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The document examines the EU's strategy of externalising border control to Libya, noting that while migrant apprehensions fell from approximately 119,000 in 2017 to around 23,000 in 2018, this success is tactical and risks long-term stability. The author contends that by providing equipment and training to hybrid forces and armed groups—such as the Coast Guard unit in Zawiya—the EU reinforces the power of unaccountable actors and criminal networks. This approach creates a 'gatekeeper' role for certain commanders and ignores the primary security concerns of Libyan citizens, such as fuel smuggling and impunity. The brief recommends that counter-migration efforts be integrated into a broader, Libyan-owned security sector reform programme that prioritises the rule of law and clear distinctions between military and civilian security roles.

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  • The EU and its member states have successfully reduced irregular migration from Libya in the short term, with Italian authorities reporting a drop in migrant apprehensions from approximately 119,000 in 2017 to around 23,000 in 2018.
  • European border security efforts in Libya rely on a hybrid security system where formal state institutions are weak and operational power is held by armed groups, some of which are quasi-affiliated with the state.
  • EU support for the Libyan Coast Guard has inadvertently empowered units linked to criminal activity; for example, the Zawiya Coast Guard unit has been flagged by UN investigators for migrant exploitation and fuel smuggling despite being one of the most operationally effective units.
  • The EU's narrow focus on counter-migration creates a disconnect with Libyan national priorities, risking the perception that security aid serves international rather than local needs.
  • The current donor approach risks creating 'gatekeepers'—specific commanders who gain privileged access to training and equipment because they meet short-term donor needs, rather than because they are most essential to Libyan security.
  • The use of military forces for civilian law enforcement missions and the reliance on hybrid forces undermine the development of a professional security sector and perpetuate a culture of impunity for armed groups.

Cite the original document

APA
Herbert, M. (2019). Less than the sum of its parts. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb-126.pdf
Chicago
Herbert, Matt. Less than the sum of its parts. Institute for Security Studies, 2019. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb-126.pdf.
Wikipedia
{{cite report |last1=Herbert |first1=Matt |title=Less than the sum of its parts |publisher=Institute for Security Studies |date=2019 |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb-126.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}
BibTeX
@techreport{herbert2019less, author = {Herbert, Matt}, title = {{Less than the sum of its parts}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, year = {2019}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/pb-126.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }

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