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Governance of Oil Resources and the Referendum in Southern Sudan

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This policy briefing examines how the governance of oil resources contributed to the secession of Southern Sudan. It argues that the failure of the National Congress Party (NCP) to ensure fair revenue sharing, transparency, and local community development convinced Southern Sudanese that they would benefit more from an independent state than from a united Sudan.

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  • The governance of oil resources by Islamist elites in Northern Sudan was a primary driver for the Southern Sudanese decision to vote for secession in the January 2011 referendum, as many believed they would benefit more in their own state.
  • Despite the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, oil revenue sharing remained acrimonious. The Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) accused the National Congress Party (NCP) of manipulating production and sales figures to underreport the South's share and claiming oil-rich border areas, such as Heglig, belonged to the North.
  • The dispute over the Abyei area is centered on the control of oil reserves. The NCP rejected the report of the Abyei Boundary Commission, and a subsequent arbitration decision from The Hague was rejected by the Misseriya nomadic Arab tribes, leading to the postponement of the self-determination vote originally scheduled for January 9, 2010.
  • Corruption and a lack of accountability have plagued both Northern and Southern leadership. In the South, allegations include ministers creating fake companies to loot public resources, and officials in Unity State and Upper Nile State failing to account for oil revenues.
  • Local communities in oil-bearing areas have been marginalized, with their interests in development and environmental protection ignored by both oil companies and government authorities. This has led to protests and the disruption of oil operations, which the GoSS has sometimes suppressed through detention to protect its budget, which is 98% dependent on oil revenues.
  • The document recommends that leaders in the North and South implement inclusive oil policies to ensure fairer benefit distribution, address local claims for employment and environmental protection, and cease coercive tactics against protesters.

Cite the original document

APA
Moro, L. N. (2011). Governance of Oil Resources and the Referendum in Southern Sudan. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Policy-Briefing-29.pdf
Chicago
Moro, Leben Nelson. Governance of Oil Resources and the Referendum in Southern Sudan. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2011. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Policy-Briefing-29.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Moro |first1=Leben Nelson |title=Governance of Oil Resources and the Referendum in Southern Sudan |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=March 2011 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Policy-Briefing-29.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{moro2011governance, author = {Moro, Leben Nelson}, title = {{Governance of Oil Resources and the Referendum in Southern Sudan}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2011}, month = mar, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Policy-Briefing-29.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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