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The paper analyzes the civil war between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), arguing that the conflict has become a proxy war for Middle Eastern powers. It details how external military support from countries like the UAE, Egypt, and Iran sustains the fighting and how a proliferation of uncoordinated, ad hoc mediation initiatives—often led by these same regional actors—has marginalized civilian political actors and hindered a comprehensive peace agreement.

The author contends that the U.S. administration's decision to exit the Paris Climate Agreement and end international climate finance creates significant risks for the United States. These include the loss of diplomatic soft power, the forfeiture of economic opportunities in a clean energy market projected to exceed $2 trillion by 2035, and the creation of a power vacuum likely to be filled by China or other actors like Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The text asserts that maintaining a leadership role is essential for U.S. companies to ensure market transparency and harmonization abroad, and warns that domestic policy rollbacks further undermine American innovation and long-term energy competitiveness.

In February 2025, M23 rebels captured Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province in the eastern DRC, following the previous seizure of Goma. The document argues that Rwanda's support for M23 is driven by a combination of national security concerns—specifically the threat posed by the Democratic Forces of the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)—and economic interests related to minerals like gold, tin, and tantalum. It further notes that rivalry with Uganda and a perceived weakness in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have emboldened Rwanda's actions. Despite calls from the US, France, the UK, and China for Rwandan forces to withdraw, the international response remains tepid, with few concrete sanctions or aid cuts implemented.

The report maps nearly one hundred agreements on critical minerals between African states and global actors, highlighting the strategic competition for resources. It identifies a lack of transparency in these deals and notes that while China and Russia are prominent, other actors like Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are expanding their footprints. The analysis emphasizes that these partnerships often reflect broader geopolitical and historical ties rather than just economic needs.

The Philippines is pursuing digital transformation to drive economic growth, with its digital economy contributing 8.5% to GDP in 2024. However, the country lags behind ASEAN peers in infrastructure and digital literacy. This gap has been filled largely by Chinese investments via the Digital Silk Road, with companies like Huawei, Alibaba, and Tencent dominating sectors such as telecommunications, cloud computing, and fintech. While these investments provide essential capacity, they create security risks and sovereignty concerns, exacerbated by territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The paper recommends that the Philippines update its regulatory frameworks, adopt ASEAN-centric ICT norms, and pursue 'friendshoring' with allies like the US and Japan to reduce dependence on Chinese technology.

The paper examines the challenges South Africa and Brazil face in transitioning to green economies and their shared vulnerability to the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM). It argues that both nations perceive CBAM as a form of 'green protectionism' that violates WTO non-discrimination principles and the Paris Agreement's principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities (CBDR-RC). The authors suggest that South Africa and Brazil can collaborate through BRICS and BASIC to advocate for fairer trade rules, technological support, and the integration of development needs into WTO climate provisions. Domestically, the paper recommends that South Africa accelerate its Renewable Energy Masterplan (SAREM) and reform its carbon tax, while Brazil should formalise a national carbon pricing regime and enforce its Forest Code to maintain export competitiveness.

The document examines China's role as the dominant economy in the expanded BRICS bloc, arguing that China views the group as a tool to counter Western hegemony and advance its own geopolitical goals, such as the Belt and Road Initiative. While the bloc has achieved significant milestones through the New Development Bank and advocacy for climate justice, the paper highlights severe internal tensions—particularly between China and India—and regional rivalries among new members like Iran and Saudi Arabia that may hinder the bloc's cohesion.

The ninth FOCAC Beijing Summit signaled a recalibration of China-Africa relations, moving toward a partnership defined by African agency and a focus on quality outcomes over quantity. Despite a period of declining lending since 2016, China committed USD 50.7 billion over three years, focusing on agricultural market access, mineral processing, and infrastructure. The summit highlighted Africa's desire for value addition and industrialization, as well as China's assertive push to promote its governance model and Global South leadership through the Global Development, Security, and Civilization Initiatives. This shift poses a competitive challenge to the EU and US, as African nations increasingly prioritize partnerships that offer tangible utility and respect for sovereignty.

The DRC and Zambia are attempting to transition from extractive economies to value-added battery producers to support the global green transition. While they possess critical reserves of cobalt and copper, their efforts are complicated by a history of privatization, problematic governance, and a geopolitical tug-of-war between the USA and China. To succeed, both nations must expand local processing capacity and improve infrastructure, such as the Lobito Corridor, while managing the social and environmental impacts of mining.

The document analyzes the global race to secure critical minerals, detailing the subsidy-driven strategies of the US, EU, UK, and Canada, and the dominant market position of China in battery production. It argues that African nations can leverage their mineral wealth to drive sustainable structural transformation by adopting a 'climate-resilient developmental regionalism' framework under the AfCFTA, which integrates climate adaptation and mitigation with regional industrialization.

The report identifies the intersection of food insecurity and climate change as a critical threat to US national security, citing risks such as political instability, the weaponization of food by adversaries, and geopolitical competition over agricultural technology and fish stocks. It highlights gaps in the US policy landscape, including institutional silos and underfunding of agricultural R&D. To address these, the authors propose 'The Feeding Resilience Plan,' which recommends a new Food Security Executive Order, a standing National Security Council process, expanded forecasting via FEWSNET, increased investment in climate-resilient agricultural innovation, and diplomatic engagement to oppose food weaponization and cooperate with partners and competitors like China.

The document examines the diplomatic, military, and economic ties between Egypt and Russia over the last decade, highlighting a shared preference for authoritarian stability and a mutual desire to balance Western influence. While cooperation has expanded in arms procurement and nuclear energy, the author contends the relationship remains transactional and flexible, as Egypt employs a strategy of diplomatic hedging to maintain ties with both Moscow and the West.

The research paper examines the intersection of G7 initiatives, such as the Energy for Growth in Africa Initiative and the Mattei Plan, with South Africa's role as a representative for African climate priorities. It highlights the tension between Western-led green transitions and African concerns over 'green protectionism' (specifically the EU's CBAM), the need for adaptation financing based on the 'common but differentiated responsibilities' principle, and the geopolitical competition for critical minerals. The author argues that the G7 must provide concrete deliverables and respect African agency to effectively bridge its goals with South Africa's upcoming G20 presidency.

The Sahel region is experiencing a major geopolitical shift as Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso have formed the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) and severed ties with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). This move reflects deep-seated anti-French and anti-EU sentiment, driven by perceptions of neo-colonialism and a focus on security and migration over socio-economic development. As the EU's influence wanes, Russia has expanded its presence through military cooperation and strategic economic interests, including potential control over Niger's uranium. The author argues that the EU and ECOWAS must move away from punitive sanctions and colonial-era approaches toward equal partnerships and dialogue to maintain stability and influence in the region.

The document examines how the competition between the US, China, and Russia affects African states, noting a shift toward non-alignment and the diversification of international relations to avoid becoming geopolitical pawns. It argues that African agency can be strengthened by empowering the African Union (AU), leveraging the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and demanding partnerships based on mutual benefit rather than great-power rivalry. The Lobito Corridor is cited as a model where competing interests can coexist to provide tangible regional benefits.

The document examines the tension between African developmental goals for critical minerals and the geopolitical priorities of external powers, specifically the US-led G7 and China. It highlights China's early-mover advantage in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zimbabwe, while noting that G7 counter-initiatives often prioritize supply chain security over African local value addition. The authors argue that African nations must develop comprehensive national and regional strategies to avoid repeating colonial extraction patterns and to leverage their resources for sustainable industrialisation.

The Philippines is pursuing an ambitious digitalisation agenda under President Ferdinand Marcos Jr., but this effort is complicated by the pervasive influence of China's Digital Silk Road (DSR). While Chinese technology provides cheap alternatives in 5G, cloud computing, and fintech, it introduces significant risks regarding data privacy, national security, and the potential spread of digital authoritarianism. These challenges are exacerbated by an outdated legal framework that fails to address modern technological breakthroughs. The authors argue that the Philippines must update its legislation and diversify foreign investment to build internal resilience and safeguard its digital sovereignty.

The European Union has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia to secure critical raw materials (CRM) essential for green and digital transitions. These agreements aim to reduce the EU's heavy reliance on imports from quasi-monopolistic suppliers, particularly China. However, the paper identifies significant obstacles, including the DRC and Zambia's lack of comprehensive national CRM policies, high levels of corruption and political instability, and the continued dominance of Chinese mining interests in both countries. The author argues that for these partnerships to succeed, the EU must prioritize industrial and economic alignment over geopolitical security agendas and find ways to de-risk investments for the European private sector, potentially by strengthening state-owned mining companies in the partner countries.

The report analyzes the energy strategy of the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) countries, finding that planned LNG and pipeline capacity will significantly exceed projected gas demand by 2030. It warns that this creates a risk of stranded assets and security vulnerabilities due to global price volatility. The author advocates for shifting investment from gas infrastructure to wind, solar, and grid interconnectors, noting that 3SI countries could reach a 67% renewable electricity share by 2030.

The document examines how African nations have responded to the Russia-Ukraine war, highlighting a trend toward non-alignment and a reluctance to support punitive measures against Russia. It argues that African responses are driven by a combination of historical grievances with Western leadership (such as the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya and COVID-19 vaccine inequity) and strategic national interests. The report details the economic opportunities arising from Europe's shift away from Russian energy, specifically regarding natural gas and critical minerals, while warning that geopolitical rivalry between the US, Russia, and China may undermine regional security initiatives like the Accra Initiative. It concludes by advocating for a foreign policy based on 'non-alignment' and 'indivisible security' to avoid becoming proxies in a new Cold War.