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Ember's analysis reveals a significant gap between planned renewable energy expansion and available grid capacity in Europe, with at least 120 GW of projects at risk. While some distribution grids can support household electrification, transmission bottlenecks threaten large-scale wind and solar projects, particularly in countries like Austria, Bulgaria, and Poland. The report advocates for 'non-wire solutions' and administrative reforms to unlock capacity and ensure energy security.

The document argues that the ICJ's 2025 advisory opinion transforms the legal landscape for investment disputes by establishing that climate action is a binding legal obligation rather than a discretionary policy choice. This shift undermines investor claims based on 'legitimate expectations' for fossil fuel activities and provides states with stronger defenses against claims of unfair and inequitable treatment (FET) or indirect expropriation. The author recommends that states reform investment treaties to exclude climate measures from compensation claims, limit prospective damages based on future fossil fuel revenues, and negotiate agreements to neutralize survival clauses in treaties like the Energy Charter Treaty.

The ICJ's 2025 Advisory Opinion establishes that states have binding legal obligations to protect the climate system, which includes phasing out fossil fuel production and subsidies. This finding challenges the legal basis for many investor-state claims, as it undermines the 'legitimate expectations' of investors in carbon-intensive industries and provides states with stronger defenses against claims of fair and equitable treatment (FET) violations. The brief argues that the prospect of ISDS can cause 'regulatory chill,' deterring necessary climate action. It recommends that states reform investment treaties through sector-based carve-outs, restrict forward-looking damages based on projected fossil fuel revenues, and coordinate withdrawals from outdated agreements like the Energy Charter Treaty.

The report highlights that 'next generation geothermal' technologies, such as Enhanced Geothermal Systems (EGS), have expanded the geographic viability of geothermal power beyond volcanic regions. In the EU, approximately 43 GW of capacity could be developed at costs below 100 €/MWh, potentially generating 301 TWh of electricity annually. While Europe has a strong historical foundation in geothermal energy, the report warns that the EU risks losing its leadership to the US and Canada due to slow permitting and a lack of coordinated policy frameworks. It also notes geothermal's potential to meet the rising energy demands of AI data centres and its ability to provide firm, low-carbon power and mineral recovery, such as lithium.

The report documents a surge in anti-LGBTQ+ hate crimes, book bans, and restrictive legislation in Western countries, noting a convergence of extremist ideologies. It highlights how tech platforms exacerbate these harms through the rollback of protections, the overmoderation of LGBTQ+ content via AI and safety legislation, and the rise of coordinated harassment campaigns like 'transvestigation'.

The document outlines the potential for geothermal energy to decarbonize district heating in Central and Eastern Europe, identifying financing and risk as the primary bottlenecks. It highlights national strategies in Hungary, Croatia, Poland, and Slovakia, while advocating for the adoption of next-generation technologies and a unified regional voice to influence EU policy.

The report identifies 27 factors across four themes—EU internal dynamics, expected effects of enlargement, attitudes/norms/perceptions, and external factors—that influence EU accession decisions. It argues that while the process is formally merit-based, EU actors exercise significant discretion, with normative factors dominating early candidacy and economic or political interests predominating during later negotiations. The analysis highlights how these factors varied across the 'Big Bang' (2004), 'Coda' (2007), and Croatia (2013) rounds, and provides forecasts for the 'Trio' of Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia.

In 2025, Europe transitioned toward commercial-scale CCS deployment, marked by the first fully operational value chain at Norway's Brevik cement plant. While ten projects reached final investment decisions (FID) between December 2024 and October 2025—adding approximately 4 Mt CO2/year of capture and 14 Mt CO2/year of storage capacity—deployment remains far below the trajectories needed for 2040 and 2050 climate targets. Progress is heavily reliant on blended finance and corporate carbon dioxide removal (CDR) offtake agreements, particularly with Microsoft. Geographically, CCS is expanding from Northern European hubs into Southern and Central & Eastern Europe, with new projects in Spain, Italy, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary. Policy advancements include the Net-Zero Industry Act's 2030 injection target and Germany's 2025 legislation classifying CO2 transport and storage as projects of overriding public interest.

The report argues that temporary CRCF units from carbon farming are currently of low quality due to insufficient management of non-permanence and additionality risks, making them unsuitable for offsetting emissions. It assesses proposed EU agri-food policies—including an Agricultural Emissions Trading System (AgETS) and Mandatory Climate Standards (MCS)—concluding that allowing these units as offsets would undermine environmental integrity. The authors recommend shifting toward activity-based payments, either through a reformed Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) or other public funding mechanisms, to promote carbon farming without the integrity risks associated with result-based crediting.

The document outlines the views of TSOs from Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia regarding EU grid development. While generally supportive of the European Grids Package, these operators express low confidence in EU-level coordination, citing administrative burdens and a perception of Western European dominance in policy shaping. Key barriers identified include outdated infrastructure, regulatory fragmentation, and complex access to EU funding mechanisms like the Connecting Europe Facility (CEF). The TSOs emphasize the need for more practical, inclusive reforms that respect national sovereignty and address specific security risks for countries on the EU's external borders.

The EU remains highly vulnerable to energy price shocks and supply disruptions due to a 58% reliance on imported fossil fuels for primary energy. While the power sector has largely transitioned to homegrown sources, sectors like transport (88% reliant on imports) and buildings remain exposed. The report argues that electrification can reduce fossil import dependency to 30% by 2040, noting that 67% of EU energy demand can already be electrified with mature technologies. Current frontrunners, such as Denmark with electric vehicles and the Netherlands with heat pumps, demonstrate significant displacement of oil and gas imports.

Central Europe's solar generation grew at twice the EU average rate between 2019 and 2024, with cumulative output increasing from 5 TWh to 29 TWh. While Hungary, Poland, and Czechia have seen significant surges—with Hungary reaching nearly 25% solar share in 2024—Slovakia has lagged due to policy hurdles. Despite this growth, the region's battery deployment remains low at 0.1 GW as of August 2025, though Poland has a substantial 7.3 GW project pipeline. The report argues that the region must improve grid flexibility and storage to sustain solar momentum and leverage its position as a global battery manufacturing hub.

The report examines the challenges and opportunities for a 'green recovery' in Ukraine following Russia's invasion, which caused direct damages of USD 176 billion. While Ukraine has established governance structures and transparency tools like the DREAM platform, it lacks a unified national reconstruction strategy, leaving sustainability efforts fragmented. The document highlights the town of Trostianets as a successful local model of sustainable rebuilding and suggests that Ukraine align its recovery with EU standards, such as the EU Taxonomy and the Recovery and Resilience Facility. It recommends the adoption of international green building and infrastructure certifications (e.g., EDGE, Envision) to ensure long-term resilience and climate neutrality.

The policy brief examines the energy landscape of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, highlighting the region's struggle to balance immediate energy affordability with long-term decarbonisation. It identifies new security risks, specifically China's dominance in clean energy supply chains and conflicting policy signals from the US and EU. The author advocates for a technology-neutral approach—integrating nuclear, renewables, and emerging technologies like CCS—and suggests that CEE can become a clean-tech manufacturing hub. Furthermore, it emphasizes the strategic importance of integrating Ukraine, Moldova, and the Western Balkans into the EU energy grid to enhance regional resilience.

The document outlines a new energy security framework for Central and Eastern Europe, emphasizing the transition to clean energy to reduce vulnerabilities associated with fossil fuel imports and geopolitical instability. It advocates for the removal of fossil fuel subsidies, the establishment of a grid security framework to counter hybrid warfare, and the expansion of the EU single energy market through harmonized permitting and increased interconnectivity. Additionally, it calls for the EU to adopt an incentive-based investment approach, similar to the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act, to maintain global competitiveness and avoid reliance on non-EU financing.

The document outlines a new energy security framework for Central and Eastern Europe, emphasizing the transition from fossil fuel imports to clean energy to mitigate geopolitical risks. It calls for the elimination of fossil fuel subsidies, the creation of a grid security framework to counter hybrid warfare, and the expansion of the EU single energy market through harmonized permitting and increased interconnector investment. Additionally, it advocates for an incentive-based investment approach similar to the US Inflation Reduction Act to maintain European competitiveness and prevent reliance on non-EU financing.

The report argues that while the EU aims to triple data centre capacity within five to seven years, grid congestion in traditional hubs like Dublin, Frankfurt, and Amsterdam is creating a primary barrier to growth. This is shifting investment toward markets with better grid preparedness, such as the Nordics and Belgium. Data centres are identified as unique grid challenges due to their large, localised, and continuous loads. Despite their economic benefits—including GDP growth and job creation—forecasts suggest the EU will likely only double its capacity by 2030, falling short of its target.

The document analyzes the legal requirements of Article 9 of the Nature Restoration Law (NRL), which mandates the restoration of at least 25,000km of free-flowing rivers in the EU by 2030. It details the process for creating barrier inventories, prioritizing the removal of obsolete structures, and ensuring these actions align with other EU frameworks like the Water Framework Directive (WFD) and the Habitats Directive. The briefing emphasizes the need for longitudinal, lateral, and vertical connectivity and warns against using the Renewable Energy Directive to justify the retention of obsolete barriers.

The document analyzes the interdependencies between the EU, China, and Africa regarding critical raw materials (CRMs). While the EU seeks to reduce its reliance on China through initiatives like the Critical Raw Materials Act and the Global Gateway, the paper argues that complete decoupling is unfeasible due to China's dominance in midstream processing and the high costs of establishing independent European supply chains. It highlights that African nations, particularly the DRC and Zimbabwe, are increasingly pushing for local value addition and processing rather than mere extraction. The author proposes a trilateral cooperation model, using a hypothetical cobalt project in the DRC, where the EU provides technical training and financing, China provides refining technology and market access, and the DRC ensures resource ownership and local industrial development.

The document argues that Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries must implement coordinated national and regional strategies to decarbonise heavy industries like refining and ammonia production. It identifies four priority actions: cost-competitive policy design, targeted deployment in industrial clusters, shared financial risk schemes, and cross-border collaboration for infrastructure. The analysis highlights that CEE accounts for nearly 25% of EU hydrogen consumption, with Poland as the dominant user, and emphasizes that the lack of domestic regulatory frameworks for CO2 storage in Poland currently forces a reliance on more expensive export options.