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The report identifies a significant 'take-off' in solar panel imports to Africa, with imports from China rising 60% to 15,032 MW in the 12 months to June 2025. This growth is widespread, with 20 countries setting new import records and 25 countries importing at least 100 MW. The report suggests this surge may be driven by distributed solar, potentially replacing expensive diesel generation and significantly increasing electricity supply in several countries, such as Sierra Leone and Chad.

The report argues that while coal's share of power generation in China has reached historic lows, institutional inertia—including capacity payments, inflexible dispatch rules, and a lack of a national retirement strategy—continues to drive high levels of new coal capacity additions. It highlights a disconnect where clean energy is growing rapidly but is often offset by the continued expansion and protection of coal assets, which are not fulfilling their intended role as flexible backups for renewables.

The document outlines a communication toolkit for framing the transition to clean energy in the home as a collective societal effort rather than an individual burden. It emphasizes the use of solar power as a symbol of progress and provides tailored messaging for five specific UK audience segments: Progressive Activists, Incrementalist Lefts, Established Liberals, Rooted Patriots, and Traditional Conservatives. The guide advises against promising immediate financial savings and instead suggests highlighting existing progress, community benefits, and the protection of the British way of life.

Türkiye's cooling-related electricity consumption reached 10 TWh in 2024, growing by 26% since 2022. This trend is shifting peak electricity demand from winter to summer, with the gap between summer and winter peaks widening to 9.1 GW by 2025. The report projects that cooling demand could reach 35 TWh by 2035, with peak hourly demand potentially hitting 85 GWh. To address this, the study recommends expanding distributed solar power, which aligns with peak cooling hours, implementing energy storage (including pumped-storage hydro), and improving data collection on air conditioner ownership to enhance demand forecasting.

The report examines the intersection of Japan's energy policy and national security, arguing that a faster shift to renewables—potentially reaching 70% of electricity generation by 2035—would mitigate risks associated with fragile fossil fuel supply chains and geopolitical instability. While acknowledging challenges such as China's dominance in clean energy supply chains and cybersecurity risks, the authors contend these are manageable compared to the vulnerabilities of continued fossil fuel dependence. The document recommends greater inter-ministerial coordination between energy, defense, and diplomatic agencies to prioritize renewables as a national security imperative.

The document argues that Africa's energy transition is occurring along two simultaneous tracks: centralised infrastructure and decentralised, bottom-up systems. It contends that current climate finance is too narrow, focusing almost exclusively on sovereign borrowers and large projects while ignoring the retail layer of the transition. To address this, the author proposes a dual mandate that combines infrastructure finance with consumer and trade finance. The document suggests that National Development Banks (NDBs) should act as refinancers and risk aggregators to provide local-currency credit, blended guarantees, and capital recycling mechanisms to support households, MSMEs, and informal trade networks.

Research indicates that while 74% of people in Britain consider climate change important, there is deep distrust in politics and a tendency to avoid the topic due to negative feelings. The report recommends that communicators ditch technical jargon, focus on positive future visions, and avoid overestimating opposition to net zero. For policymakers, it suggests prioritizing local infrastructure that lowers energy bills, accelerating inclusive solar panel roll-out, cracking down on pollution, and investing in genuine local engagement to counter top-down distrust.

The document asserts that global trends in China, the EU, and India demonstrate that decarbonization is now aligned with basic economics. It argues that Canada must overcome its fragmented energy grid to leverage its 'dispatchable clean power' and attract investments in industry, buildings, transportation, and AI, warning that failing to modernize its electricity system will result in a loss of competitive advantage.

International climate finance for Brazil grew by 84% between the 2019–2020 and 2021–2022 biennia, reaching an average of US$ 5.1 billion per year. This growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, specifically solar and wind power, and was characterized by a shift toward commercial financing instruments. While Western Europe, led by France, was the largest regional provider, the AFOLU sector—responsible for most of Brazil's GHG emissions—received only 11% of the total finance. Public institutions provided 58% of the funds, with multilateral development finance institutions (DFIs) playing a dominant role, while private finance grew fourfold to reach 42% of the total.

Merchant BESS in India became financially viable in 2024 due to falling battery costs and increasing price volatility in the Day Ahead Market (DAM). The report finds that BESS can achieve internal rates of return (IRR) up to 24% by combining energy arbitrage with ancillary services, with shorter-duration systems (1-2 hours) currently offering better returns than 4-hour systems.

The report assesses the economic damage caused by the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA), projecting significant costs to households and a reduction in GDP and jobs by 2035. It urges U.S. state policymakers to implement five 'no-regrets' strategies—accelerating wind and solar construction, streamlining deployment, sustaining electric transportation, increasing building efficiency, and stimulating clean industrial investment—to maintain economic opportunity and lower energy costs despite federal policy failures.

The policy brief outlines six priorities for U.S. states to leverage the One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) and other federal incentives: immediate electric vehicle fleet conversion, permitting and interconnection reform, filling financial gaps via public-private partnerships and aggregate purchasing, improving energy affordability, launching home energy rebates, and attracting cleantech manufacturing. It emphasizes the urgency of acting before federal tax credits expire, specifically noting a September 30, 2025, deadline for EV credits and a July 2026 construction start deadline for certain solar and wind credits.

The report outlines strategies for clean energy developers to mitigate local resistance by prioritizing early, transparent, and inclusive community engagement. Using five case studies across various technologies, it emphasizes the importance of flexible siting, aligning projects with local economic goals, and establishing equitable community benefit programs. It also recommends policy reforms at the state level to streamline permitting and integrate clean energy into broader land-use planning.

International climate finance for Brazil averaged US$ 5.1 billion per year in 2021–2022, an 84% increase from the 2019–2020 period. This growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, particularly solar and wind power, and a significant rise in private capital from commercial financial institutions. While Western Europe was the largest regional provider, the report highlights a stark imbalance in sectoral allocation: the AFOLU sector, responsible for most of Brazil's GHG emissions, received only 11% of total finance. The majority of funds were earmarked for mitigation (80%) and delivered via commercial debt and equity, while grants and concessional finance declined by 43%.

International climate finance to Brazil averaged R$ 26.6 billion per year in 2021–2022, an 84% increase from 2019–2020. Growth was primarily driven by the energy sector, specifically solar and wind power, and a significant rise in private commercial financing. While Western Europe, led by France, was the primary source, the AFOLU sector—responsible for most of Brazil's emissions—received only 11% of total funding, mostly through public multilateral sources.

The report examines the intersection of Japan's energy policy and national security, arguing that a rapid shift toward renewable energy—potentially reaching a 70% electricity share by 2035—would mitigate risks from volatile fossil fuel supply chains and enhance diplomatic and military autonomy. It identifies critical vulnerabilities in current maritime fuel routes and suggests that the resulting cost savings from reduced imports could fund defense procurement. While acknowledging challenges such as China's dominance in clean energy supply chains and cybersecurity risks, the document asserts these are manageable through diversification and technical innovation. It recommends stronger coordination between the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Defense to integrate climate security into national strategy.

Two years after the COP28 agreement to triple global renewable capacity by 2030, national targets remain largely stagnant. As of July 2025, the global sum of national targets has increased by only 2% since COP28, reaching 7.4 TW, which is significantly below the 11 TW required to meet the tripling goal. Only 22 countries have updated their targets, with the majority of these being EU member states revising plans through the National Energy and Climate Plan (NECP) process. Most non-EU updates occurred through routine planning cycles rather than as a direct response to COP pledges. Major electricity markets, including the US, Russia, and Canada, have either not set explicit targets or are unlikely to update them in 2025.

The report argues that while India's shift to electric vehicles can reduce emissions by 33%-55% compared to internal combustion engines, full decarbonisation depends on increasing the share of clean electricity in the grid. It estimates that meeting the charging needs of the projected 2030 EV stock would require approximately 14 GW of dedicated wind and solar capacity. The analysis highlights significant regional disparities in the cleanliness of EV charging across 10 Indian states, with Karnataka leading in clean energy share and Uttar Pradesh, the largest market by volume, providing only 18.3% of charging electricity from clean resources.

The paper examines how the geopolitical contest between the US and China over critical minerals creates a strategic window for African countries to diversify investors and build domestic green value chains.

The paper examines how trade policy can accelerate the clean energy transition by expanding access to renewable technologies. It highlights the role of the APEC List of Environmental Goods and the need to address non-tariff measures and global value chain complexities. The author advocates for a comprehensive approach that includes preferential treatment for components and services to reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of renewable energy deployment.