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The report details how over 500,000 tonnes of fish are diverted annually from West African coastal communities to produce FMFO for European and Asian aquaculture and livestock. It identifies Mauritania as the primary exporter, with a significant portion of its fish oil destined for the EU, particularly France and Denmark. The document links this trade to major European aquafeed companies and retailers, while highlighting the severe socio-economic impacts on local artisanal fishermen and women processors.

The document argues that the aquaculture industry's dependence on wild-caught fish for feed is ecologically and financially unsustainable, exposing investors and retailers to systemic resource risks, price volatility, and reputational damage. It highlights links between major European aquafeed producers and destructive fishing practices in India, Vietnam, and The Gambia, while asserting that current certification schemes, specifically those from the Marine Ingredients Organisation (IFFO), are ineffective 'smokescreens'.

The report details discussions from a COP19 workshop on climate-induced relocation, highlighting the extreme financial costs for communities in Alaska and the Pacific, the need for national relocation policies, and the tension between voluntary adaptation and forced loss and damage. It emphasizes the importance of community-led decision-making to protect cultural identity and calls for better integration of relocation into UNFCCC frameworks like NAPAs and the Loss and Damage mechanism.

The report concludes that the Montreal Protocol's integrated system of trade restrictions and positive incentives has been effective in achieving near-universal ratification and significantly reducing global emissions of ozone-depleting substances (ODS). Trade measures, such as bans on imports and exports of ODS and products containing them, created economic pressures that encouraged non-parties to join or comply to maintain market access. Simultaneously, positive measures—including a ten-year grace period for Article 5 parties, a financial mechanism (the Multilateral Fund), and technology transfer—lowered the economic and political barriers for developing countries. The report highlights a strong correlation between the implementation of these measures and spikes in ratification rates, particularly among export-dependent Asian economies and major ODS producers. While some Article 5 parties saw increased consumption during their grace periods, the overall global use of Annex A and B substances fell by 80% from baseline levels by 1995.

The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) issued climate-related recommendations or questions to 35 out of 43 States considered in 2023. The Committee primarily focused on the differentiated impact of climate change on women, emphasizing the need for gender-responsive strategies in adaptation and disaster risk reduction, as well as the increased vulnerability of rural, Indigenous, migrant, and refugee women. While less frequent than adaptation, the Committee also addressed mitigation policies, fossil fuel extraction—specifically criticizing Norway's expansion of oil and gas permits in the Arctic—and the necessity of women's participation in the UNFCCC loss and damage fund.

The report identifies the residential sector as the largest global source of black carbon (BC), accounting for 48% of emissions in 2017, followed by transportation (24%) and industry. While emissions have declined in North America, Europe, and China due to stricter standards and fuel switching, these gains are being offset by increases in South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, where reliance on unclean cooking fuels remains high. The document highlights critical hotspots, including eastern China and the Indo-Gangetic Plain, and notes that global BC reductions are not currently on track to meet the Paris Climate Agreement's 1.5°C warming limit.

The report identifies severe coastal erosion, flooding, fishery decline, and poor waste management as existential threats to Saint-Louis, Senegal. After evaluating eighteen financial instruments, it recommends the use of Impact Bonds due to their flexibility in scale, capacity to crowd in private capital, and focus on measurable outcomes. The report suggests potential applications for these bonds in waste management, sustainable tourism, and aquaculture, particularly targeting youth and women.

The report form classifies the Global Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF Global), managed by Pegasus Capital Advisors (PCA), as a Category I-2 programme. It confirms that an Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS) has been established and disclosed in multiple languages to accommodate target countries across Africa, Asia-Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean, and the Mediterranean.

The report examines the 'resource curse' in Southern Africa, specifically regarding LNG projects in Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. It highlights a gap between Africa's significant gas discoveries—accounting for nearly 40% of global discoveries in the last decade—and actual production due to socio-political instability. The document argues that without structural democratic reform and meaningful community consultation, resource wealth fails to translate into broad-based development, as seen in Angola. It recommends that governments and investors prioritize 'Free, Prior, Informed and Continuous Consent' and align mining projects with the Africa Mining Vision and SADC Protocol on Energy to avoid conflict and environmental degradation.

Global Witness characterizes COP27 as a failure, primarily because world leaders did not agree to phase out fossil fuels despite the presence of 636 fossil fuel lobbyists. While the organization acknowledges the historic adoption of a loss and damage fund and the inclusion of the right to a healthy environment in the cover decision, it criticizes the lack of tangible progress on deforestation and the failure to specifically acknowledge the contributions of land and environmental defenders.

The paper examines the systemic vulnerabilities of pastoralists, who manage approximately 25 percent of the world's land area. It argues that conflict in these regions is driven by a combination of ecological shocks, the encroachment of agricultural frontiers, and the political marginalization of herding communities by state governments. Using a sustainable livelihoods framework, the authors identify threats to natural, financial, physical, human, social, and political capital. The document concludes that technical interventions alone are insufficient; sustainable peace requires integrating pastoralists into wider societal and political structures, protecting their mobility and resource access, and empowering their political representation.

The briefing examines the Mo Ibrahim Prize, an award for African leaders who meet strict democratic and constitutional criteria. It discusses the surprise decision by the Prize Committee to not select a winner in a given year, despite several leaders having recently left office. The author explores whether the prize effectively incentivizes good governance and suggests that the lack of a winner may reflect a receding democracy or the systemic challenges leaders face. The document concludes by suggesting the prize expand its scope to include civil society and individuals to better support democratic entrenchment.

The document details a seminar on the African Union's (AU) response to unconstitutional changes of government, specifically military coups. It evaluates the Lomé Declaration and the AU's consistency in applying sanctions, while proposing reforms to address poor governance and presidential term limits to prevent future instability.

The document analyzes the January 2013 escalation of conflict in Mali, where Islamist rebels captured the city of Konna, prompting a French military intervention. It attributes the rebel offensive to a lack of progress in negotiations and delays in the deployment of the UN-authorized African-led International Support Mission in Mali (AFISMA). While the French intervention is viewed as timely due to the Malian army's limited operational capacity, the author warns of humanitarian risks and the long-term challenge of controlling liberated areas. The briefing concludes by questioning the effectiveness of previous initiatives to strengthen African national armies and calls for a rethink of regional defense strategies.

Between 2022 and 2024, the African Environmental Defenders Initiative documented 232 non-lethal attacks against environmental defenders, with 67% occurring in East Africa. Uganda was the most affected country, accounting for 42% of cases, largely driven by opposition to the East African Crude Oil Pipeline (EACOP). The report identifies government (34%) and multinational/investment companies (20%) as the primary perpetrators. Women defenders face specific gendered threats, including the withholding of sanitary products during detention and social stigmatization. The document also details country-specific conflicts, such as conservation-linked violence in Kenya, industrial mining in the DRC, and illegal logging in Madagascar, while highlighting the role of the African Environmental Defenders Fund in providing emergency legal and psychosocial support.

The research examines 'pirogue migration' from West Africa to the Canary Islands, arguing that migrants are not irrational or suicidal but make decisions based on a specific socioeconomic and moral context. It identifies that the inability to achieve social adulthood—defined by financial independence and the ability to marry—creates a 'social moratorium' that makes the risks of the journey acceptable. The study finds that migrants actively filter risk information, often discrediting official awareness campaigns as biased. Furthermore, notions of masculinity, honor, and Sufi Islamic beliefs frame the journey as a courageous sacrifice or a matter of divine destiny, effectively neutralizing the fear of death.

The research demonstrates that states experiencing civil wars are significantly more likely to be involved in militarized interstate disputes (MIDs). Using data from 1946 to 2001, the authors find that this 'civil peace' effect is comparable in magnitude to the 'democratic peace' effect. Analysis of over 400 MIDs reveals that the increased risk is driven by states attempting to influence the outcome of civil wars through direct intervention, externalization (such as cross-border counter-insurgency), and unintended spillovers, rather than by opportunistic attacks on weakened states or diversionary wars to consolidate domestic power.

The study argues that while rising food prices create economic grievances, these only translate into urban unrest if societal organizations—such as civil society organizations (CSOs) and political parties—are present to provide mobilization structures and frame grievances. Using data from 41 African countries, the author finds that state repression of these organizations generally decreases the probability of unrest. Interestingly, the highest risk of unrest occurs in moderately repressive regimes that still allow some organizational activity, rather than in completely open societies, where citizens may prefer voting over protesting or where organizations provide alternative coping mechanisms.

The report examines SFA in Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Somalia since 2010, finding that billions in spending have often been ineffective or counter-productive. It identifies a 'piecemeal approach' where multiple providers with diverging interests create fragmented security forces, undermining professional standards and civilian oversight. Case studies of Mali and Somalia highlight issues such as high personnel turnover, a focus on technical skills over ethics, and the diversion of equipment to illicit markets. The authors recommend long-term, coordinated partnerships based on detailed local capacity assessments to foster cohesion rather than fragmentation.

The paper finds that while Senegal has made progress in renewable energy and direct access to climate finance, its overall NDC implementation is unsatisfactory. Key obstacles include a significant funding gap, the lack of a national measurement, reporting, and verification (MRV) system, and a strategic shift toward oil and gas exploitation that threatens carbon-reduction goals.