Walking with the Bear? Russia and the A3 in the UN Security Council
Summary
This policy brief analyzes the relationship between Russia and the three elected African member states (A3) in the UN Security Council (UNSC) from 2014 to 2020. Using statistical voting data, the authors argue that Russia's influence over the A3 is often exaggerated, as African states remain more aligned with the P3 (US, UK, and France) and act largely independently of Russian vetoes and abstentions.
Key insights
- Statistical analysis of UNSC voting patterns from 2014 to 2020 provides little evidence of significant alignment or strategic coordination between Russia and the A3. The authors conclude that claims of A3 members becoming more aligned with Russian interests do not hold true for the African grouping as a collective.
- African member states on the UNSC exhibit a higher tendency to align their 'in favour' votes with the P3 (US, UK, and France) than with Russia or China. The coincidence of A3 'in favour' votes with Russia's declined from 91% in 2014 to 72% in 2020, while alignment with P3 members remained between 91% and 93% in 2020.
- The A3 generally avoid voting against resolutions, preferring to abstain on contentious issues. Between 2014 and 2020, A3 members cast only three votes 'against' resolutions: Senegal in 2016, Côte d'Ivoire in 2018, and South Africa in 2019.
- Russia frequently adopts the role of the 'loud dissenter' in the UNSC, often opposing the liberal worldview of the P3. This behavior is characterized by a high rate of abstentions and vetoes; between 2014 and 2020, Russia cast 45 abstentions and 20 vetoes, more than any other member.
- African issues dominate the UNSC agenda numerically, but are often treated as less strategic than crises in the Middle East or Eastern Europe. In 2020, 47% of UNSC meetings and 76% of Chapter VII resolutions concerned African peace and security issues.
- The A3 have increasingly sought to move from being subjects to agents in the UNSC by presenting unified positions, particularly when informed by African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council decisions. In 2019, the A3 delivered 16 joint statements.
Cite the original document
- APA
- Singh, P., & de Carvalho, G. (2021). Walking with the Bear? Russia and the A3 in the UN Security Council. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Policy-Insights-118-singh-de-carvalho.pdf
- Chicago
- Singh, Priyal, and Gustavo de Carvalho. Walking with the Bear? Russia and the A3 in the UN Security Council. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2021. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Policy-Insights-118-singh-de-carvalho.pdf.
- Wikipedia
- {{cite report |last1=Singh |first1=Priyal |last2=de Carvalho |first2=Gustavo |title=Walking with the Bear? Russia and the A3 in the UN Security Council |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=October 2021 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Policy-Insights-118-singh-de-carvalho.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
- BibTeX
- @techreport{singh2021walking, author = {Singh, Priyal and de Carvalho, Gustavo}, title = {{Walking with the Bear? Russia and the A3 in the UN Security Council}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2021}, month = oct, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2021/10/Policy-Insights-118-singh-de-carvalho.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }
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