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The COVID-19 pandemic increased food insecurity across Africa, with upper-middle income countries like South Africa experiencing higher vulnerability due to their reliance on formal employment and global supply chains. While agricultural production grew in 2020, protectionist measures such as export bans in Malawi hindered the redistribution of food. The document highlights the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) as a critical mechanism to reduce dependence on global imports, lower trade barriers, and improve food resilience through increased intra-continental trade and the legalisation of informal cross-border trade.

The statement criticizes the imposition of travel bans on Southern African countries, asserting that such measures are ineffective at stopping mutations and cause significant economic damage. It highlights the disparity in vaccination rates between Africa and advanced economies, calling for the decentralization of vaccine manufacturing, the implementation of a WTO intellectual property rights waiver, and a shift from unilateralism to collective global action to ensure equitable vaccine distribution.

The WHO-Civil Society Working Group to Advance Action on Climate and Health reports on its 2021 efforts to mobilize the health sector for climate action. Key achievements include conducting regional consultations across six WHO regions involving over 135 countries, launching the 'Healthy Climate Prescription' open letter signed by organizations representing 46 million health workers, and publishing a report on climate and health research gaps. The group also supported the Global Climate and Health Conference and the WHO Health Pavilion at COP26 to increase the visibility of health in climate negotiations.

The document analyzes the resurgent roles of China and Russia in Africa since 2000. China's influence is primarily economic, driven by the Belt and Road Initiative and long-term infrastructure investments, while Russia's approach is more opportunistic, focusing on mining, arms exports, and the deployment of private military contractors in fragile states. While the two powers coordinate on challenging Western norms and supporting non-interference in the UN Security Council, they maintain a 'competitive partnership' characterized by limited strategic coordination in security and economics, and occasional competition for commercial contracts in countries like Zimbabwe.

The report analyzes the 2019 HRC voting records of 13 African member states, finding a significant lack of unity within the African Group. While South Africa, Rwanda, and Burkina Faso emerged as the strongest supporters of international human rights, Egypt, Eritrea, and Cameroon were the most opposed. The analysis highlights a recurring contradiction where many African states strongly support resolutions condemning Israel while opposing or abstaining from resolutions targeting other rights-abusing regimes. Overall, the report suggests a general unwillingness among African states to defend international human rights, with a noted decline in support since 2017.

The document provides a multi-expert critique of COP26, noting that while the summit completed the Paris Agreement rule book and secured net zero commitments for 90% of the world, it failed to secure a 'grand bargain' for coal with India or a loss and damage fund. It highlights the $8.5 billion just transition deal for South Africa as a potential model but warns that developed nations have failed to meet the $100 billion annual finance goal. Experts argue that the summit ignored the critical role of oceans in carbon absorption and failed to address the resource-intensive economic systems driving global warming.

The document details the priorities for the second week of COP26, highlighting the critical role of nature-based solutions, the need for a functional Enhanced Transparency Framework, and the funding gap for adaptation and loss and damage. It emphasizes the necessity of integrating science and gender equity into climate action, the decarbonization of the built environment and transport sectors, and the urgent need for tangible financial commitments and representation for Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and Indigenous peoples.

The report finds that European retailers are failing to perform adequate due diligence on their farmed fish supply chains, with 76% landing in a 'red zone' of poor performance. No surveyed retailer has a clear target to eliminate wild-caught fish in feed, and none have policies to blacklist farms with high mortality rates. While some UK retailers show progress in transparency through the Ocean Disclosure Project, overall industry standards for fish welfare and labelling remain inadequate, often relying on insufficient third-party certifications.

The report examines the challenges in operationalizing the AU Peace Fund, specifically disagreements over contribution scales among member states. It warns against the increasing use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) like the Wagner Group in Africa, citing human rights risks. Additionally, it advocates for a revamp of the AU's PCRD approach to better address post-authoritarian transitions and the role of women in peacebuilding, using The Gambia as a model for small, expert-led deployments.

The global pipeline of proposed coal power plants has decreased by 76% since 2015. As of July 2021, 44 economies have formally committed to no new coal, while another 40 are positioned to do so because they have no projects in their pre-construction pipeline. However, 37 economies still consider new coal, with China, India, Viet Nam, Indonesia, Turkey, and Bangladesh accounting for 82% of the remaining global pipeline. The report provides detailed profiles of these economies, highlighting the role of Chinese financing and the impact of local opposition and environmental concerns in halting projects.

The document investigates whether Russia exerts significant influence over African states in the UN Security Council (UNSC) by analyzing voting patterns between 2014 and 2020. It argues that Russia's influence over the A3 is often exaggerated, as statistical evidence shows that African member states remain more aligned with the P3 (US, UK, and France) and are largely independent of Russian vetoes and abstentions. While the A3 have increasingly sought to present unified positions on African peace and security issues, their voting behavior on non-African files shows a declining coincidence with Russian positions over time.

The document investigates whether Russia exerts significant influence over African states in the UN Security Council (UNSC) by analyzing voting patterns between 2014 and 2020. It argues that Russia's influence over the A3 is often exaggerated, as statistical evidence shows little coordination and a trend of increasing divergence. While the A3 are increasingly presenting unified positions on African issues, their voting behavior remains more aligned with the P3 (US, UK, and France) than with Russia. The brief concludes that Russia's role as a 'loud dissenter' has not translated into a strategic alliance with the African grouping.

The paper assesses the synergy between the AfCFTA and the BRI, arguing that targeted, structured cooperation—such as sector-specific preferential trade agreements and the strategic use of Special Economic Zones (SEZs)—is more beneficial for Africa than a status-quo ad hoc approach or a full continent-wide Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It highlights the potential for growth in manufacturing and agriculture while warning against the risks of increased Chinese imports and the complexities of rules of origin.

The document outlines a framework for South African climate diplomacy, emphasizing the need to move beyond the UNFCCC to engage with the G7, G20, WTO, and IMF. It argues that the current global climate finance architecture is unfit for the needs of emerging economies, particularly regarding coal phase-outs and adaptation. The authors recommend a whole-of-government approach to secure 'package deals' that link higher emission reduction targets to concrete financial support, debt relief, and intellectual property waivers for green technology.

The report examines the governance of nuclear energy in Africa, focusing on the Treaty of Pelindaba and its implementation body, AFCONE, as well as the FNRBA and AFRA. It notes that while South Africa is the only country currently operating a nuclear power reactor, 16 other nations are exploring nuclear options for energy security and climate mitigation. The document highlights the importance of the IAEA's 'Milestones Approach' for infrastructure development and identifies critical challenges facing continental institutions, including limited funding, human resource shortages, and inconsistent member state cooperation. It recommends that all 55 African Union members ratify the Pelindaba Treaty and that AFCONE be further empowered with a predictable budget and increased staffing.

The document examines the opportunities and barriers to moving UNFCCC climate negotiations online. While digital tools could disrupt outdated and opaque practices, the transition is hindered by a lack of trust among Parties and concerns that virtual formats might exacerbate structural inequities or reduce transparency for media and NGOs. The author recommends the creation of a taskforce to design future session formats and calls for leadership from the UN Secretary-General and the UNFCCC Secretariat to modernize multilateral diplomacy.

The document reviews digital policies across Africa, finding that while most countries have strategies focusing on infrastructure, e-government, and cybersecurity, there is a lack of continental harmonization. It highlights the significant role of external actors, noting that China provides much of the physical infrastructure (e.g., 70% of 4G base stations via Huawei) while the EU exerts regulatory influence through development assistance and agreements like the EU-ACP, which incorporates GDPR standards. The authors argue for an Africa-led, harmonized digital strategy to avoid fragmented standards and better leverage the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

The Institute for Economic Justice (IEJ) critiques the South African National Treasury's approach to debt reduction through expenditure cuts, asserting that such austerity is economically flawed and violates constitutional and international human rights obligations. The report highlights the negative impacts of budget cuts on education and healthcare, noting that the 2021 Budget's non-interest spending is projected to contract at an annual real average rate of 5.2 per cent. To counter this, the IEJ suggests utilizing additional fiscal space from SARS revenue windfalls and IMF funding, implementing progressive taxes such as a wealth tax and social security tax, and launching a GDP-linked stimulus package. The document advocates for a Universal Basic Income Guarantee (UBIG) and the conduct of gendered human rights impact assessments to guide fiscal policy.

The project aims to reduce coastal flooding risks in Egypt's North Coast and Nile Delta through the installation of 69 km of sand dune dikes and the development of an integrated coastal zone management plan. Co-financed by the Green Climate Fund (USD 31.4 million) and the Egyptian Ministry of Water Resources and Irrigation (USD 73.8 million), the initiative targets direct benefits for 768,164 people. Implementation involves multiple Egyptian ministries and the UNDP as the Accredited Entity, while the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency serves as the National Designated Authority.

The Abu Rawash Wastewater Treatment Plant project, costing USD 390 million, is funded through a combination of Egyptian government public budget (USD 237 million) and concessional debt from development finance institutions (USD 150 million from AfDB and AGTF). The project aims to enhance adaptive capacity and water supply through infrastructure expansion and institutional support. The document highlights that accessing such concessional finance requires robust climate data, strong sovereign credit ratings, and a supportive policy environment, noting that Egypt is one of six African countries receiving the majority of DFI water adaptation finance.