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In 2024, global coal capacity saw a net increase of 18.8GW, driven by record construction in China (94GW) and high proposals in India (38GW), despite the lowest new capacity additions in 20 years (44GW). While the EU27 quadrupled its closures and the UK fully phased out coal, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend the life of coal plants, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with the Paris Agreement.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years (44 GW), though global capacity still saw a net increase of 18.8 GW. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, China and India saw record construction starts and proposals, respectively. Outside these two nations, development capacity has fallen for ten consecutive years. In Latin America, new proposals are nearly zero, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep existing plants operational despite the competitiveness of renewables.

In 2024, global coal power reached a 20-year low in new capacity additions (44 GW), though the total global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in decommissioned capacity and the UK closed its last coal plant, China saw record construction starts (94 GW) and India proposed record new capacity (38 GW). Russia has emerged as a leading developer of new coal projects, ranking fifth globally for development capacity, with plans focused on Siberia and the Far East to support energy demand and the domestic coal industry.

In 2024, global coal-fired power capacity additions reached their lowest level in 20 years at 44 GW, though net capacity still increased by 18.8 GW due to continued growth in China and India. While the EU saw a fourfold increase in retired capacity and the UK became the sixth country to fully exit coal since the Paris Agreement, China and India saw record-high numbers of new plant starts and proposals. In OECD countries, planned coal plants have dropped from 142 in 2015 to five today, with Turkey and Australia remaining among the few with active projects. Turkey specifically is noted as the only OECD country actively increasing coal-based electricity production, despite a 2053 net-zero target and the recent approval of an expansion at the Afşin-Elbistan complex.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years, though a net increase in the global fleet occurred due to record construction starts in China and new proposals in India. While the EU27 saw coal retirements quadruple and the UK eliminated coal power entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to seek new plants. In Latin America, proposals are declining, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep coal plants operational.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements (25.2 GW). While the UK became the sixth country to phase out coal entirely and EU27 retirements grew fourfold, China and India dominated new developments, accounting for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). In the OECD, proposals dropped to five, but annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to align with 1.5C pathways. Other trends include a surge in captive coal plants in Indonesia, the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea, and continued coal pursuit in Russia, Mongolia, and Central Asia.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements. While OECD countries and the EU are accelerating phaseouts—with the UK becoming the sixth country to eliminate coal entirely—China and India continue to drive global expansion. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). Outside these two nations, coal development has declined for ten consecutive years. However, the report notes that current retirement rates in OECD countries must more than triple to meet 1.5°C warming targets.

The document analyzes sovereign debt in the Global South as a tool of neocolonial control that perpetuates structural dependencies in food, energy, and manufacturing. It critiques existing G20 restructuring mechanisms for treating debt as a liquidity issue rather than a structural one. Drawing on the failure of the 1980s Cartagena Initiative, the authors advocate for a Global South Debtors’ Coalition to leverage collective bargaining power. This coalition would pursue 'The Bargain of the Century,' proposing that Global South nations use their strategic mineral wealth and market size to secure technology transfers from major powers like China, the US, and the EU. The paper specifically urges South Africa to use its G20 Presidency to advance this framework, linking debt justice to food sovereignty, renewable energy independence, and regional industrial policies.

The report argues that TotalEnergies' investment and production strategies prioritize oil and gas expansion and shareholder returns over climate solutions, leading to a significant overshoot of the IEA's Net Zero Emissions by 2050 Scenario.

The report assesses Colombia's solar and wind energy landscape, noting a rise in solar capacity to 9% of the electrical matrix by 2024 but significant challenges for wind energy. It details the government's goal of 20,000 energy communities by 2026 and highlights a 70% drop in renewable investment between 2022 and 2023. The document outlines the legal incentives, financing mechanisms, and the socio-environmental challenges related to equity and community benefits in the energy transition.

The paper addresses the lack of clarity regarding who is responsible for managing climate risks that propagate across borders. It introduces a framework to identify stakeholders, assets, and objectives at risk, applying it to the supply chain of Brazilian non-GMO soy protein concentrate imported for the Norwegian aquaculture industry. The analysis demonstrates that while national-level risk ownership may be clear, transboundary responsibility—such as Norway's role in supporting adaptation in Brazil—remains ambiguous.

The document examines the interdependence of climate and biodiversity, arguing that current international policy regimes operate in silos. It identifies risks where climate mitigation (such as bioenergy monocultures or transition mineral mining) harms biodiversity, and opportunities where ecosystem restoration provides mutual benefits. The authors recommend establishing a formal work programme or technical expert group under the UNFCCC to coordinate with the CBD, improving the science-policy interface between the IPCC and IPBES, and addressing the double-counting of synergistic finance reported by OECD DAC members.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in two decades at 44 GW, though China and India continued significant expansions. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in plant closures and the UK shut its last coal plant, Indonesia faces a contradictory trend: overall proposed capacity is down 90% since 2015, but 'captive' coal plants for industrial use are surging. Indonesia's transition is further complicated by conflicting government statements on a 2040 phase-out, the withdrawal of the US from the JETP leadership, and record coal production reaching 831 million tons in 2024.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global coal fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements. The report highlights a stark divergence: while the UK became coal-free and EU27 retirements quadrupled, China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW) and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). Together, China and India accounted for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity in 2024. In the OECD, proposals have plummeted from 142 in 2015 to five today, though annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to meet 1.5°C pathways. The report also notes the rise of 'captive' coal plants in Indonesia and the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea as strategies to prolong coal use.

The report critiques the current digital ecosystem as a form of 'data colonialism' driven by profit-seeking corporations from the Global North. It traces the history of the struggle for communication control from the 1970s NWICO debates to the current era of AI and Big Tech. The authors propose a 'Communication Rights' (CRs) framework that moves beyond simple freedom of expression to include collective rights, public ownership of digital utilities, and the protection of data sovereignty to ensure a more equitable and diverse digital future.

The study identifies a significant gap between the theoretical potential of individual behavior shifts to reduce emissions and the actual results achieved through behavioral interventions. While comprehensive behavioral changes could theoretically offset the average global citizen's per capita emissions, real-world interventions typically achieve only 10% of that potential. The authors identify four 'Priority Shifts'—reducing gas-powered vehicle use, decreasing air travel, lowering residential fossil fuel consumption through structural changes, and reducing animal product consumption—as the most impactful actions. Conversely, 'Supplementary Shifts' like composting have minimal impact. The research highlights a geographic imbalance, with a surplus of studies in the US and EU and a deficit in high-emitting nations like China, India, Brazil, and Indonesia. The most effective behavioral tools for driving change are choice architecture and commitment devices, while information-based approaches are the least effective.

The report analyzes the first 149 companies to adopt SBTi FLAG targets, finding that while uptake is rapid—particularly in Europe and the food and beverage sector—mitigation plans are uneven. Most companies focus on agricultural emissions reduction and food waste, but few engage in forest management or biochar. The report highlights the role of FLAG targets in accelerating no-deforestation commitments and identifies the need for more robust transition plans as target deadlines approach.

Amazon deforestation reduces rainfall and river flow, leading to significant energy and revenue losses for Brazil's largest hydroelectric plants. Together, Itaipu and Belo Monte lose an estimated 3,780 GWh of generation potential annually, equating to approximately US$ 200 million in lost revenue. The report emphasizes the need to integrate forest conservation and restoration policies with energy security strategies to protect the national electricity mix.

The document analyzes Brazil's public incentives for agricultural methane abatement, noting that while the country is the fifth largest methane emitter globally and agriculture is its primary source, existing policies often lack specific, targeted strategies for methane reduction. It examines instruments like the Ecological Transformation Plan, the Brazilian Sustainable Taxonomy, and the Eco Invest programme, while proposing the adoption of the Climate Bonds Agricultural Criteria to better direct capital toward low-carbon farming.

The author contends that prioritizing military spending over green and social investments risks exacerbating Europe's vulnerabilities to climate change and social fragmentation. The text calls for a revision of EU fiscal rules to allow borrowing for high-multiplier public investments and suggests new revenue streams, such as taxes on centimillionaires, to fund these needs.