Navigating Critical Mineral Supply Chains: The EU's Partnerships with the DRC and Zambia

The European Union has signed Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Zambia to secure critical raw materials (CRM) essential for green and digital transitions. These agreements aim to reduce the EU's heavy reliance on imports from quasi-monopolistic suppliers, particularly China. However, the paper identifies significant obstacles, including the DRC and Zambia's lack of comprehensive national CRM policies, high levels of corruption and political instability, and the continued dominance of Chinese mining interests in both countries. The author argues that for these partnerships to succeed, the EU must prioritize industrial and economic alignment over geopolitical security agendas and find ways to de-risk investments for the European private sector, potentially by strengthening state-owned mining companies in the partner countries.

• The EU is pursuing a diversification strategy to mitigate its 'heavy reliance on imports, often from quasi-monopolistic third country suppliers', specifically China, for minerals vital to wind power, hydrogen storage, and batteries.
• In October 2023, the EU signed separate but identical MoUs with the DRC and Zambia to cooperate on critical raw materials value chains, following similar partnerships with Canada, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Namibia, Argentina, and Chile.
• The DRC and Zambia lack comprehensive national strategic policies for critical raw materials; the DRC's 2018 classification of cobalt, coltan, and germanium as strategic minerals was driven by financial royalties rather than a long-term strategic policy.
• The EU faces significant challenges in mobilizing its private sector due to the DRC and Zambia's poor governance, corruption, and political instability, with the DRC listed as having a 'very low level of governance' on EU supplier maps.
• Despite EU and US efforts, China maintains a dominant position in the DRC and Zambia; the DRC recently upgraded diplomatic relations with China to a 'comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership'.
• The author suggests that the EU could secure direct supplies by strengthening the capacities of state-owned companies in producing countries, such as Gécamines or Sakima in the DRC and ZCCM Investments Holdings in Zambia.

APA

Byamungu, C. G. N. (2024). Navigating Critical Mineral Supply Chains: The EU's Partnerships with the DRC and Zambia. Africa Policy Research Institute. https://afripoli.org/navigating-critical-mineral-supply-chains-the-eus-partnerships-with-the-drc-and-zambia

Chicago

Byamungu, Christian Géraud Neema. Navigating Critical Mineral Supply Chains: The EU's Partnerships with the DRC and Zambia. Africa Policy Research Institute, 2024. https://afripoli.org/navigating-critical-mineral-supply-chains-the-eus-partnerships-with-the-drc-and-zambia.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Byamungu |first1=Christian Géraud Neema |title=Navigating Critical Mineral Supply Chains: The EU's Partnerships with the DRC and Zambia |publisher=Africa Policy Research Institute |date=6 March 2024 |url=https://afripoli.org/navigating-critical-mineral-supply-chains-the-eus-partnerships-with-the-drc-and-zambia |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{byamungu2024navigating, author = {Byamungu, Christian Géraud Neema}, title = {{Navigating Critical Mineral Supply Chains: The EU's Partnerships with the DRC and Zambia}}, institution = {Africa Policy Research Institute}, year = {2024}, month = mar, url = {https://afripoli.org/navigating-critical-mineral-supply-chains-the-eus-partnerships-with-the-drc-and-zambia}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }