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The document outlines a projected economic transition for Africa by 2043, moving from raw commodity exports to a more balanced profile of manufactured goods and services. It emphasizes the role of urbanisation as a catalyst for growth, provided it is supported by resilient infrastructure. The 'Combined scenario' predicts a strategic rebalancing where manufacturing gains GDP share and agriculture becomes more commercialised and productive, despite a declining share of total GDP. Key enablers include ICT, renewable energy investment, and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

The report examines the challenges and opportunities for African energy exporters facing the EU Methane Regulation, which imposes extraterritorial monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) standards on imports. While Africa accounts for nearly 13% of global methane emissions, the continent faces significant financing gaps and technical barriers to compliance. The authors argue that while the regulation threatens export revenues, it provides a strategic opportunity to adopt low-cost abatement technologies. Key recommendations include mobilising innovative financing like transition bonds, establishing local independent verification capacity, and harmonising MRV standards to maintain market access to the EU.

The report examines how Africa is trapped in a cycle of debt and fossil fuel dependency, which disproportionately harms women and girls. It argues that the global financial architecture forces African nations into austerity and resource extraction, leading to 'petro-masculinity' and systemic gender-based violence. The authors advocate for a 'feminist decolonial green economy' and a Fossil Fuel Treaty to enable a just transition through debt cancellation and redistributive finance.

Russia is attempting to leverage historical liberation-era ties and anti-Western rhetoric to maintain influence in Southern Africa, but faces significant constraints. While it maintains security cooperation and diplomatic links with several SADC members, its economic footprint remains modest, accounting for barely 1% of the region's external trade in 2024. The document highlights a gap between Moscow's symbolic gestures—such as debt forgiveness and limited grain shipments—and tangible developmental results, noting that sanctions and economic weakness hinder its ability to compete with China, the EU, and the US.

The document argues that the multilateral system, particularly the UN Security Council, is experiencing a 'rupture' characterized by paralysis and legitimacy deficits. While the AU seeks immediate structural changes—including permanent seats and veto power—the EU generally favors gradual procedural reforms. Despite these differences, the briefing identifies key areas of convergence: improving UNSC working methods, strengthening EU-AU-UN cooperation, and implementing UN Resolution 2719 to provide predictable financing for AU-led peace operations. It suggests that both continents must move beyond rhetorical alignment toward tangible delivery to maintain influence in a fragmented geopolitical order, especially given the US's increasing disengagement from international organizations.

The briefing identifies critical areas of focus for the 2026 Mining Indaba, specifically the impact of US, EU, and Chinese geopolitics on critical minerals, the struggle to establish domestic mineral value chains in Africa, the role of transport infrastructure like the Lobito Corridor, the viability of regional battery value chains between the DRC and Zambia, and the potential for engagement between the main event and the civil society-led Alternative Mining Indaba.

The report examines how the UAE and Saudi Arabia are emerging as primary financiers of clean energy in Africa, noting a shift toward multi-billion dollar renewable and hydrogen projects. While GCC investments are substantial, they are currently concentrated in a few low-risk markets like Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa. The authors argue that to maximize impact, the GCC should pivot toward funding transmission infrastructure, geothermal energy, methane abatement, and critical mineral refining across a broader range of African nations.

Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, Russia has restructured its African security engagements, moving from the high-profile combat deployments of the Wagner Group to a more centralised model controlled by the Kremlin and the GRU. This new approach prioritises 'regime survival' services, including elite protection, training, and intelligence sharing, while expanding covert information warfare through entities like Russia House and the African Initiative. Despite these efforts, Russia's footprint is constrained by the resource demands of its war in Ukraine and risks of 'blowback' from African governments due to human rights abuses and deceptive recruitment schemes like 'Alabuga Start'.

The ARE Energy Access Investment Forum 2026 brought together 1,400 participants from 87 countries to discuss renewable electrification. Key outcomes included the launch of the USD 25m ASCENT Project Preparation Facility by COMESA and a GDP 14m contribution from the UK's FCDO to the Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa in the DRC. The forum highlighted systemic gaps in capital allocation for small African-led firms and the need to shift from supply-led to demand-led skills training for the green transition.

In 2025, solar and wind power expanded fast enough to outpace global electricity demand growth for the first time over a sustained period. Solar growth accelerated in Africa and Central Europe, while BRICS nations now generate over half of global solar power. The rise of 'electrotech'—led by China—and falling battery costs are enabling fossil-free baseload power and supporting the energy demands of AI and data centres.

The document argues that a 'window of opportunity' has opened for Africa due to the convergence of China's domestic push for renewable energy leadership and US-China geopolitical tensions. While the US has retreated from climate leadership and scaled back African assistance, China is pivoting toward 'small is beautiful' project financing and green industrialization as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and FOCAC commitments. To maximize these opportunities, the brief recommends that African nations implement rigorous strategic planning, professionalize project pipelines, adopt innovative mixed-financing models to reduce sovereign debt, and pursue regional energy integration through frameworks like the Southern African Power Pool.

The Lobito Corridor, anchored by the Benguela Railway, aims to move beyond mineral exports to foster value addition in mining, battery production, and agro-processing. However, a stark duality exists between the modern logistics provided by the Lobito Atlantic Railway (LAR) consortium for large-scale exports and the dilapidated state of the Caminho de Ferro de Benguela (CFB) passenger rail, which hinders small and medium enterprises (SMEs). While some value-adding ventures like Pensana Plc and Flying Swans exist, they are heavily dependent on state facilitation, suggesting that private sector dynamism alone is insufficient to achieve industrial diversification.

The study finds a substantial disconnect between African climate commitments (NDCs) and national development blueprints (NDPs), with NDCs focusing on climate-centric sectors like energy and forestry while NDPs prioritize economic growth, finance, and the private sector. This 'parallel policy framework' is driven by institutional fragmentation, where NDCs are often externally funded and led by environment ministries, whereas NDPs are domestically anchored and led by economic planning ministries. The authors recommend a 'whole-of-government' approach to embed climate goals into national budgets and development strategies to maximize socio-economic co-benefits.

The report finds that SADC's maritime security governance is fragmented, with a significant disconnect between blue-economy rhetoric and actual security planning. While the 2022 Integrated Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS) represents a normative advance over the 2011 strategy, its implementation remains uneven and under-resourced. Regional coordination is primarily driven by external funding and bilateral initiatives, such as South Africa's Operation Copper, rather than formal SADC mechanisms. The report highlights a structural paradox where SADC's most ocean-dependent members—the island states—are the least embedded in its collective security frameworks, preferring partnerships with the Indian Ocean Commission and external powers like India, France, and the EU.

The document analyzes the convergence of African and European interests in reforming a strained multilateral system, specifically focusing on the upcoming AU-EU summit in Luanda. It highlights the shared need for a more representative global order and the urgent need to operationalize UN Security Council Resolution 2719 to provide predictable funding for AU peace operations.

The report analyzes the competition between China and Western powers (US and EU) for Africa's critical minerals, specifically focusing on the Lobito and TAZARA corridors. It argues that African nations can avoid 'extractivism' by coordinating regional processing hubs and leveraging the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) to build a domestic e-mobility value chain.

The report examines the application of new technologies to address explosive hazards in Africa, including landmines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and ammunition storage area (ASA) explosions. It evaluates remote sensing tools like visible light cameras, thermal imaging, LiDAR, and SAR, alongside AI-powered deep learning for data processing. The document also explores alternative disposal methods such as thermite tools, binary liquid explosives, and explosive harvesting systems. It concludes by assessing technology readiness levels (TRLs) and providing recommendations for African states, the African Union, and donors to modernize HMA operations despite shrinking funding.

The document analyzes Nigeria's climate policy through four 'policy moments', highlighting a persistent struggle with institutional overlap and fragmented governance. It examines how internal competition between bodies like the National Council on Climate Change (NCCC) and the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy on Climate (OSPEC) dilutes Nigeria's international bargaining power. The paper also discusses the impact of global energy market shifts, the divestment of onshore assets by International Oil Companies (IOCs), and the challenges of removing fuel subsidies. It concludes that Nigeria must move away from transplanting foreign institutional models and instead develop a domestically driven, streamlined framework that integrates the petroleum sector into its climate goals.

Nigeria's climate agenda is hampered by overlapping institutions and a lack of elite consensus, which diminishes its bargaining power internationally. While the Tinubu administration has attempted to centralize governance through the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy on Climate (OSPEC) and the Presidential Climate Action Committee (PCAC), these moves risk further fragmentation by sidelining statutory bodies like the National Council on Climate Change (NCCC). Externally, Nigeria faces declining oil exports to China and India and increased competition from the US in European markets, intensifying the need for a successful energy transition. The report highlights a trend of International Oil Companies (IOCs) divesting from onshore assets due to regulatory instability, while noting that agile local firms are better positioned to navigate domestic complexities.

The document examines Namibia's transition toward becoming an oil exporter, highlighting the gap between government growth targets and industry realities. While significant offshore discoveries have been made, the report warns that relying on fossil fuels may divert resources from sustainable development and renewable energy, especially as global demand declines and technical challenges persist.