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The report finds a significant gap between renewable energy targets and actual projects in development across the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) region. While six CCA countries have targets totaling 43 GW of renewable additions by 2030–2040, only 30 GW are in development, leaving a 13 GW deficit. Fossil fuel expansion remains dominant, with more than three times as much fossil capacity under construction (11.8 GW of oil and gas plus coal) as wind and utility-scale solar (3.5 GW). Azerbaijan, the COP29 host, is highlighted for limited ambition, with no wind or solar projects in development beyond 2027, calling into question its commitment to a 30% renewable share by 2030.

The report evaluates several major global climate pledges, finding that most are currently off-track. While there are isolated successes—such as the UK closing its last coal plant and growth in electric car sales—critical goals like tripling renewable energy by 2030 and halting deforestation are not being met. The document highlights a significant gap between high-level commitments and implementation, particularly in the financial sector where net-zero plans are deemed insufficient and fossil fuel subsidies have reached record highs. It calls for a shift from loose networks to platforms of accountability as countries develop their next round of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) for 2025.

The report finds that in the Caucasus and Central Asia (CCA) region, fossil fuel capacity under construction is more than three times that of wind and utility-scale solar. While non-fossil projects (including hydropower and nuclear) have a larger total pipeline, they suffer from long lead times and lower construction rates. Most CCA countries are failing to meet their renewable energy targets, with a 13 GW deficit in development across six countries. COP29 host Azerbaijan is highlighted for having a limited pipeline of renewables beyond 2027, calling into question its climate leadership.

The BRICS bloc is reaching a milestone where non-fossil power capacity is set to exceed fossil-fueled capacity for the first time in 2024. While the group hosts a significant portion of the world's coal fleet and continues to develop new fossil plants, there is a massive pipeline of wind and solar projects. The report finds that the BRICS countries have enough renewables in development to nearly triple their capacity by 2030, though the actual construction rate varies significantly by member, with China leading the transition.

The BRICS group is approaching a critical transition point where non-fossil power capacity is expected to eclipse fossil fuels by the end of 2024. While the bloc possesses a vast pipeline of wind and solar projects—enough to potentially triple renewable capacity by 2030—nearly all members continue to develop new coal, oil, or gas plants. China dominates the group's transition, leading in both renewable additions and the construction of new coal capacity. Other members show divergent paths: Brazil and Ethiopia are heavily hydropower-reliant, while the UAE, Iran, and Russia remain deeply dependent on oil and gas, though the UAE is rapidly diversifying via nuclear and solar power.

China has significantly reduced coal power plant approvals in early 2024 as massive additions of wind and solar power meet incremental electricity demand. While construction of previously permitted projects remains high, the shift toward clean energy is driving a decline in coal power generation and signaling a potential peak in CO2 emissions before 2030.

China's large generation state-owned enterprises (SOEs) have significantly diversified into renewable energy, contributing to a relative decline in coal power's share of the generation mix from over 70% in the mid-2000s to about 60% in 2023. While this strategy has accelerated the transition, the report warns that China is approaching a critical turning point where coal generation may enter an absolute decline, potentially peaking around 2025. The authors argue that current diversification efforts are insufficient to address the systemic risks to the 'coal-electricity ecosystem,' which includes coal production, logistics, and chemical industries. They propose a 'beyond-diversification' approach that emphasizes a just transition for coal-dependent regions, comprehensive economic restructuring, and coordinated stakeholder bargaining to mitigate social tensions and the rural-urban divide.

China is leading global renewable energy deployment with 339 GW of utility-scale solar and wind power under construction, nearly double the capacity of the rest of the world combined. By the first quarter of 2024, wind and solar accounted for 37% of China's total power capacity. While the country is on track to potentially reach 1,200 GW of installed capacity by the end of 2024, significant obstacles remain, including a reliance on coal to mitigate intermittency, insufficient Ultra High Voltage (UHV) transmission lines, and rising curtailment rates in several provinces.

China is significantly leading global renewable energy deployment, with utility-scale wind and solar projects under construction totaling 339 GW—double the combined total of all other countries. While China is on track to meet its 2030 target of 1.2 billion kW of wind and solar capacity years ahead of schedule, it faces critical challenges regarding grid stability, reliance on coal for intermittency regulation, and high curtailment rates in northern and northwestern provinces.

Between 2021 and 2023, commercial banks in G7 countries provided US$101 billion to the coal industry, with American and Japanese banks contributing over US$73 billion. The report highlights that this financing exceeds the G7-led pledges for Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs) and calls for stricter capital requirements and prohibitions to ensure a phase-out aligned with 1.5°C goals.

The 2024 Banking on Climate Chaos report reveals that the 60 largest global banks committed $705.8 billion to fossil fuel companies in 2023, with $347.5 billion directed toward companies with active expansion plans. JPMorgan Chase is identified as the worst financier of fossil fuels, while Japanese megabanks like Mizuho and MUFG are prominent in methane gas (LNG) financing. The report highlights significant policy gaps, noting that many banks use intensity-based metrics rather than absolute emissions targets and that some North American banks have rolled back previous exclusions for coal and Arctic oil and gas. It argues that current 'net zero' targets often serve as loopholes for continued investment in fossil fuel infrastructure, particularly in Southeast Asia.

In 2023, the share of renewables in the global electricity mix exceeded 30% for the first time, driven by record solar and wind generation. Despite this, total power sector emissions reached a record high of 14,153 million tonnes of CO2 because clean growth could not fully meet rising demand and was hampered by a record fall in hydropower. While carbon intensity hit a record low of 480 gCO2/kWh, fossil generation increased by 135 TWh, primarily in emerging economies like China and India where droughts reduced hydro output.

The document highlights a recent increase in global coal capacity and a slowdown in the adoption of coal-restrictive policies by private financial institutions, calling for urgent regulatory action and the implementation of the Coal Transition Accelerator.

China is currently off track to meet its 2025 climate commitments, including targets for carbon and energy intensity and the share of non-fossil fuels. This is driven by a surge in coal power permitting and construction, with 114 GW approved and 70 GW starting construction in 2023. Despite official rhetoric that new coal plants serve a 'supporting' role for grid stability and renewable integration, the report finds this is often a 'smokescreen' for bulk power generation, leading to significant overcapacity and stranded asset risks.

The report evaluates South Africa's REIPPPP, noting its success in attracting over R300 billion in infrastructure investment and selecting over 120 preferred bidders. However, it identifies critical bottlenecks, including limited grid capacity and high transaction costs for bidders. The author argues that maximizing the programme's potential requires improving programme design, enhancing transmission infrastructure, and developing local financial solutions to prevent global funds from crowding out domestic investors. The report also highlights the role of government tax incentives, such as Section 12B of the Income Tax Act, and the importance of integrating battery energy storage systems (BESS) and gas-to-power to stabilize the energy mix and reduce reliance on coal.

The briefing asserts that tripling renewables and doubling energy efficiency by 2030 will provide 85% of the required cuts in unabated fossil fuels for that period. By 2035, these two actions alone are projected to reduce total CO2 emissions by more than half. The document emphasizes that while nuclear energy and carbon capture and storage (CCS) play roles, their contributions are significantly smaller due to slow deployment and technology immaturity, making renewables and efficiency the most effective tools for a rapid fossil fuel phaseout.

Recourse opposes the World Bank Group's role as interim host for the UNFCCC Loss and Damage Fund, arguing that the bank's continued fossil fuel investments, lack of democratic accountability, and private-sector focus make it unfit for the task. The organization further criticizes the proposal for making contributions from developed nations 'voluntary' and calls for a strictly limited hosting period with a clear exit strategy after four years.

In the first half of 2023, global power sector emissions plateaued (+0.2%) as emissions declines in the US and EU offset a 7.9% jump in China. China led global renewable growth, accounting for 67% of wind and solar increases, but severe droughts caused a 22% drop in hydropower, forcing a record high in coal generation. In the US, power sector emissions fell 8.6% due to a 27% drop in coal generation driven by coal-to-gas switching and a 3.4% decline in electricity demand. The EU also saw a 17% drop in power sector emissions resulting from falling demand and increasing renewables.

Analysis of G20 coal power emissions reveals that while 12 of 20 economies saw per capita declines since 2015, Australia and South Korea remain the top polluters, each emitting more than triple the global average. In contrast, emerging economies like Indonesia, Türkiye, China, and India experienced increases in per capita emissions as electricity demand outpaced renewable growth. The G20's combined per capita emissions rose slightly from 1.5 to 1.6 tonnes of CO2 between 2015 and 2022, underscoring a slow overall transition despite individual national progress.

Global power sector emissions plateaued in the first half of 2023, increasing by only 0.2%. While wind and solar generation grew and increased their share of the global power mix, a historic decline in hydropower due to droughts—particularly in China—prevented a more significant emissions drop. Low electricity demand in high-income economies further suppressed emissions growth.