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The paper examines the transition of African carbon market engagement from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) legacy to the operationalisation of Article 6.4 and 6.2 of the Paris Agreement. It warns against a continued reliance on exporting low-cost credits, which risks 'carbon grabs' and price asymmetry, where credits have been offered as low as USD 1-3 per tonne. The author proposes a 'Paris mindset' where domestic use of credits for national carbon taxes or sectoral targets is prioritised, and exports are used only for calculated surpluses. To achieve this, the document outlines five pillars of readiness: Policy & Institutions, Registry & MRV, Authorisation & Corresponding Adjustments (CAs), Safeguards & Benefit-sharing, and Finance & Market Access. It provides a comparative analysis of several African nations, noting that South Africa and Egypt are adopting a domestic-focused 'Paris' approach, while Ghana and Rwanda remain more export-led, and Kenya and Nigeria are in hybrid transitions.

The paper examines the transition of African carbon markets from the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) legacy to the implementation of Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. It contrasts an 'export-led' approach, which risks exploitative 'carbon grabs' and low pricing (USD 1-3 per tonne), with a 'sovereign-first' approach that uses carbon markets as tools for national decarbonization. The author proposes a five-pillar readiness framework—covering policy, registries, authorization, safeguards, and finance—to help countries move toward domestic compliance markets. Current progress varies across the continent, with South Africa and Egypt adopting domestic-focused 'Paris' mindsets, while Ghana and Rwanda remain more export-led, and Kenya and Nigeria occupying hybrid positions.

The document examines the tension between Africa's potential as a clean energy leader and the restrictive nature of unilateral trade instruments like the EU's CBAM. While Africa possesses significant renewable energy potential and 30% of global critical mineral reserves, the paper argues that CBAM could reduce collective GDP by 0.91% (approximately USD 25 billion) and limit fiscal space for green R&D. It suggests that African nations leverage their strategic mineral advantages, utilize the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to eliminate 97% of internal tariffs, and push for more structured discussions on trade restrictions within the UNFCCC and WTO.

FSDAi invested in the International Housing Solutions (IHS) Kenya Affordable Green Housing Fund to finance EDGE-certified homes for low- and middle-income households, targeting 4,000 homes by 2030. To drive systemic change, FSDAi mandated an Open Source Policy and funded the Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa (CAHF) to lead an Open Access Initiative (OAI). This initiative collects and disseminates market intelligence on construction costs and project delivery to attract institutional capital and guide policymakers. The OAI has also enabled the tracking of six Kenyan State Department for Housing and Urban Development projects and the creation of the Nairobi Metropolitan Area Dashboard.

The document examines the 'vicious cycle' where climate shocks force African nations to borrow, increasing debt service costs and limiting investments in climate resilience and social needs. It argues that the current creditor-led focus on binding contracts ignores the environmental and social impacts of debt. The author posits that the July 2025 ICJ advisory opinion establishes customary international legal obligations—specifically the duty to prevent significant environmental harm and the duty to cooperate—which should apply to debt restructuring. The brief recommends that African policymakers use this legal grounding to push for a new conceptual framework, such as the DOVE Principles, which integrates due diligence and common but differentiated responsibilities into debt negotiations.

The document identifies a significant divergence between climate and development policy in Africa, noting that NDCs focus on sectoral mitigation while NDPs prioritize economic growth and poverty alleviation. It warns that aggressive energy transitions to reach net-zero by 2050 could reduce cropland availability by 31%, potentially undermining the agricultural sector which employs 60% of the continent's workforce. Financially, the brief highlights a massive gap, with climate finance requirements for Africa projected at $2.7 trillion by 2030, nearly equaling the continental GDP.

The statement calls for COP30 in Belem to establish an action plan for a just transition to 100% renewable energy, specifically targeting the reform of multilateral development banks (MDBs). It argues that current MDB models prioritise private profit and increase debt in the Global South, citing examples of harmful green hydrogen and hydropower projects. The authors propose three shifts: an immediate end to fossil fuel and 'false solution' finance, the provision of grants instead of debt-creating instruments, and a move toward small-scale, community-owned renewable energy projects to ensure energy sovereignty.

The report analyzes climate adaptation projects in Afghanistan, the DRC, Haiti, the Horn of Africa, Mexico, Myanmar, and Papua New Guinea. It finds that while insecurity often leads to risk-averse site selection and implementation delays, projects that integrate conflict-climate nexus analysis and prioritize bottom-up, community-led approaches can mitigate conflict and foster peace. The authors recommend flexible implementation, holistic monitoring and evaluation, and the explicit inclusion of conflict mitigation in project objectives to avoid maladaptation and 'backdraft'.

Africa faces the challenge of decarbonizing industries while expanding industrial capacity, despite its low contribution to global emissions. The continent possesses significant assets for the clean energy transition, including cobalt reserves in the Democratic Republic of Congo, solar potential, and coastal deserts suitable for green hydrogen. To move beyond simple resource extraction, the document emphasizes the need for innovation ecosystems connecting startups, research hubs, and policymakers. It highlights existing technological momentum in Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, and Morocco, suggesting that a targeted policy mix can enable entrepreneurs to develop green technologies for both local and global markets.

The report analyzes the competition between China and Western powers (US and EU) for Africa's critical minerals, specifically focusing on the Lobito and TAZARA corridors. It argues that African nations can avoid 'extractivism' by coordinating regional processing hubs and leveraging the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to build a domestic e-mobility value chain.

The report identifies a conservative USD 4.4 trillion pipeline of creditworthy sustainable bonds from 12 climate-leader countries through 2035. It argues that global megatrends—such as electrification, urbanisation, and the rise of AI—will further accelerate this pipeline beyond current projections. The document also outlines policy levers, including taxonomies and monetary policy, that governments can use to channel capital into mitigation and resilience projects.

The report argues that while tracking the quantity of climate finance is established, tracking its quality remains nascent. It proposes a three-level conceptual framework—project, market, and system—to move beyond one-off project outputs toward sustained transformational change. At the project level, it emphasizes core indicators like tCO2e for mitigation and beneficiaries reached for adaptation. At the market level, it focuses on creation, scalability, and inclusiveness, highlighting private finance catalyzation and job creation. At the system level, it identifies three catalytic pathways (singular, centralized, and decentralized) to track structural shifts in paradigms, policies, and institutional arrangements. The report concludes by identifying nine key indicators as a starting point for a common reporting approach across public climate finance actors.

The report examines climate adaptation in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, the Horn of Africa, Mexico, Myanmar, and Papua New Guinea. It finds that while instability often leads to risk-averse site selection and implementation delays, projects that integrate conflict-sensitivity and community-led approaches can mitigate these challenges and potentially contribute to peacebuilding. The analysis highlights the necessity of flexible implementation, the use of fragility assessments, and the importance of addressing root causes of vulnerability to avoid maladaptation and 'backdraft'—unforeseen negative spillover effects.

Global Energy Monitor reports that 216 GW of proposed green hydrogen projects in 11 African countries are primarily designed for export to Europe, despite a lack of established markets, funding, and infrastructure. The analysis highlights a disconnect between these massive, often hypothetical projects and the urgent need for domestic electrification, noting that 61% of prospective utility-scale wind and solar projects in Africa are earmarked for hydrogen. While small-scale distributed solar and wind projects have successfully improved energy access, the large-scale hydrogen push risks creating stranded assets and depleting local water resources without providing significant local economic value.

The G20 is assessed as an effective tool for short-term macroeconomic crisis response but a failure in delivering structural economic justice. While it mobilised trillions during the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic, it has consistently prioritised creditor interests and market stability over the needs of the Global South. The report highlights systemic failures in international financial architecture reform, sovereign debt restructuring, and climate finance, where funding remains insufficient and skewed toward profitable mitigation. However, recent Global South presidencies (Indonesia, India, Brazil, and South Africa) have successfully introduced new priorities, such as taxing the super-rich and the care economy. The authors recommend that the G20 redefine 'crisis' to include social and ecological threats and adopt justice-based metrics for success.

The document argues that online misogyny is a global challenge that fuels gender-based violence (GBV) and technology-facilitated gender-based violence (TFGBV) while simultaneously harming boys and young men by promoting hypermasculinity and emotional restriction. It identifies algorithmic amplification, influencer economies, and regulatory gaps as key drivers. The brief recommends a coordinated strategy combining 'Safety by Design' in platform architecture, gender-transformative education, community-based interventions in sports and faith spaces, and sustainable funding for long-term behavioural change.

The report analyzes maritime security in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO), emphasizing that threats like climate change, illegal fishing, and piracy are interconnected. It highlights the risks of increasing militarisation by global powers and the environmental dangers of rerouting shipping around the Cape of Good Hope due to Red Sea instability.

The report examines Sudan's history of failed transitional justice efforts and proposes a multi-pillar framework—including mental health support, truth-finding, and criminal accountability—to achieve sustainable peace. It emphasizes that while a cessation of hostilities is ideal for full implementation, certain elements like psychosocial support should begin immediately. The authors advocate for a victim-centered, Sudanese-led process that integrates traditional justice mechanisms and maintains a transnational scope to address harms involving South Sudan and the diaspora.

The study argues that climate disinformation in the Global South is not a digital accident but a reactivation of 'colonial logics of mediated authority.' By analyzing 200 social media posts and socio-cultural indices across eleven former British colonies in Africa, the author develops a 'Model of Indirect Epistemic Domination.' This model posits that disinformation achieves legitimacy by using trusted intermediaries—such as religious leaders and social media influencers—to frame climate falsehoods as indigenous truths. Statistical analysis reveals that religiosity and media access are the strongest predictors of susceptibility to climate disinformation, while formal education and trust in science do not provide significant protection.

The report finds that while Kenya has successfully increased its renewable electricity generation to 87% by 2022, the transition lacks policy coherence regarding affordability and equity. High electricity tariffs, driven by infrastructure investments and a distribution monopoly, hinder industrial competitiveness and limit energy access for vulnerable groups. The analysis identifies a significant trade-off between coal-based industrialization goals and climate mitigation targets, though the latter has gained dominance due to international financial pressure. Institutional barriers, including corruption and limited resources for social equity, further impede a just transition.