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The report examines how West African nations, particularly Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria, have prioritised military and securitised responses to terrorism over rule-of-law frameworks. This shift has led to widespread human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, torture, and arbitrary detention, often facilitated by emergency legislation and a lack of judicial oversight. The author argues that such approaches may fuel further radicalisation and recommends long-term criminal justice reform, the strengthening of civilian oversight, and the alignment of counter-terrorism efforts with international human rights standards to achieve sustainable peace and development.

This report by the Institute for Security Studies analyzes the trajectories of political violence in Sudan and South Sudan following the signing of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (ARCSS). Using ACLED and UCDP GED data, it examines whether these agreements resolved, reshaped, or perpetuated violence, concluding that while the CPA ended a long civil war, it left other conflict systems unaddressed and reinforced a pattern of state-led political violence. In South Sudan, the ARCSS is described as having failed due to poor implementation and a 'winner-takes-all' political framework that incentivized continued violent competition for power.

The report examines the recurring political crises in Guinea-Bissau, specifically the 2015 crisis triggered by the dissolution of Prime Minister Domingos Simões Pereira's government by President José Mário Vaz. It argues that instability stems from institutional weaknesses, including a lack of constitutional clarity regarding the roles of the president and prime minister in a semi-presidential system. While the March 10, 2019, legislative elections are seen as a step toward legitimacy, the authors contend they are insufficient without the implementation of the Stability Pact and reforms to the constitution, electoral laws, political party regulation, the judiciary, and the security sector. The document also details the role of ECOWAS in mediating the crisis through the Conakry Agreement and the use of targeted sanctions to pressure political actors toward a resolution.

The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) faces a gap between political enthusiasm and technical implementation. While the African Union aims for a formal launch in July 2019, critical components such as tariff schedules, rules of origin, and protocols for trade in goods and services remain unfinished. UNCTAD suggests full liberalisation could increase intra-African exports by 33%, but failure to deliver concrete benefits for investors and traders could undermine the project's legitimacy.

Egypt's 2019 AU chairmanship focuses on economic goals, intra-African trade, and institutional reform, though the author notes a significant gap regarding governance and the need for Egypt to ratify the CFTA.

The report analyzes the shift in irregular migration patterns in North Africa, where countries previously serving as transit zones have become points of departure. It argues that economic decline and structural inequality are driving young Maghrebi citizens to migrate, which in turn complicates diplomatic relations and security partnerships between Maghreb states and European nations.

The document examines the EU's strategy of externalising border control to Libya, noting that while migrant apprehensions fell from approximately 119,000 in 2017 to around 23,000 in 2018, this success is tactical and risks long-term stability. The author contends that by providing equipment and training to hybrid forces and armed groups—such as the Coast Guard unit in Zawiya—the EU reinforces the power of unaccountable actors and criminal networks. This approach creates a 'gatekeeper' role for certain commanders and ignores the primary security concerns of Libyan citizens, such as fuel smuggling and impunity. The brief recommends that counter-migration efforts be integrated into a broader, Libyan-owned security sector reform programme that prioritises the rule of law and clear distinctions between military and civilian security roles.

The policy brief examines the disproportionate dominance of South Africa within SADC and proposes a model of 'regional champions'—member states taking lead roles in specific sectors—to foster more equitable regional integration. It analyses current power dynamics using economic, military, and diplomatic metrics, identifying potential leaders in industrialisation, infrastructure, and security. The author suggests that South Africa can reduce its regional hegemony and the associated accusations of 'bullying' by supporting a more distributed leadership structure based on the comparative advantages of other member states.

The document highlights a critical lack of accurate health and mortality data for children under five in areas affected by Boko Haram in Nigeria and Cameroon. It identifies severe malnutrition, interrupted vaccination schedules, and psychological trauma as primary consequences of the conflict. The author argues that current counter-terrorism strategies often ignore or actively undermine child development, and recommends funding targeted research, empowering local community-based organisations, and ensuring the rights of children are upheld during security operations.

The document argues that the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) complements the 1969 OAU Refugee Convention by providing modern mechanisms for burden-sharing and regional cooperation. It highlights the challenges facing the Convention, including a rise in forced returns (refoulement) and the pressure of hosting 7.4 million refugees and 17.8 million internally displaced persons in Africa. The brief suggests that the GCR's Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) can reinvigorate African solidarity and promote durable solutions through a 'whole of society' approach involving the private sector and international financial institutions.

The report presents findings from interviews with 106 South Sudanese refugees in Ethiopia and Uganda, highlighting a widespread feeling of exclusion from the peace process. Key issues include a lack of trustworthy information, deep frustration with political leadership, and sharp divisions over the number of states in South Sudan. While all respondents desire to return home, many remain cautious, citing the need for proven stability and security before repatriation is safe.

The After School Game Changer (ASGC) is a strategic coordination model in the Western Cape, South Africa, designed to prevent youth violence by enhancing the quality and accessibility of afterschool care. Rather than a single program, it acts as a mechanism to align government departments, NGOs, and the City of Cape Town to provide academic, sporting, and cultural activities for learners in low- and no-fee schools. The report argues that the ASGC functions as a violence prevention tool by disrupting risky behaviors through the social ecological model, focusing on individual, relationship, and community-level interventions. Key achievements include increasing the number of registered learners to 134,380 in 2017/18, though the report notes a lack of budget transparency and a need for better reporting on how the intervention specifically addresses violence risk factors.

The report examines the fragmented political and security environment in South Sudan as it attempts to implement the R-ARCSS. It details the proliferation of armed opposition groups, the concentration of power within the government, and the challenges facing the IGAD-led mediation process, including the influence of bilateral interests from regional powers like Sudan and Uganda.

The report examines the 2019 outlook for the African Union's Peace and Security Council, highlighting the potential return of major powers like South Africa and Ethiopia to the council. It critiques the slow implementation of AU reforms, specifically regarding financial self-sufficiency and the reduction of the AU Commission. The document details a volatile 2019 electoral calendar across 11+ countries and warns of escalating instability in Gabon, Cameroon, and the Sahel. Additionally, it discusses the progress of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and the tensions surrounding AU-EU negotiations.

The report examines the gap between the official goal of freedom of movement in Southern Africa and the reality of securitised border management. It identifies key barriers including a lack of political will, unreliable data, and the prioritisation of national sovereignty over regional integration. The authors argue that migration should be viewed as a developmental opportunity rather than a security threat, noting that remittances contribute an average of 3.7% to SADC countries' GDP. South Africa is highlighted as a primary destination for migrants but a major obstacle to regional integration due to its restrictive 'detain and deport' policies and anti-immigrant rhetoric.

The report highlights that while Africa has contributed minimally to global warming, it is disproportionately vulnerable due to high levels of extreme poverty and low state capacity. It projects that without significant intervention, the number of people in extreme poverty will rise until 2040, peaking at 590 million. The document argues that prioritizing human development—specifically education, healthcare, and water infrastructure—is essential to increasing adaptive capacity. It contrasts the 'Current Path' with a 'Green Road' scenario where inclusive, sustainable growth effectively eliminates extreme poverty by mid-century and significantly reduces the population lacking access to improved water.

The report argues that Zimbabwe's economic decline is rooted in the conflation of the state with the ZANU-PF party, leading to state capture, patronage, and corruption. It highlights how government profligacy, excessive borrowing through Treasury Bills, and a protectionist import substitution strategy have fueled inflation and foreign exchange shortages. Despite President Emmerson Mnangagwa's 'open for business' rhetoric, the report finds that investment claims are often unsubstantiated and that the government continues to prioritize prestige projects and party loyalty over market-based principles. The author recommends a transition to a market-oriented, export-led economy with an independent central bank and secure property rights.

The report examines the phenomenon of Boko Haram members deserting the group in the Lake Chad Basin, identifying push factors such as military losses by the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and internal factional rivalry between Shekau and al-Barnawi. It argues that current interventions—limited to detention, judicial processing, and narrow de-radicalisation—are insufficient. The author advocates for a 'third generation' of context-sensitive DDRR that integrates security and development, emphasizing the need for gender- and age-sensitive eligibility criteria to include women and children. The report also highlights the necessity of demobilising community vigilante groups and improving state-community relations to undermine recruitment. It recommends that the Lake Chad Basin Commission lead a regional strategic framework supported by the African Union to harmonise DDRR approaches across Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.

The report examines Ethiopia's shift toward the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), which aims to move from camp-based assistance to socio-economic integration. Key initiatives include providing work permits, expanding the Out of Camp Policy, and creating jobs in industrial parks. However, the report identifies significant hurdles, including low national wages, ethnic tensions in regions like Gambella, and insufficient consultation with host communities.

The document identifies a significant gap between South Africa's stated goal of harnessing the strategic potential of African migration and its implementation of restrictive policies. While the Department of Home Affairs has proposed progressive measures like SADC visas and regularisation schemes, these have stalled. Instead, the government is fast-tracking the Border Management Authority Bill and the Refugees Amendment Act of 2017, and pursuing the construction of expensive asylum processing centres. The author argues that these measures are based on unsubstantiated claims that low-skilled migrants and asylum seekers pose security risks, and that they distract from endemic administrative corruption and management failures within the Department of Home Affairs.