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WRI collaborated with stakeholders in Shanxi, China, to implement a "coal-to-tourism" business model that created over 1,000 jobs for displaced coal workers and increased local household incomes by 10%-20%. The initiative led Shanxi to become the first Chinese province to formally integrate "just transition" principles into its government workplan, a model now being adopted by Shaanxi, Inner Mongolia, and Xinjiang provinces.

China is repositioning its coal fleet to provide system flexibility, with the entire existing fleet on track to be retrofitted by 2027. While technical capacity is increasing, the report argues that full flexibility is constrained by power market design and dispatch practices. It emphasizes that as coal retrofit potential plateaus, the rapid scale-up of clean flexibility, particularly battery energy storage, is essential to avoid locking in emissions beyond 2030 and to maintain grid stability as renewables become dominant.

China has rapidly expanded its flexible coal power capacity, exceeding its 2025 national target and positioning itself to meet a 2027 goal of retrofitting 500-700 GW. By the end of 2024, total flexible coal capacity exceeded 600 GW, with significant progress in provinces like Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and Xinjiang. While coal utilisation is generally declining and showing greater seasonal variability due to renewable growth and demand peaks, the document notes that the full potential of this technical flexibility is not yet reflected in system operations due to market design and institutional arrangements. The transition is supported by a capacity pricing mechanism and diversified revenue models, though flexible operation increases costs through higher maintenance, reduced fuel efficiency at low loads, and accelerated depreciation.

The report argues that while coal's share of power generation in China has reached historic lows, institutional inertia—including capacity payments, inflexible dispatch rules, and a lack of a national retirement strategy—continues to drive high levels of new coal capacity additions. It highlights a disconnect where clean energy is growing rapidly but is often offset by the continued expansion and protection of coal assets, which are not fulfilling their intended role as flexible backups for renewables.

China is advancing a 1.3 TW pipeline of utility-scale solar and wind projects, with operating capacity reaching 1.4 TW by 2025. The country has become a global leader in offshore wind, growing its capacity to 42.7 GW by March 2025. While offshore wind is being used to decarbonize coastal industries and produce green hydrogen, the sector faces challenges from the 2021 phaseout of national subsidies and competition from ongoing coal and gas developments. The report suggests adopting hybrid auction mechanisms and centralized marine spatial planning to ensure sustainable growth.

China is advancing a 1.3 TW pipeline of utility-scale solar and wind projects, with operating capacity reaching 1.4 TW by 2025. While solar and onshore wind are expanding rapidly, particularly in Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia, offshore wind has emerged as a global powerhouse, accounting for 50% of global capacity. However, the offshore sector faces challenges from the 2021 phaseout of national subsidies and competition from planned coal and gas capacity in coastal provinces. The document argues for a transition from provincial development to a coordinated national policy framework incorporating hybrid auction mechanisms and robust spatial planning.

In 2024, China approved 66.7 GW of new coal power and saw 94.5 GW begin construction, the highest level since 2015, despite adding a record 356 GW of wind and solar capacity. This 'energy addition' strategy is driven by long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) that guarantee coal generation and the influence of coal mining companies, who financed over 75% of new approvals. These factors lead to the curtailment of renewables and a shift away from using coal plants as flexible regulating capacity. The report concludes that China's coal expansion contrasts sharply with global trends, as China accounted for 93% of global coal construction starts in 2024.

China is the world's largest coal producer and importer, with a significant shift toward large-scale and mega-scale mining operations. Despite climate goals, China is developing approximately 1,280 Mtpa of new coal capacity, nearly half of the global proposed pipeline. This expansion, concentrated in provinces like Inner Mongolia and Shanxi, drives massive methane emissions, with China's operating mines alone accounting for roughly 70% of global coal mine methane emissions from similar-sized operations. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) dominate the sector, controlling 40% of production capacity and contributing nearly 40% of the nation's coal mine methane emissions.

China is leading global renewable energy deployment with 339 GW of utility-scale solar and wind power under construction, nearly double the capacity of the rest of the world combined. By the first quarter of 2024, wind and solar accounted for 37% of China's total power capacity. While the country is on track to potentially reach 1,200 GW of installed capacity by the end of 2024, significant obstacles remain, including a reliance on coal to mitigate intermittency, insufficient Ultra High Voltage (UHV) transmission lines, and rising curtailment rates in several provinces.

China is currently off track to meet its 2025 climate commitments, including targets for carbon and energy intensity and the share of non-fossil fuels. This is driven by a surge in coal power permitting and construction, with 114 GW approved and 70 GW starting construction in 2023. Despite official rhetoric that new coal plants serve a 'supporting' role for grid stability and renewable integration, the report finds this is often a 'smokescreen' for bulk power generation, leading to significant overcapacity and stranded asset risks.

China is experiencing a significant increase in coal power capacity, with 37 GW starting construction and 52 GW permitted in the first half of 2023. The report argues that most of these projects violate central government policies intended to limit coal to a supporting role for renewables, instead serving as bulk power generation. This trend, driven by energy security concerns and a desire to maximize carbon-intensive capacity before the 2030 peaking deadline, risks creating massive overcapacity and undermining China's carbon neutrality goals.

China has established global leadership in renewable energy, with utility-scale solar capacity of 228 GW and wind capacity exceeding 310 GW as of Q1 2023. The country is pursuing an ambitious target of over 1,200 GW of combined wind and solar capacity by 2030, supported by the '14th Five-Year Plan' and the development of massive 'wind-solar bases' in desert regions. While integrating these sources through ultra-high voltage (UHV) transmission and new energy storage technologies, China continues to utilize coal-fired power as a 'bottom-line' guarantee for grid stability, which may hinder the complete phase-out of fossil fuels.

China has established itself as the global leader in renewable energy, with operating large utility-scale solar capacity of 228 GW and combined wind capacity exceeding 310 GW. The country is pursuing a strategy of 'mega wind and solar bases' in its northern and northwestern deserts to meet a central government target of 1,200 GW of cumulative capacity by 2030, a goal it is likely to surpass by 2025. This expansion is driven by a combination of historical feed-in tariffs, favorable financing from state-owned banks, and strict provincial targets. However, the report notes that new renewables bases are often bundled with new coal-fired power plants to manage intermittency, potentially hindering the phase-out of fossil fuels. To address volatility, China is implementing 'source-grid-load-storage' integration, expanding new energy storage, and developing green hydrogen production.

The report analyzes the global cotton industry, highlighting the growth of sustainable cotton produced under voluntary sustainability standards (VSS) and the challenges posed by climate change and market volatility. It examines the disparity in value distribution across the textile supply chain, where smallholder farmers receive a minimal fraction of retail prices. While VSS like Better Cotton and Organic can improve yields and incomes, the report notes that many sustainable products are sold at conventional prices. It recommends improving contract transparency, internalizing external costs, and developing regional value chains, particularly in West Africa, to enhance resilience and farmer income.

The report identifies three primary categories of climate security vulnerabilities for China: direct risks to military and critical infrastructure, compounding risks to internal political stability, and external risks that amplify regional tensions in the Indo-Pacific. It notes that while China is investing heavily in hard infrastructure adaptation and disaster response, political incentives and a lack of societal trust may undermine these efforts. The document recommends that the US government improve its predictive data on China's physical risks, use forecasting tools like wargaming, and prioritize climate resilience funding for Indo-Pacific allies to counter Chinese influence.

The author contends that digital conglomerates have hijacked public spaces, replacing organic community meaning-making with a profit-driven consumerist ethic. This corporate dominance leads to the marginalization and potential physical endangerment of excluded groups, such as indigenous peoples in the Amazon and the Uyghur community in Xinjiang. The text calls for civil society and the ecumenical movement to defend the integrity of public communication spaces to uphold social justice and the common good.

The report finds that 2,277 million tonnes per annum (mtpa) of new coal mining capacity is under development globally, with 614 mtpa already under construction. This expansion is heavily concentrated in China, Australia, India, and Russia, which together represent 77% of global development. The authors argue that this trajectory is incompatible with the Paris Agreement, as coal production would need to decline 11% annually through 2030 to limit warming to 1.5°C. If all proposed capacity is realized, 2030 production would be over four times the 1.5°C-compliant pathway. The report also highlights a potential $91 billion USD in stranded assets and significant greenhouse gas emissions, estimated between 5,000 and 5,800 Mt of CO2-equivalent annually from these projects.

The report examines China's green finance landscape, identifying a significant gap between current investment levels and the estimated USD 1.4 trillion annual investment needed over the next decade to meet 2015 climate and environmental targets. While green credit and bonds saw success during the 13th Five-Year Plan, finance remains heavily dominated by the public sector, with at least 51% of total green finance coming from public sources, primarily Central State Owned Enterprises and state-owned banks. The document highlights barriers for private capital, such as high 'search costs' and limited access to financing channels, and notes that half of the USD 292 billion in energy-related investments to Belt and Road Initiative countries between 2013 and 2019 went to fossil fuels. It recommends increasing the ambition of green standards, improving project pipeline visibility for private actors, and introducing mandatory exclusion lists for high-emission sectors.

The report identifies a rapidly growing, cross-platform Salafi ecosystem targeting Gen-Z, characterized by a shift from traditional long-form sermons to gamified and memetic content. It highlights the emergence of 'Islamogram' and the 'akh-right' subculture, which adopts alt-right aesthetics and tactics to wage a digital insurgency against liberal Muslims and democratic values. While much content remains focused on general religious guidance, the research identifies significant 'toxicity'—including sectarianism and misogyny—and notes a concerning convergence between Salafi and far-right online behaviors. The authors argue that traditional classifications of Salafism (quietist, politico, jihadist) are insufficient for this hybrid environment and recommend a move away from purely securitised responses toward a more nuanced, data-driven approach that addresses both the supply of charismatic influencers and the demand driven by legitimate socio-political grievances.

China's engagement in Iraq and Syria is primarily driven by economic logic and the Belt and Road Initiative, though it increasingly faces security risks from terrorism and political instability. In Iraq, China has become a top trading partner with a heavy focus on oil, while in Syria, it provides political cover for the Assad regime and explores limited reconstruction opportunities. The document argues that China lacks a unified regional strategy, instead employing a cautious, pragmatic, and piecemeal approach that balances economic opportunism with a traditional policy of non-interference, though the need to protect assets may eventually push Beijing toward more active counter-terrorism efforts.