Limits to supporting security sector interventions in the DRC

The document examines why international efforts to reform the security sector and stabilise the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 2003 and 2013 achieved limited impact. It argues that the FARDC is shaped by a neo-patrimonial system where political and military elites benefit from a fragmented army and weak state institutions to maintain patronage networks. International interventions, including the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS), were overly technical—focusing on 'train-and-equip' models—and failed to address the political root causes of violence. While the 2013 defeat of the M23 rebellion provided a temporary success and a window for reform, the authors caution that the underlying incentive structures remain largely unchanged.

• The security situation in the eastern DRC is driven by a neo-patrimonial system where state apparatuses, including the FARDC and Police Nationale Congolaise (PNC), are used by elites as resources to feed social networks and maintain influence.
• The FARDC's operational effectiveness is severely hampered by its history of open-ended integration of various armed groups, which allowed former rebels to maintain their own command structures and territorial control while wearing official uniforms.
• Congolese political and military elites have a strategic interest in keeping the FARDC divided and unprofessional to prevent a potential coup d'état and to maintain the ability to play different factions against one another.
• International security sector reform (SSR) efforts between 2008 and 2013 were largely ineffective because they adopted a 'train-and-equip' technical approach that ignored the political nature of the conflict.
• The International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS) initially achieved technical successes—such as constructing 90 state buildings and rehabilitating 1,700 km of roads between 2008 and 2012—but failed to restore state authority due to a top-down approach and a lack of community input.
• The defeat of the M23 rebellion in 2013 was not solely a result of army reform, but was primarily due to better troop payment, selected leadership, and the cessation of Rwandan support for the rebels.
• The authors warn that the military defeat of the M23 may actually reduce the pressure on the Congolese government to implement meaningful national reforms, as the movement was perceived as a direct threat to governmental control.

APA

Kets, E., & de Vries, H. (2014). Limits to supporting security sector interventions in the DRC. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper257.pdf

Chicago

Kets, Evert, and Hugo de Vries. Limits to supporting security sector interventions in the DRC. Institute for Security Studies, 2014. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper257.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Kets |first1=Evert |last2=de Vries |first2=Hugo |title=Limits to supporting security sector interventions in the DRC |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=July 2014 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper257.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{kets2014limits, author = {Kets, Evert and de Vries, Hugo}, title = {{Limits to supporting security sector interventions in the DRC}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2014}, month = jul, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper257.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }