China’s engagement in the Middle East

China's engagement in Iraq and Syria is primarily driven by economic logic and the Belt and Road Initiative, though it increasingly faces security risks from terrorism and political instability. In Iraq, China has become a top trading partner with a heavy focus on oil, while in Syria, it provides political cover for the Assad regime and explores limited reconstruction opportunities. The document argues that China lacks a unified regional strategy, instead employing a cautious, pragmatic, and piecemeal approach that balances economic opportunism with a traditional policy of non-interference, though the need to protect assets may eventually push Beijing toward more active counter-terrorism efforts.

• China's involvement in Iraq and Syria is characterized by a lack of a cohesive strategy, consisting instead of opportunistic, fragmented efforts to secure economic gains.
• In Iraq, China has established itself as a major trading partner, with Iraq providing 10.9% of all Chinese crude oil imports as of 2020, despite the risks of oil installations being targeted by militias and corrupt officials.
• China's security engagement in Iraq includes supporting the fight against Islamist terrorism through personnel training, USD 10 million in humanitarian aid, and the sale of 12 Caihong-4B armed unmanned aerial vehicles and 100 FT-9 guided bombs in 2014.
• In Syria, China provides significant political support to the Assad regime, including using its UN Security Council veto to oppose coercive measures and acknowledging Assad's May 2021 reelection.
• China's interest in Syrian reconstruction is cautious and limited, including a 2017 pledge of USD 2 billion for industrial parks and a desire to develop ports to find Mediterranean access alternatives to the Suez Canal.
• Beijing is concerned that militant Islamist activities in the Middle East, as well as in Pakistan and Afghanistan, could destabilize its investments and spill over into the Xinjiang region.
• The necessity of safeguarding citizens and investments in volatile states may force China to increase its counter-terrorism activities, potentially challenging its long-standing policy of non-interference.

APA

Carrozza, I., & Anstorp, H. B. (2021). China’s engagement in the Middle East. Peace Research Institute Oslo. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/b4195ad9-0042-4320-a51f-7100d7289d29/Carrozza and Anstorp - Protecting Interests in Highly Volatile Countries PRIO Policy Brief 13-2021.pdf?inline=true

Chicago

Carrozza, Ilaria, and Henrik Buljo Anstorp. China’s engagement in the Middle East. Peace Research Institute Oslo, 2021. https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/b4195ad9-0042-4320-a51f-7100d7289d29/Carrozza and Anstorp - Protecting Interests in Highly Volatile Countries PRIO Policy Brief 13-2021.pdf?inline=true.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Carrozza |first1=Ilaria |last2=Anstorp |first2=Henrik Buljo |title=China’s engagement in the Middle East |publisher=Peace Research Institute Oslo |date=2021 |url=https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/b4195ad9-0042-4320-a51f-7100d7289d29/Carrozza and Anstorp - Protecting Interests in Highly Volatile Countries PRIO Policy Brief 13-2021.pdf?inline=true |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{carrozza2021chinas, author = {Carrozza, Ilaria and Anstorp, Henrik Buljo}, title = {{China’s engagement in the Middle East}}, institution = {Peace Research Institute Oslo}, year = {2021}, url = {https://cdn.cloud.prio.org/files/b4195ad9-0042-4320-a51f-7100d7289d29/Carrozza and Anstorp - Protecting Interests in Highly Volatile Countries PRIO Policy Brief 13-2021.pdf?inline=true}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }