Cape Town’s protection rackets

The document analyzes protection racketeering in Cape Town, contrasting the sophisticated, networked rackets in the CBD with the more diverse and often opportunistic extortion on the Cape Flats. It argues that these rackets persist not only due to state capacity failures but also through the blurring of lines between legal private security and criminal enterprises, as well as systemic police corruption.

• Protection racketeering in Cape Town's CBD is characterized by a blurring of the line between legal private security companies and criminal groups, where some of the largest registered firms were influenced by underworld figures.
• In the CBD, protection rackets often focus on labour racketeering, forcing businesses to employ their bouncers and security consultants at inflated prices.
• Despite significant urban renewal and a 90% decrease in violent crime in the CBD between 2005 and 2010, protection rackets persist as a 'necessary evil' for nightlife businesses to manage street threats and drug distribution.
• On the Cape Flats, protection rackets are more diverse and often opportunistic, with street gangs targeting informal traders and foreign-run spaza shops.
• The taxi industry in the Western Cape is subject to extortion by associations that operate like a 'modern day mafia', often linked to gangs.
• Police corruption is a significant factor in the persistence of rackets, particularly on the Cape Flats, where shebeen owners report that police are sometimes a greater problem than criminal gangs in demanding protection payments.
• The Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority (PSIRA) is described as being unable to effectively regulate the industry, with a ratio of only one inspector for every 9,000 security officers.
• Many individuals involved in Cape Town's protection rackets have backgrounds in violent sports such as kickboxing and karate, which provided the skills necessary for enforcing protection services.

APA

Goga, K., & Goredema, C. (2014). Cape Town’s protection rackets. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper259_IDRC.pdf

Chicago

Goga, Khalil, and Charles Goredema. Cape Town’s protection rackets. Institute for Security Studies, 2014. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper259_IDRC.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Goga |first1=Khalil |last2=Goredema |first2=Charles |title=Cape Town’s protection rackets |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=August 2014 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper259_IDRC.pdf |access-date=23 October 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{goga2014cape, author = {Goga, Khalil and Goredema, Charles}, title = {{Cape Town’s protection rackets}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2014}, month = aug, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/Paper259_IDRC.pdf}, urldate = {2026-10-23}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }