A Theater View on the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N)

The briefing argues that the reintroduction of the SLCM-N would be counterproductive. While it could theoretically target hardened underground facilities in extreme circumstances, the author contends that the operational costs—including reduced conventional ordnance capacity, decreased vessel employability, and limited mission flexibility compared to nuclear-capable bombers—outweigh the benefits. The analysis suggests that fielding SLCM-N would actually restrict the executable options available to the U.S. President and combatant commanders.

• The author concludes that providing the SLCM-N option to the U.S. President would paradoxically decrease the total number of military response options and the capacity of geographic combatant commanders to execute them in the event of an attack on the U.S. or its allies.
• The document identifies only one plausible scenario where the use of a nuclear weapon for tactical results would be suitable and acceptable: if one of five specific countries (China, North Korea, Russia, Belarus, or Iran) invades a U.S. ally or partner, causing losses that reach an "extreme circumstances" threshold, and the target is a hardened underground facility located within the invading enemy's own sovereign territory.
• Reintroducing SLCM-N would impose significant opportunity costs on the U.S. Navy, including the displacement of conventional weapons in vertical launch cells and a reduction in the operational employability of vessels due to the additional training and maintenance requirements of the Optimized Fleet Response Plan.
• The SLCM-N offers less mission flexibility than nuclear-capable intercontinental bombers because naval vessels require load-out decisions and transit times that can take weeks, whereas bombers can execute missions more rapidly and provide more effective force posturing for deterrence.
• The upcoming decommissioning of four Ohio-class guided missile submarines between 2026 and 2028 will reduce the submarine force's vertical launch capacity by over half, further increasing the opportunity cost of allocating limited cells to SLCM-N.

APA

Moulton, J. (2022). A Theater View on the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N). The Council on Strategic Risks. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/37-SLCM-Optionality-Warfighting.pdf

Chicago

Moulton, John. A Theater View on the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N). The Council on Strategic Risks, 2022. https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/37-SLCM-Optionality-Warfighting.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Moulton |first1=John |title=A Theater View on the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) |publisher=The Council on Strategic Risks |date=16 November 2022 |url=https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/37-SLCM-Optionality-Warfighting.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{moulton2022theater, author = {Moulton, John}, title = {{A Theater View on the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N)}}, institution = {The Council on Strategic Risks}, year = {2022}, month = nov, url = {https://councilonstrategicrisks.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/37-SLCM-Optionality-Warfighting.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }