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Analysis of the Global Oil and Gas Extraction Tracker (GOGET) reveals that oil and gas fields now take significantly longer to come online than in the 1960–1980 period, with 2025 startups averaging 15.1 years. This increase is driven by the depletion of easily accessible fields, forcing companies to target technically challenging 'hard-to-recover' reserves, such as ultra-high pressure '20K technology' fields in the U.S. Gulf of Mexico and remote Arctic projects in Russia. Additional delays stem from reservoir compositions (e.g., sour gas), ecological risks in protected areas, and more stringent environmental regulations, such as the UK's 2025 guidance on scope three emissions. The report argues that these long lead times increase the risk of creating stranded assets and locking in production that contradicts global climate targets to limit warming to 1.5°C.

Analysis of the Global Oil and Gas Extraction Tracker (GOGET) reveals that the time from discovery to production for new oil and gas fields has increased significantly, averaging 15.1 years for fields starting in 2025 compared to 4.9 years between 1960 and 1980. This trend is driven by the depletion of easy-to-access reserves, forcing companies toward technically complex '20K' high-pressure reservoirs, deepwater projects, and 'acid gas' fields. Additional delays stem from stricter environmental regulations, such as the UK's 2025 requirement to include Scope 3 emissions in impact assessments, and ecological risks in protected areas. The report argues that these long lead times increase the risk of creating stranded assets and conflict with the 1.5 °C warming limit, suggesting that capital should be redirected toward renewable energy.

In 2025, the EU power sector reached a tipping point as wind and solar generated 30.1% of electricity, surpassing all fossil fuel sources at 29.0%. Solar generation hit a record 369 TWh, growing by 20.1% over 2024, while coal fell to a historic low of 9.2% of the mix. Despite a slight increase in gas power generation and associated import costs, renewables provided nearly half of the EU's electricity (47.7%), with solar output helping to offset low wind and hydro production caused by unusual weather in early 2025.

The report finds that the EU is not on track to meet its 2030 interconnection targets, with 80% of the power system expected to miss the goal. To reach an optimal grid by 2040, Europe needs to nearly double its interconnection capacity, adding 151 GW. This expansion requires an estimated €150 billion in investment, leaving a €30 billion public funding gap in the proposed 2028-2034 Connecting Europe Facility for Energy (CEF-E) budget.

A research paper by World Weather Attribution finding that climate change made the extreme fire weather conditions of 2025 in Türkiye, Greece, and Cyprus approximately 10 times more likely and significantly more intense.

As of March 31, 2025, the GCF's total pledged amount decreased to USD 29.9 billion following the United States' revocation of USD 4 billion in outstanding pledges. The Fund has committed USD 16.7 billion to 297 projects across 133 countries, with a portfolio balance of 59% adaptation and 41% mitigation in grant-equivalent terms. The accredited entity network consists of 145 entities, 64% of which are Direct Access Entities. The Readiness Programme has approved USD 713 million for 862 grants, with 62% of support directed toward LDCs, SIDS, or African States. To manage a pipeline of 182 concept notes and 85 funding proposals, the GCF is implementing a 'targeted approach' to retire inactive legacy projects. The Project Preparation Facility (PPF) has committed USD 69.5 million to support 110 applications, unlocking USD 7.2 billion in total climate finance.

The Mediterranean region's renewable power capacity is projected to double from 315 GW in 2023 to 626 GW by 2030, primarily driven by solar and wind. However, this trajectory falls 374 GW short of the TeraMed Initiative's 1 TW goal. To bridge this gap, the region would need to install an additional 54 GW of wind and solar annually beyond current plans, totaling 98 GW per year, which significantly exceeds the historical maximum annual deployment of 45 GW.

The policy brief proposes that Cyprus leverage its unique island profile and Mediterranean position during its 2026 EU Council Presidency to advance EU-level action on water scarcity, climate adaptation, energy security, and transport decarbonisation. Key recommendations include establishing a Mediterranean Resilience Summit, a Water & Climate Security Forum, and an EU-SIDS Compact 2030, while steering legislative processes such as the Energy Security Framework and ETS revisions to support affordability and resilience.

The policy brief highlights the lack of transitional justice mechanisms in Cyprus, where conflict-related trauma and 'ambiguous loss' remain unaddressed. It warns that as older generations pass away, the risk of losing first-hand testimonies increases, leaving future generations to rely on potentially polarizing second-hand narratives. The author proposes a shift from high-level political negotiations toward community-led, trauma-informed initiatives, including memorial spaces, intergenerational dialogue, and the archiving of underrepresented histories from the 1950s to 1970s. The brief draws on international best practices from Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Chile to suggest informal, grassroots alternatives to state-level truth commissions.

The report examines the role of language in the Cyprus conflict, arguing that the formal sidelining of linguistic diversity in peace negotiations has entrenched division. It highlights the work of the grassroots organisation HADE, which uses language exchange as a tool for trust-building, and critiques the Republic of Cyprus's current educational and administrative policies for failing to provide systemic support for bilingualism. The author proposes institutionalising language through a Multilingual Technical Committee, national campaigns, and the integration of language and peace education.

The document argues that peace negotiations are not merely about power and interests but are deeply influenced by ethical considerations. It presents a holistic framework (the 4Ps) to help practitioners and analysts identify moral dilemmas. The guide explores the tension between peace and justice, the ethics of inclusion and representation, the virtues of negotiators, and the legitimacy of procedural organization, emphasizing that ethical and strategic considerations are inseparable.

The report analyzes the 'Dubaization' of North Cyprus, a process where the economy has shifted toward rent-generating sectors like speculative real estate, mass higher education, and casino-led tourism. This model, operating within a politically unrecognized state, has led to a fragmented labor market, significant infrastructural decay, and a 'war of numbers' regarding the de facto population. The author argues that these dynamics, combined with state-led naturalization of Turkish nationals, are altering the region's durable demography and increasing its structural subordination to Turkey, which complicates future peace negotiations.

The report examines Cyprus's role as a migration hub, highlighting a shift toward restrictive asylum policies, increased border security, and a lack of comprehensive integration strategies. It details the impact of regional conflicts and climate change on migration flows, the rise of xenophobic violence, and the tension between national deterrence efforts and EU-led resilience and integration frameworks.

Greece serves as a front-line state for the EU, managing mixed migratory flows through a policy that prioritizes deterrence over legal migration. While the country has seen shifts in arriving nationalities—with increases in Egyptians, Palestinians, and Iraqis—it faces significant challenges in the social and economic integration of refugees and asylum seekers. The government is currently attempting to expand legal labor pathways through bilateral agreements and domestic reforms to address labor shortages, while continuing to rely on EU funding to maintain border security and reception infrastructure.

The document examines the Eastern Mediterranean migration route, highlighting a shift toward deterrence policies across both EU member states (Greece, Cyprus) and neighboring countries (Egypt, Lebanon). It analyzes how EU external migration policy encourages these nations to act as 'gatekeepers' through financial and technical support in exchange for border management and the reduction of irregular departures. The report details specific mobility patterns, such as the surge in Egyptian migration via Libya and the displacement of Syrians and Lebanese due to regional conflict, while noting a systemic lack of legal migration pathways and significant barriers to healthcare, education, and employment for refugees and migrants across all four countries.

The EU is experiencing a surge in solar and wind power, which frequently exceeds demand during peak hours, leading to price volatility and negative electricity prices. While renewables are growing, the lack of system flexibility—such as battery storage and interconnectors—forces a continued reliance on fossil fuels during evenings and early mornings. The report highlights that by 2030, excess wind and solar power could reach 183 TWh across the EU, potentially saving €9 billion in annual gas costs if shifted effectively. It specifically notes Germany's role as a leader in battery capacity and suggests that further additions could significantly displace hard coal and gas. The document recommends removing regulatory barriers to co-location, implementing national flexibility strategies in National Energy and Climate Plans (NECPs), and establishing a comprehensive EU strategy for clean flexibility.

The report addresses the barrier of limited grid capacity in Europe's energy transition, proposing the use of hosting capacity maps to help developers of renewables, electrolysers, and data centres select optimal connection locations. It notes that while EU legislation now mandates these maps for TSOs and DSOs, there is a lack of specificity in their design. The authors provide a framework for an "ideal" map, recommending substation-level granularity, open-source data access, and the inclusion of planned grid investments to improve network efficiency and investment speed.

The policy brief examines the risk of an all-out war between Israel and Lebanon, highlighting the potential for regional escalation involving Iran and its allies, and the subsequent impact on the EU. It criticizes the EU's current approach to Lebanon, which it claims prioritizes migration control over structural stability, and calls for a shift toward comprehensive economic support, targeted sanctions against corrupt elites, and active diplomacy to avoid a humanitarian and energy catastrophe.

The authors analyze the trend of rising defense budgets in EU and NATO member states following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, noting that spending increases are uneven and unaligned. They argue that this lack of coordination risks worsening the fragmentation of the European defense industrial base, creating mismatches between industrial supply and operational needs, and undermining the concept of strategic autonomy. Furthermore, the paper highlights potential negative economic impacts, including the 'crowding out' of civilian industries and the diversion of funds from the green transition, specifically citing proposals to cut EU renewables funding to support military investments.

From June 11-13, 2024, over 290 million people in Northern Africa, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East are forecast to experience extreme heat made at least five times more likely due to human-caused climate change. Maximum temperatures of 40°C or higher are expected in several countries, including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. The document highlights risks including wildfires in Greece, damage to Bulgaria's rose oil production, and increased vulnerability for refugees in Libya, Tunisia, and Algeria.