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The Mekong Thought Leadership and Think Tanks Network is a three-year initiative supported by the Australian Government's Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). It aims to improve water and energy security and climate resilience in the Mekong Subregion by strengthening the capacity of knowledge-based policy influence organisations (KBPIOs). The program focuses on inclusive knowledge co-production and the engagement of vulnerable and marginalised groups. It is managed by a consortium of eight organisations led by the Stockholm Environment Institute - Asia Centre. The program funds flagship studies (up to AUD 250,000) and rapid response projects (up to AUD 50,000) addressing specific issues such as transboundary water disaster risks, urban heat resilience, and gender-sensitizing infrastructure in the Mekong Delta.

The report asserts that Europe can transition to a clean electricity system by 2035 without additional costs beyond stated plans or compromising energy security. It highlights that wind and solar power are the primary technologies available to displace fossil fuels and reduce reliance on imported energy. While the UK, Germany, and the G7 have set targets for decarbonised power by 2035, the document notes a lack of a unified signal from the EU and Europe, calling for increased investment and the removal of infrastructure barriers.

In 2022, wind and solar generated a record 22% of EU electricity, overtaking fossil gas (20%). Despite this, EU power sector emissions rose by 3.9% due to a 185 TWh generation gap caused by a severe drought affecting hydro power and unexpected French nuclear outages. This gap was partially filled by a 7% increase in coal generation. However, electricity demand fell by 7.9% in Q4 2022, and coal generation declined in the final four months of the year. Ember projects a 20% plummet in EU fossil generation in 2023 as hydro and nuclear capacity recover and renewable deployment accelerates.

In 2022, the EU experienced a temporary 7% rise in coal generation driven by shortfalls in nuclear and hydro power, rather than a structural 'return to coal'. This was offset by a record surge in solar capacity and a significant 7.9% drop in electricity demand in Q4 2022. Solar power generated 7.3% of EU electricity, avoiding approximately 249 billion in gas import costs. Looking ahead to 2023, the report forecasts a potential 20% plummet in fossil fuel generation as French nuclear capacity returns and renewable capacity continues to grow.

The author argues that while the EU views the energy transition as a path to energy security and global leadership, it currently lacks a comprehensive strategic plan. Internally, the EU faces risks of redundant spending and political friction between Western and Eastern member states over the distribution of benefits. Externally, the transition shifts dependencies from fossil fuel imports to critical materials and clean technology competition with the US and China. The document suggests the EU must integrate energy, infrastructure, and industrial policy to secure its markets and maintain stability in its neighborhood.

The report outlines a two-tiered approach to an EU methane import standard: an initial prescriptive standard focusing on practices and technologies, followed by a more ambitious emission intensity standard. It argues that there are no insuperable legal obstacles to such a standard under WTO or UNFCCC rules, provided the EU applies equivalent burdens to domestic production. Key recommendations include using an equivalence principle for exporting countries and companies, implementing financial penalties for non-compliance, and establishing an EU methane fund to support mitigation in developing countries. The document also highlights the need for robust monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) and warns of 'methane leakage' where high-emitting gas is redirected to less regulated markets.

The IISD provides free technical assistance and training to developing countries to help them design investment laws and policies that support sustainable development. Their services cover the entire investment lifecycle, from promotion and protection to dispute resolution, and include support for reforming investment treaties and aligning national policies with international best practices.

The document analyzes three major electricity interconnector projects: the EuroAsia Interconnector (linking Israel, Cyprus, and Greece), the EuroAfrica Interconnector (linking Egypt to Europe via Cyprus), and the Türkiye-North Cyprus Interconnector. It highlights that while these projects aim to end the energy isolation of Cyprus and Israel and enhance regional energy security, they are complicated by geopolitical tensions and financing challenges. The author proposes four scenarios for implementation, ranging from maintaining political divides to a 'regional interdependency' model that uses energy infrastructure to build mutual trust. The paper argues that prioritizing interoperability and inclusive policies—specifically including the Turkish Cypriot community in decision-making—could transform Cyprus into a regional energy hub and support a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus Problem.

The report outlines a phased roadmap for the Green Power Corridor (GPC) in North-East Asia, aiming to integrate the power grids of China, Japan, Mongolia, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the Russian Federation. Using a cost-optimization model, the study demonstrates that enhanced connectivity reduces system costs, accelerates the adoption of low-cost renewables, and supports national net-zero targets. The proposed roadmap is divided into three phases: laying the groundwork (2023-2030), implementation (2030-2040), and organic development (2040 onward), focusing on six building blocks: political accord, institutional framework, infrastructure backbone, financial arrangements, regulatory framework, and social acceptance.

The Clean Air Task Force and nine other organizations oppose a provisional agreement on RePowerEU that would allow Member States to use 60% of grants from the Innovation Fund and 40% of front-loaded ETS allowances to fund RePowerEU measures. They argue that diverting these funds undermines the deployment of non-commercial scale technologies essential for meeting climate goals.

The report analyzes the economic and environmental consequences of delaying the liberalisation of Poland's 10H distance rule for onshore wind energy. It finds that each year of delay reduces potential installed capacity by 1.5 GW and increases cumulative electricity costs between 2026 and 2030 by approximately 6-7 billion PLN. The study highlights that while the proposed government changes could unlock up to 27 GW of additional potential and increase available land to 7.1% of Poland's area, administrative barriers remain. Faster implementation of these changes would reduce CO2 emissions by 5 million tonnes per year of acceleration and decrease reliance on energy imports and fossil fuels.

In 2022, global coal emissions were poised to reach record highs due to energy disruptions, yet the year also saw record coal capacity retirements and cancellations. Over 95 percent of global coal consumption now occurs in markets committed to net-zero emissions or coal phaseouts. Finance has become a primary lever for this transition, with approximately $45.2 billion committed over two years, primarily through Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) in South Africa, Indonesia, and Vietnam. However, these funds are viewed as stepping stones, as the total investment needed for system-wide transitions—including clean energy infrastructure and just transition efforts—far exceeds current commitments. The document emphasizes the need for greater transparency in deal design and a balance between top-down country programs and bottom-up asset-level pilots to mobilize the necessary private and public capital.

The assessment finds that while Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania all commit to climate neutrality by 2050, their strategies are largely aspirational and lack the rigorous sectoral modelling, investment analysis, and socioeconomic impact assessments required by EU regulations. Lithuania's strategy is the most recent and detailed regarding targets, while Latvia's is the most legible. Estonia's original LTS is outdated and brief, though supplemented by the broader 'Eesti 2035' plan. Common regional weaknesses include a lack of integrated financial planning and insufficient detail on a 'just transition,' particularly for Estonia's oil-shale region. The report recommends structural harmonisation, comprehensive sectoral modelling, and increased regional collaboration to enhance energy security and achieve decarbonisation goals.

The briefing argues that adopting a 45% renewable energy target by 2030 would halve EU fossil gas imports compared to the 40% target in the Fit for 55 plan, resulting in €43 billion in additional savings in 2030 and an estimated €200 billion between 2025 and 2030. It warns that relying on LNG diversification creates new dependencies and exposes the EU to global price shocks and high methane emissions, particularly from the US. The analysis highlights that countries like Italy, France, and Poland would see significant cost reductions, while warning that Poland's current plans for increased gas power generation could lead to power shortages and reduced competitiveness.

Asia is currently developing 442 million tonnes per annum (mtpa) of new LNG import capacity, representing a US$119 billion investment. While driven by growing energy demand, these plans face a 'fork in the road' due to extreme price volatility caused by the European energy crisis and the falling cost of renewable energy. China leads the regional buildout, accounting for nearly half of Asia's planned capacity. The document warns that this infrastructure could lock economies into fossil fuel reliance, contradicting global 1.5°C warming targets.

Since the outbreak of war in Ukraine, European states have proposed 195 bcm/y of additional LNG import capacity to reduce reliance on Russian gas. While 9.1 bcm/y is already online and 33 bcm/y is under construction, the briefing warns that global market tightness will keep prices high until 2026. Furthermore, 15- to 20-year supply contracts signed in 2022 may undermine the EU's goal to reduce gas demand by 35% by 2030. The document also notes a lack of concrete evidence for converting this new infrastructure to hydrogen, despite claims by German project promoters.

In Belgium, Green parties in government are addressing a social crisis driven by soaring electricity and gas prices through a three-pronged approach: emergency support for vulnerable households and companies, structural income protections, and investments in the energy transition. Key measures include a 'social rate' price cap for the lowest 20% of the population, a ban on energy disconnections, and the use of windfall taxes on energy companies to fund offshore wind developments and building renovations. The strategy aims to reduce dependence on Russian gas and achieve carbon neutrality while ensuring social justice and the 'power to live with dignity'.

The author argues that the Brothers of Italy (FdI) won the 2022 Italian elections not through ideology, but by promising security and a stronger state during a period of energy crisis and war. While the centre-right coalition shared a platform, FdI distinguished itself by prioritizing energy security, a presidential system, and cutting spending—including the abolition of green renovation grants—which aligned with voter priorities over climate action or immigration. Conversely, the centre-left failed by focusing on discrediting opponents rather than offering credible alternatives on economic intervention and social liberalism.

The report warns African nations against relying on fossil fuel investments, citing the 'green paradox' and the risk of stranded assets in Mozambique and Tanzania. It advocates for a strategic shift toward clean energy value chains and the use of COP27 to mobilise funding for domestic energy needs, rather than focusing on gas extraction for the Global North.

The document asserts that Africa requires novel equitable climate financing and that developed nations must fulfill previous financial promises. It argues that global decarbonisation agendas must incorporate African perspectives to be considered just. Additionally, it highlights the need for equitable urban climate adaptation governance and locally led, resilient food governance to combat food insecurity driven by the climate crisis, geopolitical tensions, and commodity price increases.