Search Climate Insights Directory

The document explains that many critical minerals are not mined independently but are produced as co-products or by-products of 'host' metals. This 'companionality' creates inelastic supply chains where the availability of a critical metal depends on the economic viability of a different host metal. The paper highlights risks including high price volatility, under-reporting of reserves, and the loss of strategic minerals in tailings. It suggests that reprocessing waste dumps and improving regulatory frameworks for companion metals can help bridge the supply gap for the energy transition.

The document examines the concept of 'metal companionship,' where critical metals are often produced as co-products or by-products of major 'host' metals rather than as primary targets. This dependency creates significant supply inelasticity, price volatility, and risks of material loss in tailings. The author argues that understanding these associations can help identify new sources of metals, such as reprocessing mine waste, and inform national development strategies for producer countries.

The document analyzes the economic relationship between South Africa and the BRICS nations, noting that while trade has grown, it remains unbalanced and dominated by raw material exports to China. It identifies three primary 'enablers' for deepening these ties: the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), the shift in global manufacturing due to US-China rivalry (including 'friend-shoring' and 'Chexit'), and the potential expansion of BRICS membership. The author recommends that South Africa use its 2023 BRICS chairship to promote Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and business-to-business engagements to attract diversified investment into Africa.

The document argues that BRICS failed to harness the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity for collective health diplomacy, instead relying on bilateral arrangements and national interests. Despite declarations of cooperation, there were no 'all-BRICS' partnerships for vaccine development, and the bloc experienced significant discord over the transparency and approval of vaccines like Russia's Sputnik V and India's Covaxin. The author highlights a lack of a dedicated BRICS health institution and recommends the creation of a collaborative think tank, a joint research centre, and a formal pandemic intervention protocol to move from 'vaccine nationalism' toward effective science diplomacy and technology transfer.

The Europe Gas Tracker 2023 reports that the EU is pursuing a costly and uncoordinated expansion of gas infrastructure, including a potential 136% increase in LNG import capacity. This build-out, estimated to cost €53.5 billion, risks locking the bloc into fossil fuel dependency and contradicts the European Climate Law's goals of a 55% emissions reduction by 2030 and climate neutrality by 2050.

The briefing recommends that NATO avoid reactive expansions of its nuclear arsenal or mirroring Russia's suspension of the New START Treaty following Putin's announcement to operationalize tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. The authors argue that NATO's current deterrence is sufficient and that overreacting would play into Russian narratives of NATO aggression. Key recommendations include continuing transparency regarding B61-12 deployment, prioritizing the reduction of tactical nuclear weapon risks, and strengthening crisis communication channels with Russia to prevent accidental escalation.

The document analyzes how the conflict in Ukraine has accelerated Europe's shift toward renewable energy while simultaneously causing severe ecological damage within Ukraine and destabilizing global food security. It highlights the systemic interplay between war, climate change, and environmental degradation, noting that the resulting ecological losses and food system disruptions may have long-term, irreversible effects.

In 2022, Türkiye's coal generation returned to its previous peak of 113.6 TWh, driven largely by imported coal, with Russia becoming the primary supplier and the import bill reaching a record $5.3 billion. While wind and solar combined for a 15.5% share of generation, solar deployment lags behind its potential and faces grid capacity barriers. Hydropower proved critical for energy security during a ten-day gas supply disruption from Iran in January 2022, demonstrating its flexibility as a complement to variable renewables.

The document outlines eight reasons why the UK should not increase its military spending, asserting that the UK and NATO already possess significant force advantages over Russia and China. It highlights recent budget increases, such as a £24bn boost in 2020, and criticizes the arbitrary nature of NATO's 2% GDP spending target. The author argues that funds would be better allocated to the National Health Service, overseas aid, and carbon emission reductions, noting that military spending is more than seven times the budget for reducing national carbon emissions.

Earthjustice argues that limiting climate mitigation to the property level is insufficient to protect world heritage. The statement recommends that the World Heritage Committee recognize state parties' national-level obligations to limit warming to 1.5°C, acknowledge extraterritorial obligations under Article 6(3) to prevent transboundary harm, and utilize the List of World Heritage in Danger to hold states accountable for climate-related threats.

The report details a surge in EU gas infrastructure projects, including 30 fast-tracked LNG terminals and extensive pipeline networks, driven by the 'gas panic' after Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It warns that the proposed 227.2 bcm/y of additional LNG capacity would increase the EU's maximum import capacity by 136%, potentially costing €53.5 billion and emitting up to 950 million tons of CO2 annually. The document argues that these uncoordinated efforts, led by countries like Germany, Greece, and Italy, conflict with the EU's 'Fit for 55' climate goals and the European Climate Law. Additionally, it critiques the 'European Hydrogen Backbone' initiative, stating that repurposing methane pipelines for hydrogen is technically risky and economically unjustified, further entrenching fossil fuel use.

The brief examines the WTO JSI on e-commerce, noting a shift toward a less ambitious agreement focusing on 'lower-hanging fruit' like e-commerce facilitation. It highlights the rise of Digital Economy Agreements (DEAs) and increased national regulatory activity, while noting that the JSI's December 2022 consolidated text reflects a dilution of policy coverage and the removal of a dedicated market access section.

The report provides a comprehensive stocktake of the WTO Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) on E-commerce as of December 2022. It highlights a shift toward a less ambitious agreement for the 13th Ministerial Conference (MC13), focusing on resolved trade facilitation issues while deferring controversial market access topics. The document analyzes the impact of increasing national digital regulation, the rise of flexible Digital Economy Agreements (DEAs), and the revitalized WTO Work Programme's focus on the digital divide. It details the structural changes in the December 2022 consolidated text (INF/ECOM/62/Rev.3), including the removal of the 'Market Access' section and the creation of an 'Annex' for low-support proposals. While 10 articles have reached 'clean' or 'convergent' status, significant gaps remain regarding cross-border data flows and source code. The report concludes that 2023 will be a critical year for finalizing a simplified agreement.

The report provides a comprehensive stocktake of the WTO's Joint Statement Initiative (JSI) on e-commerce at the end of 2022. It highlights a shift toward a less ambitious 'light' agreement focusing on minor facilitation points, while more contentious issues like market access and data flows remain unresolved. The document notes the rise of flexible Digital Economy Agreements (DEAs) and an increased focus on the digital divide within the broader WTO work programme. By December 2022, 87 WTO members participated in the JSI, though participation from African countries and Least Developed Countries remains marginal. The report details the progress of various technical small groups, noting that 10 articles have reached a 'cleaned' or 'convergent' state, while others, such as source code and cryptography, face persistent divergences.

The report analyzes the global banana industry, highlighting the role of VSSs like Fairtrade and Organic in improving producer prices and resilience. It details the sector's high vulnerability to climate-driven pests and diseases, such as Tropical Race 4, and the economic pressures caused by retail price wars and market concentration. The document argues for a shared responsibility model across the value chain to ensure living wages and sustainable production.

The Ukraine war has accelerated a shift toward transactional alliances in the Middle East, empowering states like Saudi Arabia and Turkey to pursue greater strategic autonomy while weakening others like Egypt. As US influence diminishes and Russia focuses on its war effort, China has expanded its role from an economic power to a diplomatic mediator, exemplified by brokering the March 2023 Saudi-Iran rapprochement. The document also notes that Vladimir Putin's authoritarian leadership style and anti-Western ideological framing resonate with regional strongmen, posing a challenge to the liberal democratic order and the normative foreign policy of states like Norway.

The document examines how African nations have navigated the Russia-Ukraine war, highlighting a preference for non-alignment driven by historical grievances with Western leadership and strategic national interests. It details the varied voting patterns of African states at the UN General Assembly, the potential for Africa to fill Europe's energy gap through gas and critical minerals, and the risks posed by great-power competition to regional security, particularly in the Sahel.

The document analyzes Russia's strategic pivot toward Africa as a means to diversify partners and evade Western sanctions following the invasion of Ukraine. It identifies three primary pillars of engagement: economic interests in mining, energy, and agriculture; geopolitical efforts to undermine Western influence in the Sahel and Mediterranean; and the promotion of multipolarity to challenge US-led unipolarity. While Africa is described as a 'policy tool' rather than a central priority, Russia leverages its lack of colonial history and non-conditional military support to gain influence among African states.

One year after the invasion of Ukraine, the EU has substituted nearly 75% of Russian gas imports and seen wind and solar generate a record 22% of its electricity in 2022. Globally, gas demand is forecast to peak by the end of the decade, with 88% of electricity demand growth to 2025 expected to be met by renewables. While renewable energy saved billions in fossil fuel costs, high gas and coal prices drove 90% of the global increase in electricity costs in 2022. Russia faces significant financial losses from sanctions, including a USD 25 billion public deficit in January 2023, while EU industrial production grew by over 2% on average despite a 15% drop in industrial gas demand.

Since the start of the war in Ukraine, the EU saw a record increase in wind and solar generation, which together provided 23% of total electricity. This growth saved the EU €12 billion in avoided gas costs and contributed to a significant drop in Russian gas import reliance, from approximately 40% before the invasion to 16% in the period analyzed.