A HANDBOOK FOR ENDING CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS

The report argues that the United States must shift from biological risk management to an aggressive strategy of pandemic prevention and the obsolescence of biological weapons. It proposes a "10+10 over 10" budget plan, investing $20 billion annually for ten years—split equally between biological weapons deterrence and global health security. Key recommendations include doubling the Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) budget, expanding the Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) to $400 million annually, and restructuring the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) for greater independence. The authors emphasize a systemic approach combining pathogen-agnostic early warning systems, rapid medical countermeasure manufacturing, and robust international cooperation to deny attackers success in causing mass casualties.

• The report proposes a new national vision where the United States leads the world in making biological weapons the first category of weapons of mass destruction to be "effectively eliminated or rendered obsolete."
• To achieve this, the authors recommend a "deterrence by denial" strategy, which focuses on "denying an attacker success in their likely aims regarding biological weapons, such as causing mass casualties, mass confusion, and erosion of operational capabilities."
• The report suggests a "10+10 over 10" resourcing plan: $10 billion per year for ten years for deterring and addressing biological weapons threats, and $10 billion per year for ten years for global health security and direct pandemic prevention.
• The Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP) has seen a budget decline over the last decade; the report recommends doubling its funding to at least $2 billion in the next year, eventually reaching a range of $6.5 billion to $7 billion annually.
• The Biological Threat Reduction Program (BTRP) is recommended for a budget increase to $400 million per year to maintain international partnerships and reduce proliferation risks.
• The report argues that the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) should be granted more independence, potentially by converting it to a DoD Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC).
• The authors recommend that the Department of Energy (DOE) National Laboratories be positioned as leaders in "engineering biology" to strengthen biosecurity and the bioeconomy.
• The report suggests creating a "Biosecurity Reserve Corps" where non-governmental experts can sign on for a period of service to surge into cooperation with National Labs during crises.
• The report recommends that the Department of State appoint a special envoy dedicated to biological threats to lead on pandemic prevention and biotechnology cooperation.
• The authors advocate for a shift from list-based threat assessments to "pathogen-agnostic" approaches, such as the Disease X Medical Countermeasure Program, to address unknown viral threats.
• The report proposes an annual multi-agency exercise program to practice the rapid development of diagnostics and countermeasures, with a goal to halve the time Operation Warp Speed took to produce vaccines.

APA

Beaver, W., Lim, Y.-B., Parr, L., Parthemore, C., Weber, A., Bajema, N., Chitale, R., duPont, J., Fall, C., Teran, N., & Titus, A. (2021). A HANDBOOK FOR ENDING CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS. The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Handbook-for-Ending-Catastrophic-Biological-Risks_December-2021.pdf

Chicago

Beaver, William, Yong-Bee Lim, Lillian Parr, Christine Parthemore, Andrew Weber, Natasha Bajema, Rohit Chitale, et al. A HANDBOOK FOR ENDING CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS. The Council on Strategic Risks, 2021. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Handbook-for-Ending-Catastrophic-Biological-Risks_December-2021.pdf.

Wikipedia

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BibTeX

@techreport{beaver2021handbook, author = {Beaver, William and Lim, Yong-Bee and Parr, Lillian and Parthemore, Christine and Weber, Andrew and Bajema, Natasha and Chitale, Rohit and duPont, Jackson and Fall, Chris and Teran, Nikki and Titus, Alexander}, title = {{A HANDBOOK FOR ENDING CATASTROPHIC BIOLOGICAL RISKS}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2021}, month = dec, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/A-Handbook-for-Ending-Catastrophic-Biological-Risks_December-2021.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }