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China is repositioning its coal fleet to provide system flexibility, with the entire existing fleet on track to be retrofitted by 2027. While technical capacity is increasing, the report argues that full flexibility is constrained by power market design and dispatch practices. It emphasizes that as coal retrofit potential plateaus, the rapid scale-up of clean flexibility, particularly battery energy storage, is essential to avoid locking in emissions beyond 2030 and to maintain grid stability as renewables become dominant.

China is repositioning its coal fleet to serve as a regulatory and security resource to manage the variability of its growing renewable energy sector. This transition is driven by a critical need for short-term flexibility, with the IEA estimating that these needs will be three times higher in 2030 than in 2022. To achieve this, the Chinese government has implemented a series of Five-Year Plans and policies, including a target to retrofit "above 200 GW" of coal capacity for flexibility between 2021 and 2025. Technical efforts focus on lowering minimum loads (ML) to 25-40% of rated capacity and decoupling heat and electricity generation in combined heat and power (CHP) units. Financial mechanisms supporting this shift include a coal capacity pricing mechanism introduced in 2024 and the use of infrastructure real estate investment trusts (REITs) for eligible plants.

China is shifting its power system flexibility from coal retrofits to clean alternatives like battery energy storage. While coal retrofits are nearing exhaustion by 2027, the document argues that market reforms and updated dispatch practices are essential to prevent a reliance on new coal capacity and to meet 2030 emission goals.

China has rapidly expanded its flexible coal power capacity, exceeding its 2025 national target and positioning itself to meet a 2027 goal of retrofitting 500-700 GW. By the end of 2024, total flexible coal capacity exceeded 600 GW, with significant progress in provinces like Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Shanxi, and Xinjiang. While coal utilisation is generally declining and showing greater seasonal variability due to renewable growth and demand peaks, the document notes that the full potential of this technical flexibility is not yet reflected in system operations due to market design and institutional arrangements. The transition is supported by a capacity pricing mechanism and diversified revenue models, though flexible operation increases costs through higher maintenance, reduced fuel efficiency at low loads, and accelerated depreciation.

The Institute for Economic Justice (IEJ) asserts that while South Africa saw modest GDP growth of 1.2% in 2025 and improvements in energy and logistics, these gains have not reduced high unemployment, poverty, or food insecurity. The IEJ calls for a shift from market-centric policies to a developmental macroeconomic framework that prioritizes industrial policy, progressive taxation, and expanded social security to achieve inclusive growth.

The document evaluates the feasibility of fuel cell electric trucks (FCETs) and hydrogen internal combustion engine (ICE) trucks in India. It finds that while FCETs could be more cost-competitive than diesel trucks in long-haul, heavy-duty applications by 2040, they currently struggle to reach cost parity with battery electric trucks (BETs) due to high hydrogen fuel costs. These costs are driven by production, refueling infrastructure, and an 18% GST. The brief argues that hydrogen trucks are a critical complement to BETs for use cases requiring high payload and minimal downtime. It recommends a coordinated pathway involving capital subsidies, tax rationalization (reducing GST to 5%), and the development of public hydrogen refueling stations (HRS) to unlock the market.

The report uses a fictional 2030 scenario to analyze how various global actors would react to a proposed Arctic-based Stratospheric Aerosol Injection (SAI) deployment. It concludes that geopolitical instincts and existing rivalries, rather than scientific data, would drive initial responses, with Russia posing the primary security risk. The authors argue that a trusted multilateral scientific assessment and early trust-building are essential to prevent miscalculation and escalation.

The 'Big Five' agricultural traders—ADM, Bunge, Cargill, COFCO, and LDC (collectively ABCCD)—dominate the global trade of staples like grains, corn, soy, and sugar, controlling 70% to 90% of the commercial grain trade. During the 2021-2022 food price surge, these companies saw net profits increase by 200% to 300% compared to the 2016-2020 average. The author contends that this was achieved through strategic market consolidation, vertical integration, and inter-company cooperation, often facilitated by the EU's restrictive competition policy, which focuses primarily on immediate consumer prices rather than cumulative social harm. The document highlights the recent approval of the $34 billion Bunge-Viterra merger as evidence of regulatory failure and advocates for a transition toward an economy based on degrowth and decarbonization to dismantle the incentives for market concentration.

The report argues that South Korea's heavy reliance on imported fossil fuels (84% of total energy supply) creates critical vulnerabilities to geopolitical conflicts in the Strait of Hormuz, Malacca Strait, and South China Sea, as well as climate-driven infrastructure risks. It posits that a rapid shift to renewables can mitigate these risks, reduce financial burdens associated with energy price volatility, and support the energy needs of advanced AI and defense systems. While acknowledging challenges such as China's dominance in critical mineral supply chains and cybersecurity risks associated with digitalized grids, the document concludes these are manageable through battery storage innovation, grid modernization, and supply chain diversification. It recommends integrating renewable energy goals explicitly into national security planning and the 12th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand.

The report argues that South Korea's heavy reliance on fossil fuel imports—approximately 84% of its total energy supply—creates significant national security vulnerabilities due to geopolitical tensions and climate risks. It posits that transitioning to renewable energy would reduce exposure to fragile maritime chokepoints, lower fiscal strain, and improve military readiness. While acknowledging challenges such as China's dominance in critical mineral supply chains and cybersecurity risks from digitization, the report concludes these are manageable compared to the structural risks of fossil fuel dependence. It recommends integrating renewable energy targets into national security planning and leveraging the newly created Ministry of Climate, Energy and Environment to coordinate a whole-of-government approach to energy resilience.

The document analyzes the implications of the ICJ's advisory opinion on States' obligations to prevent environmental harm, specifically focusing on the cessation of fossil fuel subsidies and the regulation of private finance. It argues that States may commit internationally wrongful acts by continuing to fund fossil fuel production or failing to regulate private financiers. Additionally, it outlines binding obligations for developed States to provide financial assistance to developing countries for climate adaptation and mitigation under the UNFCCC and Paris Agreement. The briefing concludes by categorizing various types of climate litigation—including cases against public agencies, central banks, and private financial institutions—where these legal findings are applicable.

The report details how industrial actors employ strategies such as suppressing harmful data, funding biased research, and using front groups to avoid regulation of toxic chemicals. It provides case studies on PFAS, Bisphenol A (BPA), benzene, and neonicotinoids to illustrate these patterns of disinformation. The document concludes that to protect public health and the environment, companies producing hazardous substances should be prohibited from influencing the formulation of the policies that regulate them.

The document outlines a 'playbook' of industry tactics used to block chemical regulations, including the suppression of harmful data, the funding of biased research, and the use of front groups. It provides detailed case studies on PFAS, Bisphenol A (BPA), benzene, and pesticides to illustrate these patterns. The authors argue that because of this history of manipulation, chemical manufacturers and their trade associations should be prohibited from participating in the regulatory processes that govern their products, similar to the WHO's approach to the tobacco industry.

The document outlines a 'playbook' of corporate strategies used to avoid regulation of hazardous substances, including withholding data, undermining independent science, and using front groups. It provides case studies on PFAS, Bisphenol A (BPA), benzene, and neonicotinoids to illustrate these tactics and recommends banning industry participation in regulatory policymaking to protect human health and the environment.

The report identifies China as the world's largest methane emitter and explores how sustainable finance can bridge the investment gap for abatement. It highlights the 2025 NDC update as a critical window for action and recommends the integration of quantitative methane targets, expanded green taxonomies, and the inclusion of methane in the national emissions trading system to mobilise the estimated USD 7.7 billion in annual investment needed.

The report identifies China as the world's largest methane emitter and highlights a significant funding gap, estimating a domestic need of approximately 7.7 billion USD annually. While China has updated its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) to include all greenhouse gases, the report argues that a lack of quantitative targets, detailed technical standards, and integrated MRV systems hinders large-scale private investment. It suggests expanding the Green Finance Support Project Catalogue, integrating methane into the national carbon trading system, and developing diverse financial instruments—such as KPI-linked bonds and equity funds—to accelerate the deployment of abatement technologies in coal mines, oil and gas systems, and livestock and rice farming.

The document positions renewable energy as a core pillar of Japan's national security, noting that the country's energy import dependency reached 87.4% in 2024. It argues that the current 7th Strategic Energy Plan is insufficient because it maintains high fossil fuel targets (30-40% by 2040) that conflict with 1.5°C climate goals. The author proposes a four-step policy framework—expanding grid capacity, accelerating permitting, expanding distributed energy, and utilizing long-term power purchase agreements—to achieve a clean energy ratio of 80% or more by 2040. This transition is estimated to potentially save up to 3.4 trillion yen in fossil fuel costs by 2035 and requires approximately 38 trillion yen in investment, which is roughly 25% of Japan's 150 trillion yen GX investment plan.

The report analyzes how the shift from internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) to electric vehicles (EVs) will reshape India's automotive job market. It projects significant job creation in EV assembly, component manufacturing, service, and charging infrastructure, while highlighting the risk of obsolescence for ICE-specific roles. The document identifies critical skill gaps in battery engineering and power electronics and recommends a three-pronged strategy involving diverse financing, specialized courses, and supportive policies to ensure a just transition.

The document highlights the transition to electric vehicles (EVs) as a method to eliminate tailpipe emissions, citing Shenzhen's replacement of internal combustion engine buses with 16,000 electric buses. While the transition in Shenzhen reduced transportation emissions by an estimated 1.4 million tonnes CO2e annually, it also increased emissions within the electricity sector due to charging demand. The report notes a total project impact of 1 MtCO2e and a global emissions reduction potential for EV transitions of 3 BtCO2e.

The document explores how sunlight reflection methods (SRM), such as stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI) and marine cloud brightening (MCB), interact with global security. While SRM could mitigate climate-driven security risks by lowering temperatures, it may introduce new tensions regarding its use and outcomes. The briefing distinguishes SRM from cloud seeding, noting that while the latter has a history of weaponisation (e.g., Operation Popeye), SAI and MCB are too imprecise for direct weapon use but could still be used for general disruption. It argues that large-scale deployment would be difficult to hide due to detectable infrastructure and atmospheric effects. Two hypothetical scenarios are presented: one involving military tensions in the Arctic over an SAI programme and another involving accusations of drought in South Asia. The authors recommend building trust, transparency, and using scenario gaming to manage these security challenges.