Governance of Oil Resources and the Referendum in Southern Sudan

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The policy brief examines how the mismanagement of oil resources, lack of transparency, and systemic corruption contributed to the breakup of Sudan. It highlights the failure of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) to resolve disputes over oil-rich border areas like Heglig and Abyei, and notes that both Northern and Southern leaders neglected local communities in oil-bearing regions. The author concludes that the perceived injustice in the distribution of oil wealth convinced Southern Sudanese that secession was the only path to fairness.

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  • The governance of oil exploitation by Islamist elites in Northern Sudan played a major role in convincing the majority of Southern Sudanese that they would benefit more from their own state than from a united Sudan.
  • Implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was hindered by disputes over oil-rich border areas, specifically Heglig and Abyei, where the National Congress Party (NCP) sought to retain control despite requirements for shared control with the SPLM/A.
  • Mistrust between the North and South was exacerbated by the NCP-dominated government's alleged underreporting of oil production and sales volumes, a claim supported by evidence from Global Witness.
  • Corruption and a lack of accountability have persisted in the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), with some ministers allegedly creating fake companies to loot public resources and officials in Unity and Upper Nile states failing to account for oil revenues.
  • Local communities in oil-bearing areas have been marginalized, facing environmental pollution and destruction of homes and farmland, while the GoSS prioritizes oil flow because it provides approximately 98% of its budget.

Cite the original document

APA
Moro, L. N. (2011). Governance of Oil Resources and the Referendum in Southern Sudan. South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Policy-Briefing-29.pdf
Chicago
Moro, Leben Nelson. Governance of Oil Resources and the Referendum in Southern Sudan. South African Institute of International Affairs, 2011. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Policy-Briefing-29.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Moro |first1=Leben Nelson |title=Governance of Oil Resources and the Referendum in Southern Sudan |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=March 2011 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Policy-Briefing-29.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{moro2011governance, author = {Moro, Leben Nelson}, title = {{Governance of Oil Resources and the Referendum in Southern Sudan}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2011}, month = mar, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2011/03/Policy-Briefing-29.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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