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The 2023 Clean Air NDC Scorecard reveals a significant gap in the integration of air quality and health into national climate plans, with an average score of 3.5/15 across 170 analysed NDCs. Low- and middle-income countries generally outperform high-income countries, with Colombia and Mali achieving the highest scores (12/15). Conversely, several high-emitting nations, including Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, scored 0/15. The analysis highlights a critical disconnect in countries with high air pollution mortality, such as North Korea and the Solomon Islands, where NDCs fail to recognise the links between climate action and healthy air.

The report identifies a critical policy gap where climate change, food insecurity, and national security are often addressed in silos. It argues that while the U.S. intelligence and military communities recognize these as top security concerns, current interventions remain focused on immediate humanitarian aid rather than long-term community resilience. The document recommends scaling up R&D, synchronizing agricultural emission cuts with food supply needs, and integrating geopolitical risks into strategic military and government planning to prevent global instability and conflict.

The study analyzed bilateral climate finance from 2016 to 2020 for ten countries with low governance scores, finding a total disbursement of US$1.3 billion. The funding was heavily skewed toward mitigation (92%) and dominated by Japan, which provided US$1 billion specifically for natural gas-fired power plants in Uzbekistan.

The report assesses the escalating risk of catastrophic biological threats driven by the democratization of biotechnology and climate change. It highlights that future pandemics could be orders of magnitude more lethal than COVID-19, whether through natural emergence, laboratory accidents, or deliberate use. The authors argue that current U.S. biodefense spending is insufficient, representing less than 1% of the defense budget. They propose a "10+10 over 10" investment plan—$20 billion annually for ten years—focusing on pathogen-agnostic defensive tools, strengthened international norms, and improved deterrence through preparedness. The report concludes that such investments are highly cost-effective compared to the trillions of dollars in potential economic losses and millions of lives at risk.

The 2023 CleanAir NDC Scorecard reveals a significant gap between national climate pledges and the integration of air quality and health. While most NDCs mention air pollution, few quantify health impacts or set forward-looking targets. Low- and middle-income countries generally score higher than high-income nations, though many still face high air pollution mortality rates, highlighting a need for increased international finance to translate commitments into action.

The briefing argues that the reintroduction of the SLCM-N would be counterproductive. While it could theoretically target hardened underground facilities in extreme circumstances, the author contends that the operational costs—including reduced conventional ordnance capacity, decreased vessel employability, and limited mission flexibility compared to nuclear-capable bombers—outweigh the benefits. The analysis suggests that fielding SLCM-N would actually restrict the executable options available to the U.S. President and combatant commanders.

The 10th Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) failed to produce an outcome document due to Russian objections regarding the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant in Ukraine. While the NPT remains relevant, it faces a credibility crisis as recognized nuclear weapons states modernize arsenals and fail to abide by treaty stipulations. The author argues that the NPT must adapt by strengthening enforcement, establishing a clear timeline for complete nuclear disarmament, and leveraging the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) to increase its effectiveness.

The report analyzes the evolution of biological weapons threats from the 1940s to the 2010s, noting a shift from battlefield utility to 'gray zone' and asymmetric warfare. It argues that the COVID-19 pandemic acts as a 'game changer' that could either drive nations toward biological weapons as a low-cost deterrent or catalyze a new era of international cooperation. The authors identify critical gaps in U.S. policy, including an over-emphasis on bioterrorism over state-based threats and declining biodefense funding, recommending a 'deterrence by denial' strategy and increased international collaboration.

The authors argue that the seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant and threats to the Chernobyl site demonstrate the extreme dangers of nuclear facilities in conflict zones. They suggest the United States must develop a strategy to provide alternatives to Russian nuclear exports, monitor how these events affect global public perception of nuclear energy's role in climate mitigation, and adopt a more holistic approach to risk assessment that incorporates extreme climate projections and converging security threats.

Global Energy Monitor (GEM) finds that operating coal mines emit 52.3 million tonnes of methane per year, exceeding IEA estimates for oil and gas. The analysis identifies China, specifically Shanxi province, as the primary source of these emissions. GEM warns that proposed mine projects could add another 11.3 million tonnes annually, effectively locking in emissions equivalent to the coal-based CO2 emissions of the United States. To meet Net Zero 2030 targets, the report argues for a faster coal phase-out and the cancellation of new projects, as current mitigation measures are often insufficient or circumvented.

The briefing analyzes the proposed return of U.S. nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) from a Japanese security perspective. It argues that the capabilities once sought by Japan—such as low yield, stealth, and survivability—are already provided by other modernized U.S. assets, including the W76-2 low-yield SLBM warhead, B61-12 bombs, and long-range stand-off (LRSO) missiles. The author concludes that nuclear SLCMs would be a duplicative capability with low marginal benefit, especially given China's increasing anti-access and anti-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

The report analyzes the evolution of biological weapons threats from the 1940s to the 2010s, noting a shift from battlefield utility and strategic deterrence toward hybrid warfare and assassination tools. It argues that the COVID-19 pandemic acts as a 'game changer' that could either trigger a new era of proliferation or foster unprecedented international cooperation. The authors propose three future scenarios: one where bioweapons become a key component of deterrence, one where the world pivots toward collective biosecurity, and a hybrid world of ambiguous threats driven by disinformation. The report concludes that U.S. policy must rebalance its focus from bioterrorism to state-based threats and increase funding for biodefense.

The briefing analyzes the Biden Administration's 2021 climate security reports, identifying climate change as a 'shaping threat' that necessitates a reexamination of national security assumptions. It argues that climate risks are current and future, wide-ranging, and exacerbate other security concerns, particularly in competition with China. The authors propose five 2022 priorities: mainstreaming climate security in regional strategies, linking adaptation with conflict prevention, maximizing whole-of-government science collaboration, increasing support for allies, and utilizing strategic foresight for worst-case scenarios.

The report argues that the United States must shift from biological risk management to an aggressive strategy of pandemic prevention and the obsolescence of biological weapons. It proposes a "10+10 over 10" budget plan, investing $20 billion annually for ten years—split equally between biological weapons deterrence and global health security. Key recommendations include doubling the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) budget, expanding the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) to $400 million annually, and restructuring the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) for greater independence. The authors emphasize a systemic approach combining pathogen-agnostic early warning systems, rapid medical countermeasure manufacturing, and robust international cooperation to deny attackers success in causing mass casualties.

The paper examines Africa's role in global nuclear disarmament, highlighting the Pelindaba Treaty as a model for regional non-proliferation and the shift from a security-based to a humanitarian-based narrative to challenge nuclear-armed states.

The briefing argues that the U.S. Department of State must expand its role in addressing biological threats, particularly in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the rise of synthetic biology. It recommends creating tailored multilateral cooperation mechanisms, such as an epidemic early warning center, and leveraging AI and big data for better pathogen attribution and treaty verification. The authors also call for the appointment of a special envoy for biorisks and an increase in scientific expertise within the diplomatic corps to manage the dual-use dilemma of life sciences and counter the suspected biological weapons capabilities of nations like Russia, China, and North Korea.

The briefing assesses the role of the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) in addressing global biological threats, highlighting its history of securing Soviet-era biological weapons and its role in COVID-19 detection in Thailand. It argues that BTRP is a strategic asset for countering the influence of Russia and China, improving pathogen early warning systems, and reducing risks at high-containment laboratories. The authors recommend increasing BTRP's annual budget to $400 million and expanding its operational authorities to allow for global activity.

The report assesses the intersection of climate change and national security in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). It projects that by 2030 and 2050, intensified extreme rainfall, sea level rise, and crop yield failures will stress the regime's ability to provide public goods, potentially leading to domestic upheaval or regional conflict. Specific risks are identified for the Yongbyon Nuclear Scientific Research Center, the capital city of Pyongyang, and key coastal military and commercial hubs. The authors argue that these climate stressors could lead to miscalculations in military posture, increased migration, and strained bilateral relations with China and South Korea, while suggesting that climate cooperation could offer a new avenue for diplomatic engagement.

The document contends that US concerns regarding a nuclear-armed Japan are unfounded and should not prevent President Biden from declaring a no-first-use policy. It bases this on two secret government inquiries (1970 and 1995) that rejected the nuclear option, overwhelming public opposition to nuclear weapons in Japan, and the fact that a small minority of conservative officials lack the political agency to pursue such a program. The report asserts that a no-first-use declaration would not undermine the US nuclear umbrella's deterrent function for Japan.

The Council on Strategic Risks suggests a series of questions for U.S. Senate confirmation hearings for Jill Hruby (nominated as Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the NNSA) and Heidi Shyu (nominated as Under Secretary for Research and Engineering at the DoD). The proposed questions focus on enhancing biotechnology leadership, improving interagency cooperation for biological threats, ensuring civilian oversight of nuclear weapons, and implementing safety recommendations at National Labs.