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Africa was instrumental in establishing the deep seabed mining regime under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea but became apathetic following the 1994 Implementation Agreement. Currently, Africa is the only regional group that has not sponsored an entity to explore the international seabed area (the Area). While the African Union and the UN Economic Commission for Africa have integrated DSM into blue economy strategies and roadmaps, implementation has lagged. The report argues that investing in DSM is strategically appropriate for Africa as the global transition to a low-carbon economy may impact terrestrial mining. It recommends that African states consider sponsoring exploration contracts and that the AU adopt the Lomé Annexes and revise its Integrated Maritime Strategy to provide a clear legal and policy framework for DSM.

The paper examines the rise of Eurobond issuance in Africa as governments seek alternatives to aid, noting that sovereign credit ratings from Moody’s, Fitch, and S&P are essential for market access. It finds that most African countries' ratings have deteriorated since their first assessment, leading to higher borrowing costs and prioritizing debt repayment over human rights and health during the COVID-19 pandemic. The authors criticize the 'big three' for their oligopolistic nature, unreliable methodologies, and limited physical presence in Africa, recommending increased regulation, accountability, and transparency in how Eurobond funds are utilized.

The document examines the rise of Eurobonds as a development financing tool in Africa and the corresponding increase in sovereign credit ratings assigned by Moody's, Fitch, and S&P. It finds that most African countries' ratings have deteriorated since their first assessment, increasing borrowing costs and sometimes forcing governments to prioritize debt repayment over public health and human rights during crises like COVID-19. The authors criticize the 'big three' for their oligopolistic nature, lack of local presence, and use of unsolicited ratings, recommending stricter regulation, better local knowledge, and transparent project-linked borrowing.

The Lagos Declaration on Community Justice outlines a series of pledges by West African organisations to strengthen legal empowerment for the poor. Key commitments include training paralegals to address climate change and land rights, increasing the participation of women in legal work, and advocating for the formal recognition of community paralegals across the region. The participating organisations, forming the West Africa Legal Empowerment Network, aim to co-create participatory action research to tackle environmental and land justice challenges in both rural and urban settings.

The proposal seeks USD 2,499,426 over 36 months to address the centralized nature of Togo's 2018 National Adaptation Plan (NAP). It aims to downscale adaptation planning to the regional level, specifically targeting the agriculture, water, and forestry sectors. Key objectives include establishing Regional Adaptation Plans (RAPs), creating a national knowledge management system for climate change adaptation, and developing a National Strategy for Private Sector Engagement. The project also intends to operationalize the National Investment Fund for Climate and Sustainable Development and develop a system for tracking adaptation finance to reduce reliance on international grants.

Togo is requesting a 24-month Readiness grant of USD 540,000 to address critical gaps in its climate change governance. The project focuses on operationalizing the National Designated Authority (NDA), reforming institutional frameworks, and enhancing technical expertise in greenhouse gas (GHG) inventories and Monitoring, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) systems. Key goals include reducing dependency on external expertise, improving the quality of national communications to the UNFCCC, and increasing the involvement of the private sector in climate finance. The program will be implemented by the Centre de Suivi Ecologique (CSE) of Dakar.

The document analyzes how end-user subsidies—direct or indirect payments to consumers—can bridge the affordability gap for basic electricity access. It evaluates two primary methodologies for calculating this gap (SEforALL's 'Taking the Pulse' and the World Bank's 'Off-Grid Solar Market Trends Report') and identifies key design attributes such as financing structures, delivery modalities, and verification systems. Through case studies, it finds that Ghana's programme succeeded due to accurate targeting and pricing, while Uganda's faced challenges with high costs and payment delays. Togo's CIZO programme is highlighted for its innovative use of mobile money for subsidy delivery. The brief concludes that improving demographic and consumption data is essential to avoid market distortion and ensure subsidies reach the poorest households.

The document argues that end-user subsidies are essential for achieving universal electricity access by reducing product costs for the poorest households. It analyzes two primary methodologies for calculating the affordability gap—the SEforALL 'Taking the Pulse' and the World Bank 'Market Trends' approaches—and identifies key design attributes including financing structures, delivery modalities, and verification systems. Through case studies, it demonstrates that successful programmes, like those in Ghana and Togo, rely on accurate demographic data and effective public-private partnerships, whereas the Ugandan experience highlights risks such as payment delays and inaccurate subsidy thresholds. The brief concludes that harmonized data metrics and a modified energy burden threshold for emerging economies are necessary to prevent market distortion and improve targeting.

The project aims to establish a comprehensive multi-risk early warning system in Togo, targeting 100% of the population (approximately 8.28 million direct beneficiaries). It addresses critical gaps in hydrometeorological monitoring, data processing, and dissemination. The initiative is structured around four components: institutional development, operational capacity improvement for monitoring agencies, infrastructure modernization (including low-cost automated weather stations), and the creation of a sustainable financial framework involving public-private partnerships. The project seeks $10 million in GCF grants with an equal amount in co-financing for a total cost of $20 million over four years.

West Africa has experienced warming of 1–3°C since the mid-1970s, leading to increased heatwaves, variable rainfall, and widespread losses in GDP and food productivity. Future projections indicate severe risks, including a potential 30% decline in marine fisheries catch and significant population exposure to sea level rise, particularly in coastal cities like Lagos and Abidjan. Adaptation requires transformative, ecosystem-based approaches and a significant increase in climate finance, as current funding is insufficient and heavily skewed toward non-African institutions.

The AfCFTA has the potential to generate USD 3.4 trillion in GDP and lift over 100 million people out of poverty by 2040, with primary gains expected in manufacturing and services. However, significant disparities in factor markets—including labour skills, technology adoption, and financial capacity—exist across the continent, with Eastern and Southern Africa generally possessing higher capacities than Central and Western Africa. The document highlights risks associated with heavy reliance on non-African financing, such as the EU-funded Africa Trade Observatory, and urges member states to leverage domestic capital markets and sovereign wealth funds. It further emphasizes that political stability and the empowerment of regional bodies are essential to protect private sector investment in cross-border infrastructure, which the World Bank estimates requires USD 47.6 billion annually.

The document examines the 'militarisation of politics' in Africa, using the conflict in Ethiopia between the federal government and the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) as a primary example. It defines militarisation as the tendency to settle political disputes militarily and notes that this trend is often a legacy of colonial rule. The author highlights a history of military coups and civil wars across the continent, noting that by 2017, Africa had experienced 200 successful and failed coups. While the African Union (AU) has frameworks like the Lomé Declaration and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance to prevent unconstitutional changes of government, the document argues that inconsistent implementation—such as the AU's failure to suspend Chad after the seizure of power by the Transnational Military Council—undermines these efforts. Additionally, the text notes a 17% increase in African military spending over the last decade, totaling $41.2 billion in 2019. In the Horn of Africa, the conflict involving Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Sudan risks regional destabilisation and the undoing of previous peace agreements.

The report argues that subsidiarity in the African Union (AU) is currently used as a political tool rather than a clear legal principle, leading to competition and inconsistency between the AU and regional mechanisms (RMs). It highlights that the lack of operational definitions and contradictory legal frameworks—such as the 2007 MoU and the PSC Protocol—creates confusion in the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The authors suggest shifting the focus from a division of competences to a model of complementarity, where regions act as 'first responders' while the AU remains the 'primary actor'. Key recommendations include establishing a comprehensive legal, policy, and financial framework, utilizing the AU Peace Fund for alignment, and creating operational liaison offices between the AU Commission and RMs.

The report analyzes the security landscape of West Africa, identifying a complex interplay of weak governance, economic inequality, and emerging threats like violent extremism and transnational crime. It highlights how these factors undermine regional stability and development, particularly in the Sahel. While Ghana is relatively stable, it faces risks from porous borders and internal community tensions. The document recommends pursuing economic integration via the AfCFTA, addressing youth unemployment, and strengthening regional security alliances to combat terrorism and trafficking.

Togo's revised NDCs aim for a total greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction of 50.57% by 2030 compared to a reference scenario, consisting of a 20.51% unconditional target and a 30.06% conditional target. The plan prioritizes the energy, agriculture, forestry, and waste sectors for mitigation, while focusing on food security, water management, and coastal protection for adaptation. Implementing these goals requires an estimated total investment of 5.48 billion USD, with 78% of the funding needed as international conditional support. The document also outlines a national Measurement, Reporting, and Verification (MRV) system and a communication strategy to increase public awareness and local ownership of climate actions.

As of May 24, 2022, 43 companies have committed USD 458 million across 48 countries to support the Zero Hunger Private Sector Pledge. The largest individual commitments come from Bayer (USD 160 million) and PepsiCo (USD 100 million), with significant regional focus on Africa, Asia, and Latin America.

The Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF), approved by the GCF in 2020 and running through 2028, aims to mobilize USD 750 million to support approximately 40 subnational projects with deal sizes between USD 5 million and 75 million. The fund utilizes a Technical Assistance Facility and USD 150 million in concessional equity from the GCF to attract USD 600 million in commercial equity, targeting subnational governments that lack fiscal autonomy or the ability to borrow from international capital markets. The fund involves 42 countries, including 16 in Africa, and focuses on projects aligned with NDCs that incorporate Nature-based Solutions.

The WACA program aims to strengthen coastal resilience in Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Mauritania, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, and Togo by mainstreaming climate risks into national policies and investing in transport, urban, and natural resource sectors. Supported by a USD 222 million package approved by the World Bank in 2018, the initiative utilizes a 'WACA Marketplace' to match investment demand with partner financing. As of June 2021, 17% of committed funds were disbursed, with specific outcomes in Benin including the securing of 3,500 households from erosion and flooding. The document highlights that the success of such regional instruments depends on strong regional cooperation, political stability, a pipeline of bankable projects, and currency stability.

The African Risk Capacity (ARC) operates as a mutual insurance company and agency to help African Union members manage climate shocks through weather-index insurance. Since 2014, ARC Ltd has provided USD 720 million in coverage and paid USD 65 million in claims, primarily targeting the agriculture sector. Participation requires the use of Africa RiskView (ARV) software to define payout thresholds based on rainfall deviation. The program's viability depends on robust subnational climate data, government technical expertise in sovereign insurance, and high-level political awareness.

The document describes Cooling as a Service (CaaS) as a pay-per-service model that removes upfront costs for customers by having service providers own and maintain energy-efficient cooling equipment. It highlights the role of sale-leaseback arrangements with banks to scale financing and identifies Nigeria's ColdHubs as a practical application for solar-powered cold storage. The text also notes the importance of legal frameworks, national energy efficiency policies, and the potential for CaaS implementation in 21 countries that prioritized urban planning in their NDCs.