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Brazil is characterized as a global leader in renewable energy and a sophisticated nuclear actor, yet it faces severe systemic risks. The country is pursuing a nuclear-powered submarine program while managing rising deforestation in the Amazon and significant climate threats, including projected temperature increases of 1°C to 2.2°C by 2060. These environmental stressors intersect with deep socioeconomic inequality, a fragile healthcare system strained by COVID-19, and political instability marked by a shift toward authoritarianism and widespread corruption. The document argues that the intersection of these climate, health, and political crises could undermine Brazil's stability and its role in the international order.

The Council on Strategic Risks argues that the United States must adopt an integrated, whole-of-government approach to confront existential security threats. The authors propose the creation of a dedicated White House Strategy on Confronting Strategic Security Risks and specific National Security Presidential Directives to coordinate the Pentagon, intelligence community, and diplomatic agencies. Key recommendations include establishing a comprehensive Climate Security Strategy, creating a rapid response system for biological outbreaks, and reshaping nuclear doctrine to move away from destabilizing 'low yield' weapons and toward renewed arms control agreements.

The authors contend that the ocean is a critical but overlooked factor in global health, security, and economic stability. They highlight how climate change drives systemic risks—including sea-level rise, extreme weather, and collapsing fisheries—while asserting that sustainable ocean-based industries like offshore wind and seaweed harvesting can facilitate a transition to a cleaner economy. The text calls for multilateral collaboration and science-based management to ensure the resilience of marine ecosystems and human populations.

The Council on Strategic Risks identifies a gap between the existing technical capacity for real-time pathogen surveillance and the actual implementation in the United States. While tools like next-generation sequencing and metagenomics enable rapid detection, the U.S. response is hindered by outdated data sharing methods, such as fax machines, and a lack of a trusted, neutral entity to manage global health data. The report advocates for a 'wartime footing' to modernize public health infrastructure and create a coordinated, potentially independent, data-focused institute to manage pathogen information.

The author contends that the existence of specific nuclear capabilities leads to the creation of contingency plans that can easily be executed, potentially bypassing political restraint. Citing the short interval between the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the text argues that technical capabilities and the routine work of war planners shape the conditions for nuclear use more than high-level policy. The author advocates for moving away from nuclear weapon types that are perceived as 'usable' or prone to miscalculation.

The author contends that the White House has intentionally failed in its duty to inform the public by attempting to block scientific testimony from experts on both climate change and COVID-19. These actions are described as a consistent pattern of science suppression that leaves the American public vulnerable and unsafe, thereby posing a national security threat.

The briefing analyzes the intersection of climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, economic instability, deteriorating governance, and nuclear-armed geopolitical tensions in South Asia. It argues that these converging risks create non-linear dynamics that could lead to a systemic collapse or 'regime shift,' posing significant spillover risks to the global international system.

The document analyzes how environmental degradation, the pursuit of civilian nuclear power, and geopolitical tensions—primarily involving China—intersect to create instability in the South China Sea region. It highlights the vulnerability of Indonesia and the Philippines to sea-level rise and extreme weather, their efforts to establish nuclear energy frameworks via IAEA guidance, and the internal threat posed by ISIL-affiliated extremists. The report argues that these converging risks, combined with hegemonic competition between the U.S. and China, threaten regional stability.

The Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) identifies systemic racism, xenophobia, and rising authoritarianism as drivers of dangerous human security consequences in the U.S. The organization commits to integrating the experiences of vulnerable groups into its analysis of systemic risks, asserting that justice is a prerequisite for peace and security.

The authors, former U.S. officials, assert that racial injustice and inequality within the United States fundamentally threaten national security and undermine the country's standing as a global beacon of freedom.

The authors highlight the accuracy of previous intelligence warnings regarding pandemics to argue that similar foresight must be applied to climate change. They assert that unabated climate change will trigger global instability through food and water insecurity, mass migration, increased international tensions, and high-impact 'wildcard' events, necessitating a move toward net-zero emissions to protect global security.

The authors defend the creation of Kazakhstan's new Central Reference Laboratory (CRL), which opened on January 1, 2020. Funded by the US Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction program, the CRL replaces the dilapidated Kazakh Scientific Center for Quarantine and Zoonotic Diseases (KSCQZD). The authors contend that the CRL's BSL-2 and BSL-3 standards mitigate the risk of laboratory accidents and natural infectious diseases, such as Crimean Congo hemorrhagic fever and COVID-19, while calling for regional cooperation between Kazakhstan, Russia, and China to ensure transparency and compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention.

The authors argue that COVID-19 and climate change are direct threats to U.S. national security and act as 'threat multipliers' that amplify geostrategic competition and local conflicts. They contend that the U.S. should not simply reallocate funds away from national defense but instead expand the defense toolkit to include biodefense, climate adaptation for military bases, and support for international cooperation to prevent the collapse of global governance systems.

The document examines how the COVID-19 pandemic and climate change concurrently degrade the readiness of the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). It highlights the financial and operational strain caused by severe weather, specifically citing the $3.6 billion in damages to Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune from Hurricane Florence. The author contends that the DoD should apply the same decisive adaptation strategies used to combat COVID-19 to mitigate long-term climate risks, such as recurrent flooding and wildfires, to ensure national security and deter adversaries.

The author recommends two immediate 'Day One' actions for a U.S. President to address climate security: rejoining the Paris Agreement to restore international leadership and announcing a whole-of-government 'Climate Security Plan for America'. This plan is structured around four pillars: demonstrating leadership through a new White House Office on Climate Security, assessing risks via an interagency Climate Security Crisis Watch Center in the ODNI, supporting allies through Regional Climate Security Plans, and preparing for impacts through a Climate Security Infrastructure Initiative and a global greenhouse gas emission reduction policy.

The document details a March 3 hearing where U.S. defense officials discussed the strategic challenges of the Arctic. Key issues include the military buildup of Russia and China, the degradation of military and local infrastructure due to permafrost thaw, and a critical shortage of icebreakers. While the U.S. is pursuing a Polar Security Cutter Program, officials acknowledged current limitations in conducting Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in ice-congested waters compared to Russia's extensive icebreaker fleet.

The author contends that the world's failure to prepare for the coronavirus pandemic demonstrates a need for a dedicated international organization to treat pandemics as global security problems. This proposed institution would be a public-private enterprise featuring a Scientific Advisory Board, a 24/7 Situation Centre, and Rapid Response Assistance Teams. The author suggests using the Biological Weapons Convention as a legal framework and proposes that a coalition including the European Union, ASEAN, the United Kingdom, Japan, and Australia could provide the necessary leadership to establish the body.

Turkey is pursuing a civilian nuclear energy program to diversify its energy sources and meet rapidly growing electricity demand, primarily through the Akkuyu Nuclear Power Plant developed with Russia under a 'build-own-operate' (BOO) model. While Turkey adheres to international nonproliferation regimes and collaborates with the IAEA, the BOO model creates risks regarding regulatory oversight, information asymmetry, and potential safety compromises to reduce costs. Additionally, Turkey faces significant climate security threats, including drought and sea-level rise, which may impact the operation of its coastal nuclear sites. The program also reflects Turkey's complex strategic balancing between Russia and NATO allies.

The author contends that while the U.S. government has established frameworks for critical infrastructure through CISA and the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, these plans overlook the workers—such as grocery store staff and delivery drivers—who keep these systems operational. The text highlights a lack of consistent definitions for 'essential workers' across different states and a lack of protections for those without unions. It proposes a review of the Stafford Act to establish a shared lexicon and legal recognition for these employees to improve future pandemic preparedness and national security.

The document examines the vulnerabilities of India's nuclear infrastructure to climate-induced threats, including sea-level rise, cyclones, and extreme rainfall. It highlights a history of 'near-misses' and safety lapses, arguing that the lack of an independent regulator and a culture of secrecy exacerbate these risks. The author identifies the west coast and Tamil Nadu as high-risk zones and notes that climate change may indirectly increase nuclear tensions via the India-Pakistan rivalry over the Indus River Basin.