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The report argues that while MDBs have increased overall climate finance, urban climate investments in L&MICs have plateaued and remain insufficient. It identifies critical gaps in strategy, operating models, and private capital mobilization, recommending a shift from project-by-project approaches to programmatic strategies and increased direct financing for cities to meet global climate goals.

This research paper outlines the strategic positioning of African countries and institutions ahead of COP28 in Dubai, emphasizing the role of the Nairobi Declaration and the African Union's Climate Change and Resilient Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032) in driving the regional climate agenda.

The report finds that while current national targets collectively aim for a doubling of renewable capacity by 2030, they often underestimate the actual pace of deployment. A global tripling to 11,000 GW is considered achievable if governments update targets to reflect recent growth and maintain a 17% annual increase in additions. The analysis identifies specific countries with high potential to increase ambition, such as Australia, Japan, South Korea, and the UAE, while noting that others like India and Saudi Arabia already have targets that aim for a tripling of their 2022 capacity.

The EU-Iran relationship has deteriorated following the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018 and recent regional conflicts. Iran has responded by breaching nuclear limits and forging strategic alliances with Russia and China, including joining the SCO and BRICS. The author suggests the EU shift toward incentives and new areas of collaboration, such as climate cooperation and the Paris Agreement, to maintain influence and prevent a regional nuclear arms race.

The 2023 update finds that while current policies for 25 major economies may result in 2030 emissions between -6% and +8% compared to 2019 levels, this falls short of the 43% reduction aligned with the Paris Agreement. While 13 countries are now on track to meet their NDC targets, 12 countries still face an implementation gap.

The report forecasts a significant increase in Africa's energy demand due to population growth, projecting that it will overtake the EU27 by 2043. While Africa possesses vast oil, gas, and hydropower reserves, its current energy mix remains heavily reliant on fossil fuels, with 'other renewables' making up only 1.6% of production in 2023. The document highlights a trajectory where Africa will eventually become a major global source of carbon emissions from fossil fuels, overtaking the EU by 2034.

The document examines Africa's natural gas landscape, noting that while the continent holds approximately 10% of global proven gas reserves, a lack of domestic infrastructure means most production is destined for export. It highlights a potential global LNG supply glut starting in mid-2025 and 2026, which may lower prices and profits for exporters. Key reserves are concentrated in Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, and Libya, while new discoveries are emerging in countries like Mozambique and Senegal. Specific large-scale projects are detailed for Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Mozambique, and Tanzania.

The report identifies Africa as a net energy exporter, though it forecasts that total energy demand will exceed production by 2039. While a small group of countries like Algeria, Nigeria, and Angola maintain high export values, a significant number of African nations remain heavily dependent on energy imports, a group expected to expand by 2043.

The document outlines the state of nuclear energy in Africa, noting that while South Africa is the only country with a commercial plant, Egypt is constructing a large-scale facility and several other nations are exploring the option. It highlights the potential role of small modular reactors (SMRs) in balancing grids with renewable energy.

The document reports that Africa holds 111.4 billion barrels of oil equivalent (BBOE) in proven oil reserves, representing 5% of the global total. Five countries—Libya, Nigeria, Algeria, Egypt, and Angola—account for 80% of these reserves.

The document argues that Saudi Arabia has spent three decades using procedural and substantive tactics to undermine UN climate negotiations and the IPCC scientific process. It details how Riyadh leverages consensus-based decision-making, raises opportunistic procedural objections, and contests climate science to delay the transition away from fossil fuels. The authors conclude by recommending structural changes to UN voting rules and increased transparency to combat such obstructionism.

The document is a curated list of resources published between 2005 and 2023 that challenge the validity and ethics of various climate mitigation strategies. It categorizes these resources into reports and briefings, blogs, articles, press releases, and other media. The listed materials focus on the perceived dangers of carbon markets, geoengineering, and corporate-led 'net zero' strategies, often framing them as 'false solutions' that may facilitate continued fossil fuel use or result in 'green colonialism'.

The analysis reveals a significant gap between the mention of gender in African NDCs and the implementation of substantive gender-responsive actions. While 90% of assessed NDCs reference gender, only 23% include gender-responsive budgeting and 32% are informed by a gender analysis. The paper highlights that high levels of climate finance mobilisation in countries like Morocco, South Africa, and Egypt have not translated into gender-responsive budgeting. Furthermore, private climate finance remains heavily concentrated in the energy sector (74%), which typically has lower female participation compared to the agriculture, forestry, and other land use (AFOLU) sector, which received only 7% of funding.

The document analyzes the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC), highlighting a significant misalignment between its aggressive production expansion plans and the 1.5°C global warming limit. It details how ADNOC is increasingly relying on international equity, bonds, and bank financing, thereby exposing global investors to transition and litigation risks. The brief maps these financial connections across upstream, midstream, and downstream operations and recommends that investors and banks push for greater transparency and a cessation of new fossil fuel infrastructure to mitigate these risks.

The document analyzes the 'epidemic' of military takeovers in Africa, identifying governance dysfunction, democratic decline, civil-military tensions, and Islamist insurgencies as primary drivers. It argues that the African Union (AU) and regional economic communities (RECs) have relied on reactive, inconsistent, and ineffective blanket sanctions that fail to deter coup plotters. The author recommends a shift toward prevention, targeted sanctions, and the strengthening of civil-military relations and democratic legitimacy.

The GCF's second formal replenishment (GCF-2) resulted in total pledges of USD 9.322 billion from 25 contributors. A High-Level Pledging Conference held in Bonn, Germany, on 5 October 2023, served as the primary venue for these announcements. The process saw 72% of contributors increase their pledges relative to the first replenishment (GCF-1), with some countries doubling their contributions. The GCF's commitment authority for GCF-2 became effective during the conference after Austria, Germany, and Monaco signed contribution agreements, surpassing the required 25% effectiveness threshold.

The report highlights the human and climate costs of gas flaring in countries that export fossil energy to the EU, noting that nearly 10 million people live within 5km of active flares. It advocates for the EU to leverage its market power by adopting a methane import standard to curb these emissions and improve global health outcomes.

The document outlines four key principles for effective public engagement on climate change: connecting with deeply held values, using inclusive and participatory approaches, engaging positive social norms, and creating honest, empowering stories. It illustrates these principles through three case studies: a diverse network of small-scale environmental initiatives in Egypt, a community-led relocation project for the Carteret Islands in Papua New Guinea, and a citizens' assembly in Scotland. These examples demonstrate that bottom-up, deliberative, and co-creative processes can lead to a stronger public mandate for climate policies and resilience.

The report examines the climate and health impacts of routine gas flaring in 20 countries that export oil and gas to the European Union. It finds that nearly 10 million people live within 5km of active flares in these nations, with Iraq and Nigeria being the most affected. The authors argue that the EU can use its buying power to catalyze flaring reductions by adopting a methane import standard, which would align with the EU's Global Health Strategy and the Global Methane Pledge.

The Climate Policy Initiative (CPI) proposes a Global Credit Guarantee Facility (GCGF) to address the high cost of capital for renewable energy in emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs), where debt costs are on average 7x higher than in developed economies. The GCGF would act as a trust fund providing partial guarantees to mitigate sovereign, off-taker, and average foreign exchange risks, while transferring political and residual FX risks to existing institutions like MIGA and TCX. CPI outlines three sizing approaches for the facility: a 'Conservative' model requiring USD 4.2 billion in funded capital, a 'Base Case' requiring USD 1.2 billion, and an 'Optimistic' model requiring USD 660 million. The paper estimates that an AAA-rated guarantor could reduce risk premiums by an average of 6% and improve credit ratings by 5-6 notches under its primary risk reduction approach.