sitrep2010_23nov-7e1f547fcb9cc578.pdf

This briefing examines the challenges of completing the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) process and security sector reform (SSR) of the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC) in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). It details the failures of previous DDR phases, the complexities of integrating various armed groups, and the lack of political will and donor coordination hindering the creation of a professional national army.

• The national DDR programme in the DRC has struggled with completion across two phases. The first phase (November 2004 to December 2006) was terminated early due to renewed violence in the eastern DRC, while the second phase (July 2008 to December 2009) also remained incomplete and transitioned into the STAREC and UNSSSS plans.
• Integration of combatants into the FARDC occurs through two distinct methods: 'brassage' and 'mixage'. Brassage involves approximately 45 days of military training at centres such as Kitona, Kamina, and Kisangani to break existing chains of command. In contrast, mixage allows combatants to be integrated and deployed within their own areas of operation, a compromise made with groups like the CNDP that was not supported by MONUC or the international community.
• The Congolese government presented a new military reform plan on 26 January 2010, spanning 15 years (2009–2024). The plan is divided into three phases: stability and internal reform (2009–2011), capacity building and the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force (2011–2016), and a return to normal military routine with potential participation in AU and UN peace support operations (2016–2024).
• Security Sector Reform (SSR) is severely hindered by a lack of national ownership and political will. The Congolese government has prioritised the acquisition of weaponry and the creation of a Rapid Reaction Force over Western models of accountability and oversight, which the government views as a threat to its control over security forces.
• International support for SSR is fragmented due to poor donor coordination and competing interests. Many donors operate bilaterally and in secrecy, leading to varied levels of military training and strategic ethos across integrated battalions trained by different countries, including France, Belgium, South Africa, Angola, Tanzania, and the US.
• The DDR process has failed to include adequate vetting or criminal record checks for integrated militia leaders. This has resulted in the integration of unskilled or illiterate personnel, such as the Mai-Mai, into the official military structure, which the document suggests creates more institutional problems than it solves.
• Parallel to the national DDR, a DDRRR process for foreign armed groups (primarily from Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi) was coordinated by MONUSCO. Between 2003 and February 2010, over 16,100 soldiers and dependants were repatriated, though the FDLR remains a central security concern.

APA

Institute for Security Studies (n.d.). sitrep2010_23nov-7e1f547fcb9cc578.pdf. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SitRep2010_23Nov.pdf

Chicago

Institute for Security Studies. sitrep2010_23nov-7e1f547fcb9cc578.pdf. n.d. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SitRep2010_23Nov.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |author=Institute for Security Studies |title=sitrep2010_23nov-7e1f547fcb9cc578.pdf |url=https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SitRep2010_23Nov.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{instituteforsecuritystudiesndsitrep201023nov7e1f547fcb9cc578pdf, author = {{Institute for Security Studies}}, title = {{sitrep2010\_23nov-7e1f547fcb9cc578.pdf}}, institution = {Institute for Security Studies}, url = {https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/SitRep2010_23Nov.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }