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The document assesses South Africa's strategic position in global development, arguing that the country can strengthen its peacebuilding and PCRD efforts in Africa by leveraging the IBSA Fund and the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB). It highlights the role of the newly established SADPA in coordinating these efforts while cautioning that South Africa must align its PCRD vision with the African Union and manage domestic perceptions of its outgoing aid.

The document assesses South Africa's role as an emerging global actor in peace and security, specifically its interactions with the UN peacebuilding architecture (PBC, PBSO, and PBF). It highlights South Africa's experience in mediation and peacekeeping in countries like the DRC and Burundi, while noting a lack of systematic staffing of South Africans in the UN system. The paper emphasizes the potential of South-South cooperation, exemplified by the IBSA Fund, and recommends that South Africa leverage the 2015 UN peacebuilding review to promote African perspectives and national ownership of peace processes.

The emergence of the Islamic State represents a significant shift in global jihadism, offering a divisive alternative to al-Qaeda. Africa is particularly vulnerable due to the presence of established radical Islamist groups and the potential return of thousands of battle-hardened African fighters from Iraq and Syria. The document warns that the Islamic State's model of territorial occupation and its extreme ideology could destabilise several African regions, particularly North and West Africa. It argues that governments should avoid draconian counter-terrorism measures, which often fuel radicalisation, and instead pursue criminal justice-based approaches that address local drivers of discontent.

The research finds that most African countries are unlikely to meet the World Bank's target of reducing extreme poverty to below 3% by 2030. Using the International Futures (IFs) model, the authors argue for a more achievable continental goal of reducing extreme poverty to below 20% by 2030 and below 3% by 2063. The paper emphasizes that poverty reduction requires a combination of pro-poor economic growth, social assistance, human development, and progressive social change, noting that policies must be tailored to individual country contexts due to varying initial conditions and poverty gaps.

The report examines the instability in Burkina Faso stemming from President Blaise Compaoré's efforts to amend Article 37 of the constitution to extend his presidency. It highlights a fragile socio-economic environment, a significant rift within the ruling Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès (CDP) party leading to the creation of the Mouvement du people pour le progrès (MPP), and the potential for military intervention. The document notes that while the CDP remains the most powerful political force, the opposition and civil society have shown an unprecedented capacity for mobilization. Mediation efforts by domestic figures and Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara have largely failed due to a lack of trust and irreconcilable positions.

The document analyzes protection racketeering in Cape Town, contrasting the sophisticated, networked rackets in the CBD with the more diverse and often opportunistic extortion on the Cape Flats. It argues that these rackets persist not only due to state capacity failures but also through the blurring of lines between legal private security and criminal enterprises, as well as systemic police corruption.

The document proposes a new analytical framework for understanding organised crime, suggesting that criminal networks act as 'parallel sovereigns' that exercise authority in spaces neglected by formal institutions. It argues that the global neoliberal market has replaced the state as the primary referent of sovereignty, allowing criminal networks to commoditise influence and political connectivity to integrate themselves into governance.

The report analyzes the failure of international interventions in the DRC's security sector between 2003 and 2013. It argues that the 'technocratic interpretation' of violence as a lack of state capacity ignored the neo-patrimonial nature of the Congolese state, where elites benefit from a fragmented and divided military (FARDC). While the 2013 defeat of the M23 rebellion provided a temporary success and a window for reform, the authors warn that the underlying political incentives for maintaining a weak, divided army remain strong. The report critiques the 'train and equip' model of SSR and the early phases of the International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy (ISSSS), suggesting that future efforts must move beyond technical fixes to address local community grievances and the opaque power structures in Kinshasa.

The report examines the deteriorating political climate in Burundi as it approaches the 2015 elections. It highlights the ruling CNDD-FDD party's efforts to restrict political space, its attempts to amend the constitution to allow President Pierre Nkurunziza a third term, and the role of the Imbonerakure youth wing in intimidating opponents. While the army is viewed as stable, the report warns that the Imbonerakure and a restrictive legal environment pose significant risks to stability.

The document examines why international efforts to reform the security sector and stabilise the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 2003 and 2013 achieved limited impact. It argues that the FARDC is shaped by a neo-patrimonial system where political and military elites benefit from a fragmented army and weak state institutions to maintain patronage networks. International interventions, including the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS), were overly technical—focusing on 'train-and-equip' models—and failed to address the political root causes of violence. While the 2013 defeat of the M23 rebellion provided a temporary success and a window for reform, the authors caution that the underlying incentive structures remain largely unchanged.

The 2014 South African Defence Review describes the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) as being in a 'critical state of decline' due to obsolescence, force imbalance, and unsustainable budgeting. The review proposes a long-term rejuvenation plan through four planning milestones extending to 2034, requiring significant budget increases. However, the author argues that the review's 'mandate-driven' approach is overly expansive given South Africa's financial constraints and actual tasks. The brief recommends refocusing the SANDF on peace operations, downsizing bloated staffing structures, and reforming the department's accountability and procurement legislation.

The 2014 South African elections saw the ANC retain power with 62.2% of the vote, though it experienced a real loss of 10.41% when controlling for registered voter growth. The DA increased its national vote share to 22.23%, consolidating its position as the official opposition, while the newly formed EFF secured 6.35% of the national vote and became the official opposition in Limpopo and the North West. The analysis highlights significant ANC losses in Gauteng and predicts highly competitive 2016 local government races in the City of Johannesburg, Tshwane, and Nelson Mandela Bay.

The policy brief examines the potential for leveraging private sector activity to enhance Africa's 'rising' economic phenomenon, emphasizing that non-inclusive growth can exacerbate insecurity. It identifies a shift toward more explicit business engagement in sustainable development driven by commercial risk management, a desire to be a 'partner of choice', and investor impatience with state capabilities. The author recommends that governments create transparent platforms for business engagement in national development plans and that donors link foreign investment to local private sector development.

The document analyzes four potential political pathways for South Africa: 'Bafana Bafana' (moderate underachievement), 'The Future is ANC' (continued dominance), 'The Rise of Multiparty Democracy' (coalition governance), and 'A Nation Divided' (populist decline). It identifies the leadership of the ANC, splits within COSATU, rising voter apathy among 'born frees', and the DA's ability to attract black voters as decisive factors. The author recommends electoral reforms, including a mixed-member proportional system and mandatory voting, to address a lack of political accountability.

This research paper by the Institute for Security Studies presents three plausible scenarios for South Africa's economic and political trajectory up to 2030: 'Bafana Bafana' (continued underachievement), 'Mandela Magic' (high growth and vision), and 'Nation Divided' (political instability and populist decline). Using the International Futures forecasting system, the author analyzes how leadership choices, particularly within the African National Congress (ANC) and its alliance with COSATU, will impact GDP, employment, and social stability.

The paper argues that while South Africa possesses comparative advantages in access and shared experience, its previous aid efforts—managed via the African Renaissance Fund (ARF)—were often ad hoc and lacked strategic coordination. It recommends that SADPA move beyond high-level diplomatic agreements to engage with national aid architectures and employ political-economy analysis to ensure local ownership of projects.

The report examines the impasse in Zambia's ongoing effort to draft a new constitution, highlighting a historical pattern of executive-driven processes that lack public legitimacy. It details the current friction between the Patriotic Front (PF) government and civil society organisations (CSOs) over the validation and adoption of the draft, specifically the role of the Inquiries Act and the demand for a national referendum. The author argues that without a transparent, inclusive roadmap, the process risks being viewed as illegitimate, potentially threatening security and stability ahead of the 2016 general elections.

The document examines the escalating tensions between the Frelimo government and Renamo in Mozambique, triggered by Renamo's 2009 electoral defeat and subsequent claims of fraud. It assesses whether Renamo's threats to return to civil war are credible, noting that while the party lacks the external support and youth it had during the 1975-1992 conflict, it remains capable of sabotaging key infrastructure. The brief highlights internal rifts within Renamo between 'bush' and 'city' factions and the rising influence of the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM). It also discusses the geopolitical concerns of SADC members, particularly Zimbabwe and Malawi, regarding the disruption of economic corridors, and recommends sincere political dialogue and regional mediation to ensure peaceful 2014 general elections.

The report examines the potential of South Africa's shale gas reserves, estimated by the US Energy Information Administration as the eighth largest globally. It contrasts a 'Base Case' of no fracking with a 'Shale Boom' and a 'Blue Bridge' scenario. While a shale boom could boost GDP and reduce poverty, it risks significant water contamination in the semi-arid Karoo region and may increase long-term carbon emissions by delaying renewable energy investment. The authors propose a 'Blue Bridge' approach, using an excise tax on fracking to fund renewable energy infrastructure, which they argue could maximize economic growth while ensuring long-term environmental sustainability.

The document warns that Togo faces a potential election crisis if the 2006 Global Political Agreement (GPA) reforms are not consensually implemented. Despite dialogue led by Archbishop Nicodème Barrigah and US Ambassador Robert Whitehead, fundamental disputes remain over the composition of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), electoral boundaries, the voting system, and presidential term limits. The July 2013 parliamentary elections exacerbated tensions, as the ruling Union for the Republic (UNIR) won an absolute majority of 62 out of 91 seats despite receiving fewer total votes (880,000) than the combined opposition (900,000). The author argues that without urgent intervention from national actors and international facilitators like Burkina Faso's President Blaise Compaoré, the opposition may resort to street protests.