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The report analyzes Africa's high level of commodity dependence, noting that commodity exports constituted 90% by value of all merchandise exports in 2021. It argues that this dependence often leads to the 'resource curse,' characterized by poor governance, political corruption, and slow economic growth. While some countries like Botswana have attempted to manage resources through sovereign wealth funds, many others face volatility and 'Dutch disease.' The text also highlights how the global energy transition is shifting demand toward minerals like cobalt and lithium, and how climate change is exacerbating vulnerability by reducing agricultural yields in regions such as the Sahel.

The document examines the diverse nature of Africa's manufacturing sector, noting that most countries remain outliers with low manufacturing shares of GDP. It highlights a trend of 'premature deindustrialization' in low-income countries and the significant role of Chinese private enterprises in meeting domestic demand. While most of the continent relies on raw material exports, a few countries like Eswatini and South Africa show higher industrial competitiveness.

The document examines the necessity of the AfCFTA for overcoming Africa's fragmented markets and limited intra-continental trade. It highlights that success depends on regional value chains, infrastructure investment, and the removal of non-tariff barriers. The authors emphasize that while the AfCFTA is crucial for long-term growth, national governments must manage the short-term political and economic pain of tariff losses and address the challenges of integrating unequal economies.

The Manufacturing scenario projects a structural economic transformation for Africa by 2043, increasing the manufacturing sector's GDP share to 18.1% and adding US$282.8 billion to the continent's total GDP. This shift is expected to generate 34.6 million additional jobs, primarily unskilled roles in agro-processing and services, while increasing government revenue by US$81.6 billion. The scenario forecasts a reduction in extreme poverty, lifting 19.11 million more people out of poverty by 2043 than the Current Path, and predicts a long-term decrease in income inequality through the expansion of the middle class.

The document analyzes Africa's economic trajectory, noting that while the absolute size of the economy is growing, its share of global GDP remains stagnant at around 3% despite a rapidly increasing population. It highlights a widening gap in GDP per capita between Africa and the rest of the world, attributing this to a reliance on raw material exports, the 'resource curse', and a slow recovery from COVID-19. By 2043, Nigeria is projected to become the world's third-largest country by population, and the five largest African economies are expected to be Nigeria, Egypt, South Africa, Ethiopia, and Kenya.

The document examines Nigeria's potential to leverage transition minerals—such as lithium, nickel, and cobalt—to drive industrialization and fund climate action. It contrasts the current 'extract-and-export' model, which has left the mining sector contributing only about 0.3% to GDP, with a beneficiation strategy that could significantly increase revenue and create high-skilled jobs. The author highlights the global demand surge for these minerals and the geopolitical opportunity created by the concentration of processing in China. While the Nigerian government has introduced policies to mandate local processing and revoke dormant licenses, the paper notes that a lack of infrastructure and persistent governance deficits, including illegal mining and revenue leakages, remain primary obstacles.

Since the death of Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023, Russia has restructured its African security engagements, moving from the high-profile combat deployments of the Wagner Group to a more centralised model controlled by the Kremlin and the GRU. This new approach prioritises 'regime survival' services, including elite protection, training, and intelligence sharing, while expanding covert information warfare through entities like Russia House and the African Initiative. Despite these efforts, Russia's footprint is constrained by the resource demands of its war in Ukraine and risks of 'blowback' from African governments due to human rights abuses and deceptive recruitment schemes like 'Alabuga Start'.

The report assesses the state of asset management and pension systems across Africa, highlighting a general trend of conservative investment strategies, low retail participation, and uneven regulatory oversight. It identifies a strong prevalence of defined benefit and pay-as-you-go pension schemes, particularly in francophone and lusophone countries, while anglophone nations lean toward funded defined contribution models. Key challenges include low coverage for informal workers and women, limited ESG integration, and a heavy reliance on government securities. The document recommends shifting toward risk-based supervision, expanding micro-pension schemes, and developing national ESG taxonomies to deepen capital markets.

The report examines how mining-producer countries use local content policies to translate extractive activities into domestic economic development. Key findings indicate a primary focus on local employment and contracting, with a significant emphasis on benefits for communities near mine sites. While many governments employ mandatory requirements and incentives, the report identifies critical gaps in the use of 'rules of origin' and data-based monitoring tools. Despite challenges such as limited technical capacity and infrastructure deficits, the report concludes that these policies are generally successful when they balance local community benefits with national development and avoid unrealistic industry burdens.

The African Climate Foundation and Dalberg developed the NDC Investment Planner (NIP) to address the gap between climate ambition and investment in Africa. While many African countries have submitted second and third-generation NDCs, only about 11% of the continent's annual climate-finance need is met. The NIP provides a three-stage process—Identify, Evaluate, and Select and Act—to move from broad policy frameworks to investable portfolios. It evaluates opportunities based on 'investment potential' and 'economic transformation potential' to help governments prioritise actions, refine analyses, and prepare projects for funding.

The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA), supported by the Climate Policy Initiative and Promethium Carbon, has developed two financial instruments to scale the voluntary carbon market (VCM) in South Africa. A proposed carbon credit-backed bond would raise capital for project loans, with repayments consisting of cash interest and carbon credits. A Carbon Repo Facility would provide short- to medium-term liquidity by allowing developers and banks to sell carbon credits with an agreement to repurchase them later. These tools aim to bridge the gap between high demand for offsets—driven by the national carbon tax—and a limited supply of bankable projects caused by high early-stage costs and regulatory ambiguity.

The 2026 Progress Report details WWF's conservation efforts in 2025, focusing on the recovery of African elephants, mountain gorillas, snow leopards, bison, and sharks and rays. Key achievements include a consumer awareness campaign against ivory in Viet Nam, the establishment of a transboundary conservation area for snow leopards in Asia, and the restoration of bison herds in North America. The report emphasizes the use of scientific research, such as population censuses and GPS telemetry, to guide habitat management and policy across multiple continents.

In 2025, solar and wind power expanded fast enough to outpace global electricity demand growth for the first time over a sustained period. Solar growth accelerated in Africa and Central Europe, while BRICS nations now generate over half of global solar power. The rise of 'electrotech'—led by China—and falling battery costs are enabling fossil-free baseload power and supporting the energy demands of AI and data centres.

The study finds a substantial disconnect between African climate commitments (NDCs) and national development blueprints (NDPs), with NDCs focusing on climate-centric sectors like energy and forestry while NDPs prioritize economic growth, finance, and the private sector. This 'parallel policy framework' is driven by institutional fragmentation, where NDCs are often externally funded and led by environment ministries, whereas NDPs are domestically anchored and led by economic planning ministries. The authors recommend a 'whole-of-government' approach to embed climate goals into national budgets and development strategies to maximize socio-economic co-benefits.

The report finds that SADC's maritime security governance is fragmented, with a significant disconnect between blue-economy rhetoric and actual security planning. While the 2022 Integrated Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS) represents a normative advance over the 2011 strategy, its implementation remains uneven and under-resourced. Regional coordination is primarily driven by external funding and bilateral initiatives, such as South Africa's Operation Copper, rather than formal SADC mechanisms. The report highlights a structural paradox where SADC's most ocean-dependent members—the island states—are the least embedded in its collective security frameworks, preferring partnerships with the Indian Ocean Commission and external powers like India, France, and the EU.

The document contends that democracy in Africa often exists in form but lacks substance because it is built upon colonial socio-economic structures that preserve elite control. Using foresight methods and a case study of the South African National Dialogue, it argues that political liberation has not led to structural transformation, resulting in 'economic entrapment'. To resolve this, the author proposes a shift toward 'solidarity economics'—prioritizing community ownership and social equity over neoliberal profit—alongside civic education, a National Competency Framework for public service, and 'living constitutions' that allow for periodic renewal and citizen recall rights.

Global Energy Monitor reports that 216 GW of proposed green hydrogen projects in 11 African countries are primarily designed for export to Europe, despite a lack of established markets, funding, and infrastructure. The analysis highlights a disconnect between these massive, often hypothetical projects and the urgent need for domestic electrification, noting that 61% of prospective utility-scale wind and solar projects in Africa are earmarked for hydrogen. While small-scale distributed solar and wind projects have successfully improved energy access, the large-scale hydrogen push risks creating stranded assets and depleting local water resources without providing significant local economic value.

The study argues that climate disinformation in the Global South is not a digital accident but a reactivation of 'colonial logics of mediated authority.' By analyzing 200 social media posts and socio-cultural indices across eleven former British colonies in Africa, the author develops a 'Model of Indirect Epistemic Domination.' This model posits that disinformation achieves legitimacy by using trusted intermediaries—such as religious leaders and social media influencers—to frame climate falsehoods as indigenous truths. Statistical analysis reveals that religiosity and media access are the strongest predictors of susceptibility to climate disinformation, while formal education and trust in science do not provide significant protection.

The report analyzes governance and democracy across seven Southern African nations, highlighting a gap between policy frameworks and actual implementation. It emphasizes the critical role of civil society organizations (CSOs) as intermediaries and the necessity of freedom of expression for national stability, while noting that CSOs face increasing political and financial threats.

The report examines the role of securitisation in developing African capital markets, noting that while South Africa has a mature market, other sub-Saharan regions remain nascent. It identifies significant barriers, including fragmented legal and tax frameworks, a lack of a 'ratings culture', and limited understanding among financial institutions. Despite these challenges, the study finds a substantial supply of securitisable assets in banking, microfinance, and fintech sectors. It recommends a holistic regulatory approach, the use of anchor investors from DFIs and MDBs, and the adoption of scalable structures like warehouse facilities to mobilise private capital and bridge the private credit gap.