax credits, and public auctions, as well as voluntary carbon markets (VCMs). The authors conclude that CDR must be a complementary tool, not a substitute for decarbonization. They propose a policy framework based on three principles: precaution, 'do no significant harm' (DNSH), and the primacy of emission reductions. Key recommendations include separating emission reduction targets from CDR and land-based sequestration targets, implementing rigorous measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems, and shifting from offsetting models to 'contributive approaches' or public procurement like reverse auctions.

The document argues that current carbon dioxide removal (CDR) policies often encourage 'mitigation deterrence' by treating removals as equivalent to emission reductions. It reviews various mechanisms—including emissions trading systems, tax credits, and voluntary markets—and concludes that most fail to ensure environmental integrity or permanence. The authors propose a 'blueprint' for sensible policy that strictly separates emission reduction targets from removal targets, mandates robust monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV), and prioritizes the 'Do No Significant Harm' principle. It suggests that funding for CDR should come from carbon pricing revenues or dedicated procurement schemes rather than offsetting mechanisms.

The 2023 Production Gap Report finds that governments plan to produce more than double the amount of fossil fuels in 2030 consistent with a 1.5°C warming limit. While many major producers have pledged net-zero emissions, most continue to expand production, with global coal production projected to increase until 2030 and oil and gas until at least 2050. The report argues for a managed, equitable phase-out of all fossil fuels, noting that reliance on carbon capture and storage (CCS) and carbon dioxide removal (CDR) is risky due to technical uncertainties and a poor track record of pilot project success.

The report examines parental leave policies in the mining sector across 12 countries, comparing national laws with corporate policies. While many mining companies provide benefits that meet or exceed legal requirements, the report identifies a 'leaky pipeline' where women leave the industry between ages 35 and 44. This suggests that formal policies are undermined by workplace cultures that create anxiety around pregnancy disclosure and a lack of support for the transition back to work. The document advocates for normalizing paternity leave for men and improving awareness of reproductive rights to foster a more inclusive environment.

The 2023 Scorecard on Insurance, Fossil Fuels and the Climate Emergency finds that while more insurers are adopting coal exit policies, the industry's overall response to the climate crisis remains inadequate. Most insurers continue to underwrite the expansion of oil and gas infrastructure, and many have abandoned net zero commitments due to political pressure in the United States. The report highlights a contradiction where insurers withdraw cover from climate-affected regions while continuing to fund the fossil fuel industry.

The document discusses the role of municipalities in maintaining carbon sinks, noting that in forested countries like Finland, Norway, and Sweden, this is complicated by the desire to use wood to replace fossil fuels. It argues that while formal policy instruments to prevent forest conversion are under-developed, local governments can lead through voluntary actions and land-use influence.

The report argues that delivering existing clean power commitments would allow the UK to produce 98% of its electricity from clean sources by 2030, saving the average household £300 per year and reducing total household costs by £8.7 billion. It contrasts a 'Delivering commitments' scenario with a 'Falling short' scenario, noting that the latter would increase reliance on volatile fossil gas imports and result in the UK remaining a net importer of electricity. While grid investment would increase network costs, these are outweighed by a significant drop in wholesale electricity prices. The report identifies critical barriers to this transition, including slow permitting processes, grid connection delays, and unsuccessful renewable auction rounds, particularly for offshore wind.

The policy brief outlines how Saudi Arabia and the UAE can leverage their geological storage potential and National Oil Companies to scale up carbon capture and storage (CCS). It identifies current project statuses, storage capacities, and recommends the creation of carbon management strategies, open-access storage hubs, and enduring financial incentives to decarbonize hard-to-abate industries and the power sector.

The authors argue that the Norwegian Arts Council's 2023-2030 strategy exhibits 'klimablindhet' (climate blindness) by failing to use the word 'climate' once, despite the urgent global climate crisis. They contrast this with the proactive approaches of the Danish Arts Foundation (Statens Kunstfond) and Arts Council England, which provide CO2 calculations, training, and strategic environmental programs. The authors claim that Norwegian cultural actors fear losing public support if they engage in climate critique, particularly regarding Norway's oil policy, and call for the Arts Council to acknowledge the climate crisis and support the sector's role in a just transition.

The Clean Air Task Force (CATF) recommends that the EU prioritise 'no regrets' industrial sectors for hydrogen deployment, utilize all clean production pathways (including 'blue' hydrogen), and site production close to consumption to minimize transport inefficiencies. The report emphasizes that public funding should be matched to projects that provide socio-economic benefits to local communities and that a comprehensive EU database should be established to ensure transparency and collaboration.

The report identifies clinker production as the primary source of emissions in the cement sector, accounting for 88% of total emissions. It evaluates three main decarbonization levers: substituting clinker with materials like fly ash and calcined clay, replacing coal and gas with biomass, waste, or green hydrogen, and deploying CCUS. While some progress is noted in developed markets, the report warns that absolute emissions will rise as production grows in emerging markets like India and Africa unless green processes are scaled. Key barriers include supply constraints for substitutes, high upfront costs for CCUS, and a lack of carbon transport infrastructure in high-growth regions.

The report analyzes the global transition of road transport to electric vehicles, noting that while passenger EV adoption is on an exponential growth trajectory, freight and emerging markets face significant hurdles. Key barriers include insufficient charging infrastructure, power grid limitations, and high total cost of ownership (TCO) for heavy-duty trucks. The document emphasizes the need for a shift from demand-side subsidies to supply-side policies, such as prioritized permitting for battery production and direct funding for charging networks, to sustain the transition toward net-zero emissions.

The document discusses the shift from territorial to consumption-based emission tracking in Nordic municipalities to capture embodied emissions from imported goods and services. It highlights that imported embodied CO2 emissions in final consumption ranged from 45% in Finland to nearly 60% in Iceland in 2015. The brief identifies data collection across value chains as a primary challenge and notes that the Greenhouse Gas Protocol for cities (GPC) lacks detailed guidance for comprehensive consumption-based assessments.

The report finds that importing large quantities of low-carbon hydrogen to Europe is expensive and energy-inefficient due to hydrogen's low volumetric energy density. Pipeline transport is consistently more cost-effective than maritime shipping, with Norway and Algeria identified as the most competitive pipeline sources. Among maritime options, ammonia is the lowest-cost carrier, with the Arabian Gulf being the most economical exporter. The analysis suggests that importing LNG to produce hydrogen at the point of import may be more feasible than long-distance hydrogen transport. CATF recommends that the European Commission re-examine its 2030 target of 20 million tonnes of clean hydrogen per year, as it may lack a clear basis.

Between 2015 and 2020, climate finance for land use in Brazil averaged US$ 6.6 billion per year, dominated by domestic private finance and rural credit. While the crop sector was the primary recipient, the report highlights a significant gap in the proportion of total rural credit that is climate-aligned and notes a decline in public budget allocations for the forest sector.

The document is a formal letter from a group of NGOs to the European Commission and the UK Government calling for sustainable, ecosystem-based fishing limits for 2024. The authors argue that current catch limits often ignore scientific advice, undermining biodiversity and the capacity of marine life to mitigate climate change. They demand that limits be set at or below the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) advice, the adoption of a precautionary approach for mixed fisheries and forage fish, the elimination of bycatch and discards through remote electronic monitoring, and increased transparency in decision-making.

A group of environmental NGOs has called on the Spanish Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food to lead the EU in setting 2024 fishing limits based on scientific advice rather than exceeding it. The letter highlights failures in the Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) to end overfishing by 2020 and notes specific crises in the Baltic Sea and Northeast Atlantic. The NGOs argue that overfishing undermines marine biodiversity and the capacity of oceans to mitigate climate change, urging the adoption of an ecosystem-based approach, the elimination of bycatch, and increased transparency in decision-making.

The document argues that the EU failed its 2020 legal deadline to end overfishing and continues to set Total Allowable Catches (TACs) above scientific advice. The NGOs recommend setting 2024 TACs well below the maximum catch levels advised by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) to build ecosystem resilience against climate change. Key proposals include the mandatory roll-out of remote electronic monitoring (REM), the application of an ecosystem-based approach for forage fish, and the reinstatement of TACs for stocks where limits were previously removed. The report also emphasizes the need for stricter management of deep-sea stocks and the recovery of critically endangered species like the European eel.