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The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DR Congo) possesses vast natural wealth, including the world's largest cobalt production and the second-largest tropical rainforest, yet remains one of Africa's poorest nations. Since independence in 1960, the country has been characterized by political instability, authoritarian rule under Mobutu Sese Seko, and devastating conflicts such as the Great African War. Recent history has seen a transition toward democratic elections, though the administration of President Félix Tshisekedi continues to face challenges regarding economic stability and violence in the eastern region.

The report analyzes the 'Dubaization' of North Cyprus, a process where the economy has shifted toward rent-generating sectors like speculative real estate, mass higher education, and casino-led tourism. This model, operating within a politically unrecognized state, has led to a fragmented labor market, significant infrastructural decay, and a 'war of numbers' regarding the de facto population. The author argues that these dynamics, combined with state-led naturalization of Turkish nationals, are altering the region's durable demography and increasing its structural subordination to Turkey, which complicates future peace negotiations.

The document argues that the regionalization of the conflict in Yemen has created a fragmented mediation landscape where the United Nations' influence has diminished. Saudi Arabia's simultaneous roles as a conflict party and mediator have constrained the space for other actors and led to agreements that address immediate threats rather than underlying intra-Yemeni grievances. The author identifies a 'two-part dilemma' for mediators: deciding which actors to engage (regional rivals versus domestic parties) and determining whether to seek a narrow ceasefire or a comprehensive political solution. Ultimately, the paper concludes that military regionalization has impeded conflict ripeness, excluded non-armed civil society groups, and resulted in fragmented outcomes that fail to address the nature of the Yemeni state.

The report finds a stark contrast between public support for climate action in Massachusetts and the actual legislative outcomes. While approximately 90% of public testimony supports environmental priorities, ambitious legislation is frequently blocked by powerful industry coalitions—most notably regulated utilities and the Associated Industries of Massachusetts (AIM). The study identifies four primary opposition coalitions: utilities, fossil and chemical companies, real estate, and power generation companies. It highlights that utilities are uniquely successful in steering policy, often opposing decentralized solar energy while supporting large-scale wind and hydro projects that benefit their business models. Furthermore, the report notes a shift in opposition rhetoric from climate denial to 'discourses of delay,' such as policy perfectionism and appeals to social justice. The authors conclude that the lack of transparency in the State House, combined with the immense spending power of corporate lobbyists, creates a hostile environment for ambitious climate policy.

The document examines Egypt's long-term nuclear ambitions, culminating in the current Dabaa nuclear power plant project. It argues that the project is framed as a 'national prestige' mega-project under President Abd al-Fattah al-Sisi, characterized by 'technological fetishism' and a lack of public transparency. The author highlights the project's funding via a $25 billion Russian loan and expresses concerns regarding safety, the management of spent fuel, and the exclusion of public consultation in the decision-making process.

The document analyzes Egypt's long-term pursuit of nuclear energy, framing the current Dabaa project as a 'techno-nationalist' mega-project under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. It highlights the lack of transparency in the selection of ROSATOM as a partner, the financial burden of a $25 billion loan, and the government's tendency to prioritize national prestige over public consultation and safety transparency.

The paper analyzes the relationship between China and Ethiopia, highlighting how Ethiopia's 'developmental state' model and strategic location in the Horn of Africa make it a key partner for China. It details Chinese investments in infrastructure, energy, and telecommunications, while noting that China's political influence is constrained by Ethiopia's strong national pride and centralized power structures. The document also explores China's increasing role in regional stability through the African Union and IGAD.

The document examines why international efforts to reform the security sector and stabilise the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 2003 and 2013 achieved limited impact. It argues that the FARDC is shaped by a neo-patrimonial system where political and military elites benefit from a fragmented army and weak state institutions to maintain patronage networks. International interventions, including the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS), were overly technical—focusing on 'train-and-equip' models—and failed to address the political root causes of violence. While the 2013 defeat of the M23 rebellion provided a temporary success and a window for reform, the authors caution that the underlying incentive structures remain largely unchanged.

The author argues that the 2007 financial crisis failed to diminish the power of the banking lobby in shaping regulatory rules. Focusing on bank capital adequacy standards set by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and transposed into EU law via the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD IV), the text details how private financial actors dominate consultative processes. The author highlights how the banking sector successfully lobbied to delay the phase-in of Basel III requirements until 2018 and limited the application of the leverage ratio until 2017 by citing potential negative economic impacts. To counter this 'capture' of regulators, the author proposes increasing the range of stakeholders—including green SMEs and pension funds—and implementing a 'legislative footprint' to ensure transparency in the policymaking process.

The paper examines why Angola, SADC's second-largest economy, has remained outside the SADC Free Trade Area (FTA) despite signing the Protocol on Trade (PoT) in 2003. While the government of Angola (GoA) cites the need to rebuild its war-ravaged industry and protect 'infant industries' from cheap imports, the author argues that this protectionism is contradictory given Angola's openness to imports from China, Brazil, and Portugal. The analysis suggests that vested interests—specifically 'Empresários de Confiança' (trusted businessmen with political links)—benefit from existing high-cost import monopolies and may be discouraging the FTA. The document also critiques the SADC Secretariat for its lack of enforcement mechanisms to hold member states accountable for protocol violations.

The document analyzes South Africa's role as a 'middle power' and 'systems stabiliser' within the G-20 and BRICS. It argues that while South Africa uses these platforms to enhance its global profile and champion the 'African Agenda', its positions on finance and food security are often generalist rather than grounded in specific domestic strategies. The paper evaluates the potential of the BRICS Bank to address infrastructure gaps in Africa and highlights the lack of a cohesive collective identity among BRICS members, which limits their ability to act as a unified counterweight to the G-7. It concludes that South Africa must better align its external engagements with measurable domestic development imperatives to avoid 'bureaucratic capture' and ensure tangible benefits for its citizens.

Since resuming diplomatic ties in August 2006, China has significantly expanded its presence in Chad, primarily through the China National Petroleum Corporation's (CNPC) Rônier project. This venture, which includes a refinery and pipeline, represents a shift from previous Western-led oil projects by integrating upstream and downstream production to enhance Chad's domestic energy capacity. Beyond oil, China is funding infrastructure such as a cement factory, an international airport, and a railway network. However, the relationship faces tensions over the economic viability of the refinery versus President Idriss Déby's social promises of affordable fuel. Additionally, China's engagement is entangled in regional security dynamics involving Sudan and Darfur, while relying on French military presence for stability.

The document analyzes the differing strategies of China and India in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). China employs a state-led approach, utilizing loans from the Export-Import Bank to secure mining assets and fund infrastructure in exchange for resources. India's engagement is characterized as more market-driven, with private companies operating in mining and telecommunications, though the Indian government provides some credit lines for power projects. While both are drivers of growth, the paper notes concerns regarding transparency, labor conditions, and environmental pollution associated with smaller firms from both nations.

The paper examines the emerging institutional architecture for adaptation finance and explores the feasibility of an 'adaptation market'. It concludes that commodifying adaptation benefits is unfeasible due to a lack of international demand and viable metrics, as adaptation primarily generates local and private benefits rather than global public goods. However, it identifies a nascent marketplace for 'adaptation finance credits'—where the commodity is the proof of expenditure—supported by a growing professional industry of project developers and consultants, though it lacks the allocative efficiency of carbon markets.

The document examines the historical and contemporary drivers of conflict in Sudan, arguing that the centralisation of power in Khartoum and the economic neglect of peripheral regions created a pattern of resistance. It distinguishes between the 'high politics' of oil, which fueled the second civil war and secessionist movements, and the 'low politics' of subsistence resources, such as land and water, which continue to drive local-level violence between pastoralists and farmers. The author concludes that the stability of both Northern and Southern Sudan depends on their ability to move away from elite-driven power concentration and establish inclusive governance and resource-sharing frameworks.

The policy brief examines how the mismanagement of oil resources, lack of transparency, and systemic corruption contributed to the breakup of Sudan. It highlights the failure of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to resolve disputes over oil-rich border areas like Heglig and Abyei, and notes that both Northern and Southern leaders neglected local communities in oil-bearing regions. The author concludes that the perceived injustice in the distribution of oil wealth convinced Southern Sudanese that secession was the only path to fairness.

The briefing analyzes the shift in U.S. climate policy from a focus on national cap-and-trade legislation toward regulatory agency actions, subnational initiatives, clean-tech funding, and international trade issues. It argues that while a national mandatory system is unlikely in the short term, climate action is diversifying across administrative, local, and trade-related channels.

The document analyzes the strategic interdependence between China and Angola, where Chinese credit lines for infrastructure are guaranteed by oil supplies, and Chinese national oil companies seek equity in Angolan oil blocs. It details the 'Angola model' of resource-collateralized loans and the specific successes and failures of Sinopec's upstream and downstream ventures.

The document analyzes the failure of 'oil for infrastructure' deals in Nigeria, where Chinese companies secured oil blocs in exchange for projects like the Lagos–Kano railway and Mambilla power station. These projects were stalled after the 2007 transition to President Yar’Adua's administration, which preferred cash payments over infrastructure. Consequently, Chinese firms have shifted toward direct acquisitions of oil assets for cash, exemplified by Sinopec's $7.2 billion purchase of Addax Petroleum in 2009.

The document examines the historical and political drivers of violence in the Nuba Mountains of Sudan, specifically contrasting the conflict formation of the 1980s with the post-2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) era. It argues that while resource scarcity is often cited as a cause of Sahelian conflict, the violence in the Nuba Mountains is rooted in a long history of systemic marginalisation by an Arab-Muslim dominated state hierarchy. The author details the role of the National Islamic Front (NIF) in launching a 'jihad' against the Nuba in the 1990s, involving forced Islamisation and the use of 'murahaleen' militias. The paper concludes that the CPA has failed to address Nuba demands for self-determination, leaving the region volatile ahead of the 2010 elections.