polbrief50-ce48e083d992608f.pdf

This policy brief by the Institute for Security Studies analyses the escalating political tensions between the Mozambican government (Frelimo) and the Mozambican National Resistance Movement (Renamo) following the 2013 attacks on Renamo's base. It evaluates Renamo's capacity to return to civil war, the internal divisions within the party, and the geopolitical implications for the SADC region, while offering recommendations for a political resolution ahead of the 2014 general elections.

• Political tensions escalated in October 2013 after government forces attacked the base of Renamo leader Afonso Dhlakama, leading Renamo to declare an end to the General Peace Agreement (GPA) signed on October 4, 1992.
• Renamo's current political instability is linked to its defeat in the October 2009 general elections, where Frelimo's Armando Guebuza won 75% of the presidential vote and 191 parliamentary seats, while Renamo's Dhlakama won 16.41% and 51 seats.
• Renamo has three primary demands: increased representation in state institutions (especially national security forces), reform of the electoral system and the National Election Commission (CNE), and a more equitable share of natural resources.
• There are conflicting analyses regarding Renamo's ability to wage war. One view is that its capacity is diminished because it lacks the external military and financial support it once had from Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), Apartheid South Africa, and the US, and its members are mostly aging ex-guerrillas. However, it remains capable of sabotaging infrastructure like the North-South road (EN-1) and rail routes in Sofala province.
• Renamo is experiencing internal divisions between a 'bush Renamo' faction favoring violence and a 'city' or 'parliamentary Renamo' faction seeking a political path. This instability is further evidenced by the party's boycott of the November 20, 2013 municipal polls, which allowed the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM) to strengthen its position by winning in Beira, Quelimane, and Nampula.
• Regional stability is at risk because the Beira port corridor is an economic lifeline for landlocked Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe specifically feared the destabilization of its Marange diamond belt and the disruption of the 287km-long Feruka pipeline from Beira to Mutare.
• The Southern African Development Community (SADC) has been slow to respond to the crisis, partly due to its doctrine of non-interference and the fact that Mozambique was the chair of the SADC Summit when the situation began to deteriorate in October 2012.

APA

Institute for Security Studies (n.d.). polbrief50-ce48e083d992608f.pdf. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief50.pdf

Chicago

Institute for Security Studies. polbrief50-ce48e083d992608f.pdf. n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief50.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=polbrief50-ce48e083d992608f.pdf |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief50.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudiesndpolbrief50ce48e083d992608fpdf, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{polbrief50-ce48e083d992608f.pdf}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/PolBrief50.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }