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The report details how climate change drives biodiversity loss through mechanisms like ocean acidification and species range shifts, while biodiversity loss weakens the planet's carbon sinks. It critically assesses 'false solutions'—including monoculture tree plantations, carbon offsetting, and geoengineering—arguing that these policies often cause further ecological damage and land grabbing. The document calls for a systemic shift toward agroecology, energy sufficiency, and the protection of Indigenous Peoples' land rights to address the polycrisis holistically.

In 2024, global coal power saw a contradiction: while new completions reached a 20-year low of 44 GW and the EU increased retirements fourfold, China and India saw record-breaking activity. China's new coal starts reached a ten-year high of 94 GW, driven by approval surges in 2022-2023 and supportive policies like capacity electricity tariffs and long-term power purchase agreements. Conversely, OECD nations have significantly reduced planned projects, though their retirement pace remains too slow to meet Paris Agreement goals.

In 2024, global coal capacity saw a net increase of 18.8 GW despite the lowest number of new commissions in 20 years, driven primarily by record construction activity in China and India. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK eliminated coal entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to expand capacity. The report highlights a stark divide between OECD countries, where projects have plummeted, and Asia, where China and India account for 92% of new projects.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in two decades, though China and India continued significant expansions. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, Indonesia experienced a surge in 'captive' coal plants for industrial use, contradicting its stated transition goals.

In 2024, global coal capacity saw a net increase of 18.8GW, driven by record construction in China (94GW) and high proposals in India (38GW), despite the lowest new capacity additions in 20 years (44GW). While the EU27 quadrupled its closures and the UK fully phased out coal, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend the life of coal plants, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with the Paris Agreement.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years (44 GW), though global capacity still saw a net increase of 18.8 GW. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, China and India saw record construction starts and proposals, respectively. Outside these two nations, development capacity has fallen for ten consecutive years. In Latin America, new proposals are nearly zero, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep existing plants operational despite the competitiveness of renewables.

In 2024, global coal-fired power capacity additions reached their lowest level in 20 years at 44 GW, though net capacity still increased by 18.8 GW due to continued growth in China and India. While the EU saw a fourfold increase in retired capacity and the UK became the sixth country to fully exit coal since the Paris Agreement, China and India saw record-high numbers of new plant starts and proposals. In OECD countries, planned coal plants have dropped from 142 in 2015 to five today, with Turkey and Australia remaining among the few with active projects. Turkey specifically is noted as the only OECD country actively increasing coal-based electricity production, despite a 2053 net-zero target and the recent approval of an expansion at the Afşin-Elbistan complex.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years, though a net increase in the global fleet occurred due to record construction starts in China and new proposals in India. While the EU27 saw coal retirements quadruple and the UK eliminated coal power entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to seek new plants. In Latin America, proposals are declining, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep coal plants operational.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in 20 years, though total capacity still grew by 18.8 GW due to record construction starts in China and high proposal numbers in India. While OECD nations have seen planned coal plants drop from 142 in 2015 to 5 currently, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend coal use, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with Paris Agreement goals.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements. While OECD countries and the EU are accelerating phaseouts—with the UK becoming the sixth country to eliminate coal entirely—China and India continue to drive global expansion. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). Outside these two nations, coal development has declined for ten consecutive years. However, the report notes that current retirement rates in OECD countries must more than triple to meet 1.5°C warming targets.

Southeast Asia is facing a potential surge in gas production, with 14 projects potentially reaching final investment decisions (FIDs) in 2025. If approved, these would add over 20 bcm/y of capacity, an 18% increase over current output. However, many projects have a history of delays, and the expansion threatens ecologically sensitive areas like the Coral Triangle and Mekong Delta. The report highlights contradictions between these extraction plans and the net-zero commitments of Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Brunei.

The report analyzes the role of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), International Investment Agreements (IIAs), and Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) in the critical minerals supply chain. It highlights a fundamental tension: exporting countries seek to maximize domestic value addition and industrialization, while importing countries prioritize stable, affordable access to raw materials. Through case studies of Chile, Indonesia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the report demonstrates that while newer agreements are beginning to incorporate ESG standards and protect policy space for producers, old-generation IIAs still pose significant risks via Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) mechanisms. The authors recommend that exporting countries reform outdated treaties to secure industrial policy space and that importing countries support value addition in producer nations to enhance overall supply chain resilience.

The report finds that none of the 20 largest European and UK banks have developed a robust climate transition plan, with an average score of 41/100. While banks have improved reporting and governance to meet regulatory requirements, they lack concrete decarbonization and engagement strategies, often continuing to finance fossil fuel development. The analysis highlights a significant gap between public net-zero commitments and actual business model shifts, warning that current disclosures are more 'ESG marketing material' than actionable transition plans.

The report finds that 'responsible' employee savings funds offered by France's top account keepers are marginal and often contradictory to climate goals. It highlights that over 30% of responsible funds from Crédit Agricole and Société Générale invest in fossil fuel expansion, attributing this to partnerships with asset managers like Amundi. The study also accuses these institutions of greenwashing through misleading marketing, while noting that BNP Paribas E&RE and Natixis Interépargne offer more aligned options via managers like Mirova.

The Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations (CDC), a major French public investor managing 323 billion euros, is criticized for a lack of transparency regarding its portfolio composition and voting records. Despite claiming alignment with a 1.5°C trajectory, the CDC holds 9.2 billion euros in fossil fuel-related investments and lacks a strict ban on companies developing new oil and gas projects. Furthermore, the CDC delegates approximately 10 billion euros to external asset managers without applying robust climate selection criteria, potentially exposing public savings to climate-harmful strategies.

The document examines the transition to a sustainable bioeconomy in the tropics, focusing on the institutional, business, and technological environments of specific bioresources in Thailand, Kenya, and Colombia. It highlights a systemic gap where public policies prioritize economic growth and productivity over environmental and social sustainability, particularly for smallholder farmers. While Thailand leads in high-value bioproducts like bioplastics from cassava, it faces challenges with soil degradation and labor shortages. In contrast, Kenya and Colombia primarily use cassava for food security, with nascent industrial sectors. The paper also explores non-timber forest products (NTFPs), such as croton in Kenya and açaí in Colombia, noting that while they offer high value and conservation potential, they are hindered by complex regulatory permits and a lack of scaled investment. The authors recommend shifting from monocultures to sustainable production systems, strengthening smallholder cooperatives, and streamlining biodiversity regulations to ensure an inclusive and ecologically sound bioeconomy.

The document analyzes how climate change disrupts agricultural yields and trade flows, particularly in developing regions, while contributing significantly to global GHG emissions. It highlights the risks of food insecurity and the potential for trade-related climate measures to marginalize vulnerable economies. The author argues for a comprehensive international cooperation agenda focused on reducing trade tensions, reforming harmful subsidies, facilitating technology transfer, and securing global food stocks to ensure a fair transition to sustainable agriculture.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in two decades at 44 GW, though China and India continued significant expansions. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in plant closures and the UK shut its last coal plant, Indonesia faces a contradictory trend: overall proposed capacity is down 90% since 2015, but 'captive' coal plants for industrial use are surging. Indonesia's transition is further complicated by conflicting government statements on a 2040 phase-out, the withdrawal of the US from the JETP leadership, and record coal production reaching 831 million tons in 2024.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global coal fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements. The report highlights a stark divergence: while the UK became coal-free and EU27 retirements quadrupled, China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW) and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). Together, China and India accounted for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity in 2024. In the OECD, proposals have plummeted from 142 in 2015 to five today, though annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to meet 1.5°C pathways. The report also notes the rise of 'captive' coal plants in Indonesia and the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea as strategies to prolong coal use.

The report finds that while some progress has been made since 2015, the EU and UK failed to meet the 2020 deadline to end overfishing, with over 40% of assessed TACs for 2021 still exceeding scientific advice. It highlights a particular lack of consistency in following advice for data-limited stocks and notes a mixed record for the UK, which improved transparency by including NGOs in negotiations but continued to push for unsustainable bycatch TACs and inter-area flexibility in the West of Scotland.