Back to the Shadows: Russia African Security Engagements Since Prigozhin

Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, Russia has restructured its African security engagements, moving from the high-profile combat deployments of the Wagner Group to a more centralised model controlled by the Kremlin and the GRU. This new approach prioritises 'regime survival' services, including elite protection, training, and intelligence sharing, while expanding covert information warfare through entities like Russia House and the African Initiative. Despite these efforts, Russia's footprint is constrained by the resource demands of its war in Ukraine and risks of 'blowback' from African governments due to human rights abuses and deceptive recruitment schemes like 'Alabuga Start'.

• Following the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin, Russia's security operations in Africa have transitioned from an oligarch-led model to one of increased centralisation under the Presidential Administration, with activities now underwritten by Kremlin funds.
• Russia has expanded its information warfare in Africa through a network of state-controlled media and cultural centres, including the proliferation of Russia House branches, which are intended to reach 22 countries and provide cover for intelligence officers.
• Russian military engagements have shifted from large-scale combat roles to a more risk-averse model focused on training, intelligence, and the protection of elites and assets, as seen in Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, and Niger.
• Russia's security offer now emphasizes 'regime survival' services, which include VIP protection, propaganda support, and the provision of surveillance technology such as SORM, which has been promoted to clients in Comoros, Kenya, and Niger.
• The 'Alabuga Start' programme, which recruits young African women under the guise of education to manufacture kamikaze drones for the war in Ukraine, has caused reputational damage and triggered investigations in South Africa, Malawi, Botswana, and Zimbabwe.
• Russia's ability to sustain its African presence is limited by the material and personnel demands of the war in Ukraine, leading to a reduction in the target personnel for Africa Corps from 40,000 to 20,000.

APA

KLYSZCZ, I. U. (2026). Back to the Shadows: Russia African Security Engagements Since Prigozhin. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/SAIIA_OP_363_BacktotheShadows-1.pdf

Chicago

KLYSZCZ, IVAN U. Back to the Shadows: Russia African Security Engagements Since Prigozhin. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2026. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/SAIIA_OP_363_BacktotheShadows-1.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=KLYSZCZ |first1=IVAN U |title=Back to the Shadows: Russia African Security Engagements Since Prigozhin |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=February 2026 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/SAIIA_OP_363_BacktotheShadows-1.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{klyszcz2026back, author = {KLYSZCZ, IVAN U}, title = {{Back to the Shadows: Russia African Security Engagements Since Prigozhin}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2026}, month = feb, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/SAIIA_OP_363_BacktotheShadows-1.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }