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In February 2025, M23 rebels captured Bukavu, the capital of South Kivu province in the eastern DRC, following the previous seizure of Goma. The document argues that Rwanda's support for M23 is driven by a combination of national security concerns—specifically the threat posed by the Democratic Forces of the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR)—and economic interests related to minerals like gold, tin, and tantalum. It further notes that rivalry with Uganda and a perceived weakness in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) have emboldened Rwanda's actions. Despite calls from the US, France, the UK, and China for Rwandan forces to withdraw, the international response remains tepid, with few concrete sanctions or aid cuts implemented.

The 2023 elections in the Democratic Republic of Congo are marked by high voter registration but significant concerns over electoral fraud, institutional corruption, and insecurity in the east. The National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) faces accusations of lack of transparency and poor quality voter identification. Security forces have reportedly cracked down on opposition candidates, and the presence of armed groups like M23 in North-Kivu and Ituri threatens to disenfranchise millions. Internationally, the outcome is linked to the control of strategic minerals, particularly cobalt, with China and the West competing for influence, and regional tensions with Rwanda and Angola complicating the political landscape.

The document provides a comprehensive legal framework for environmental and land rights defenders in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), detailing the risks they face from extractive industries, agribusiness, and conservation efforts. It outlines fundamental rights guaranteed by the DRC Constitution and international treaties, and lists specific judicial and non-judicial mechanisms for seeking justice, including the role of civil society and international bodies like the UN and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.

The report analyzes the DRC's development challenges, including endemic corruption, high fertility rates, and severe infrastructure deficits. It argues that while the country possesses immense mineral and agricultural wealth, it suffers from the 'paradox of plenty.' The analysis suggests that a comprehensive strategy combining improved governance, human capital investment, agricultural intensification, and economic diversification could significantly reduce extreme poverty and increase GDP by 2050 compared to the current trajectory.

The resurgence of the M23 rebel movement since late 2021 has displaced 600,000 people and heightened tensions between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. The author argues that current regional efforts—including the East African Community (EAC) Regional Force, the Nairobi Process, and the Luanda Process—are insufficient because they treat symptoms rather than the root causes of instability. The paper recommends a high-level regional political process led by the AU and UN to address long-term drivers of conflict and rebuild trust between the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi.

The report examines the 'paradox of plenty' in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where vast natural resources coexist with extreme poverty and political instability. Using the International Futures (IFs) forecasting platform, the document aims to project the country's development path to 2050 and assess how specific interventions could help the government achieve long-term growth targets.

The report examines the political shift in the DRC following President Felix Tshisekedi's creation of the 'sacred union' coalition, which granted him a parliamentary majority. While this shift provides an opportunity for electoral reform and improved security in the east, the document highlights significant tensions over the content of these reforms, the independence of the electoral commission (CENI), and whether a proposed population census is a genuine development need or a strategy to delay the 2023 elections.

The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) faces a 'paradox of plenty,' where immense natural resources coexist with extreme poverty and poor human development indicators. On its current trajectory, the DRC is projected to remain a low-income country with stagnant per capita income and high poverty rates through 2050. Key constraints include endemic corruption, a massive infrastructure deficit in electricity and transport, and a high fertility rate that hinders the demographic dividend. The report models several intervention scenarios, finding that while agricultural improvements offer short-term poverty relief, long-term prosperity depends on structural economic transformation and improved governance. A combined comprehensive scenario suggests that concerted action across governance, infrastructure, human capital, and agriculture could reduce the extreme poverty rate to 9.6% by 2050.

The document assesses the chronic instability in the Great Lakes region, specifically the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It argues that while governance failures in the DRC are often blamed, the repressive domestic policies and illicit economic interests of Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi are equally significant drivers of conflict. The author suggests that the presidency of Félix Tshisekedi provides an opportunity to shift regional dynamics, provided the international community demands better governance from all regional actors and supports a comprehensive political dialogue rather than purely military solutions.

Kivu Green Energy (KGE) is deploying solar PV and storage mini-grids in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to replace expensive and unreliable diesel generation. Operating in challenging environments like North Kivu, KGE provides electricity to homes, businesses, and humanitarian organizations. The company aims to scale its capacity from a 1.3MW project in Goma to 1 GW by 2033 to serve 5 million urban customers, supported by the Energy Access Booster award.

The document analyzes the volatile political climate in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) ahead of the December 2018 elections. It highlights the systematic elimination of political competition by the ruling party, deep distrust in the electoral commission (CENI), and the persistent insecurity in the eastern DRC. The authors present four scenarios: a worst-case scenario of election cancellation leading to violence, a win by the ruling party's candidate Emmanuel Ramazani Shadary (either as a puppet for Joseph Kabila or as an independent leader), a contested win legitimized by a biased judiciary, and a popular opposition victory. The paper emphasizes that the DRC's vast mineral wealth, particularly cobalt, sustains international interest but also fuels internal instability and patronage networks. It recommends that SADC and the AU maintain pressure on the government to ensure a credible election and prepare for potential wide-scale violence.

The document examines the application of human rights due diligence in the mineral supply chains of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), specifically focusing on 'conflict minerals' like tantalite, tin, tungsten, and gold. It reviews six major initiatives—including the OECD Guidance, the ICGLR Regional Certification Mechanism, and the iTSCi—concluding that their heavy reliance on traceability is insufficient to stop the financing of armed groups. The author argues that these frameworks are based on a reductionist 'resource curse' theory and fail to account for the informal nature of artisanal mining, weak state governance, and complex land ownership disputes. The paper highlights that such initiatives can lead to a de facto embargo on minerals, harming the livelihoods of artisanal miners. It concludes that sustainable management requires the meaningful inclusion of local stakeholders and a deeper understanding of the political and socio-economic drivers of conflict beyond mere economic profit.

The document examines why international efforts to reform the security sector and stabilise the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 2003 and 2013 achieved limited impact. It argues that the FARDC is shaped by a neo-patrimonial system where political and military elites benefit from a fragmented army and weak state institutions to maintain patronage networks. International interventions, including the International Security and Stabilisation Support Strategy (ISSSS), were overly technical—focusing on 'train-and-equip' models—and failed to address the political root causes of violence. While the 2013 defeat of the M23 rebellion provided a temporary success and a window for reform, the authors caution that the underlying incentive structures remain largely unchanged.

The 2011 elections in the DRC were marked by logistical failures, allegations of fraud, and political radicalization. While Joseph Kabila was declared the winner and maintained a parliamentary majority, the process was criticized by international observers and the domestic opposition. Post-election stability has been undermined by renewed insecurity in the east, specifically army mutinies and tensions with Rwanda, alongside persistent socioeconomic hardship and a lack of national reconciliation.

The document analyzes the escalation of violence in North Kivu, DRC, linked to the M23 rebel group and alleged Rwandan support, alongside the economic collapse and civil unrest in Sudan following the loss of oil revenues to South Sudan.

Indian mining companies in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) operate on a small to medium scale compared to Western and Chinese firms, primarily growing through profit reinvestment rather than state or external capital. While companies like Rubamin, Chemaf, and Somika contribute to copper and cobalt output in Katanga, they face criticism over environmental pollution and labor conditions. Mining Mineral Resources (MMR) is strategically positioning itself as a producer of 'conflict-free' tin and tantalum through tagging and the construction of a domestic smelter. The primary risk to these operations is political instability following the departure of Katanga's governor, Moïse Katumbi.

The document analyzes the failure to complete multiple phases of the DDR process in the DRC, noting that ongoing violence in the eastern region and a lack of political will have hindered stability. It highlights the tension between 'brassage' (retraining and deployment) and 'mixage' (local integration) and argues that the FARDC's security sector reform cannot succeed without the effective completion of DDR. The report details the roles of international bodies like MONUSCO and the World Bank, while criticizing the Congolese government's preference for operational equipment over institutional accountability and the fragmented approach of bilateral donors.

The DRC faces significant hurdles in establishing state authority and territorial integrity, complicated by a stalled decentralisation process and border disputes over oil and gas deposits. The transition from MONUC to MONUSCO represents a symbolic shift toward stabilisation, while the STAREC programme attempts to restore basic institutional infrastructure in conflict zones. Resource governance remains precarious due to illegal mineral trade, lack of monitoring technology for oil exports, and legal disputes over mining contracts involving international corporations.

The document reports on a seminar held in Addis Ababa on July 14, 2009, which assessed the instability in eastern DRC. Key discussions focused on the role of armed groups like the FDLR and CNDP, the effectiveness of military operations such as Kimia II and Umoja Wetu, and the normalization of relations between the DRC and Rwanda. The seminar highlighted systemic challenges including a weak national army, land tenure disputes, corruption, and the limitations of MONUC's bureaucratic structure and troop levels. Recommendations emphasized strengthening democratic processes, building army capacity, and pursuing political dialogue for the disarmament of FDLR members not involved in the 1994 genocide.

The paper argues that artisanal mining in Kalima is more beneficial to the local population than industrial mining was, providing higher employment, better income, and more democratic working conditions. While it notes a decline in local farming and a collapse of social services previously provided by industrial companies, it suggests artisanal mining is more environmentally benign than industrial methods, despite the high carbon footprint of flying ore out of the region. The author also analyzes the DRC's punitive export tax regime, which encourages smuggling into Rwanda, and argues that the lack of conflict in Maniema's mining sector contrasts with the resource-fueled violence in the Kivu regions.