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The document highlights the risks of planning water and energy sectors in isolation, particularly as climate change increases water stress and impacts hydropower. It proposes the combined use of the Low Emissions Analysis Platform (LEAP) and Water Evaluation and Adaptation Planning (WEAP) tools, alongside macroeconomic modelling, to identify trade-offs and synergies. Case studies in Rwanda and Central Asia illustrate how this integrated approach can prevent GDP losses and reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The brief further suggests that such integration helps countries align their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) and National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) to optimize limited climate finance.

The Water Evaluation and Adaptation Planning (WEAP) platform is a scenario-based modelling tool used in 190 countries to integrate supply- and demand-side perspectives for water resilience. It enables users to simulate climate-driven scenarios, evaluate adaptation strategies such as infrastructure upgrades and demand management, and analyze trade-offs at the water-energy-food nexus through integration with the Low Emissions Analysis Platform (LEAP) and macroeconomic models. WEAP supports both top-down and locally led initiatives across various scales, from local watersheds to transboundary river basins.

The document identifies critical gaps in the U.S. nuclear supply chain, particularly regarding HALEU fuel, nuclear-grade graphite, and ultra-large forgings, noting a heavy reliance on Russia and China for these essential materials and services.

As of 31 August 2025, the GCF has a total pledged amount of USD 30 billion and has committed USD 18 billion to 314 projects across 133 countries. The portfolio is split between adaptation (58% in grant-equivalent terms) and mitigation (42%). The Fund's accredited entity network consists of 153 entities, 66% of which are direct access entities. The Readiness Programme portfolio has grown to USD 749.1 million. The current pipeline includes 142 concept notes and 66 funding proposals requesting a combined USD 12.3 billion in GCF financing, which exceeds the projected commitment authority for 2026–2027. The Secretariat is implementing pipeline optimization measures to retire inactive proposals and align with the 2024–2027 Strategic Plan.

The report argues that rapid methane abatement is a priority for transition finance due to its immediate impact on limiting global warming to 1.5°C. It analyzes the current financing landscape, noting a significant gap between the USD 9.6bn in private methane finance (2021/2022) and the estimated USD 48bn to USD 100bn required annually by 2030. Through case studies of 20 corporates, the report finds that while oil and gas firms generally integrate methane abatement into short-term strategies, agrifood firms struggle with supply chain tracking and specific targets. To address this, the report promotes the use of Use of Proceeds (UOP) and sustainability-linked instruments guided by Climate Bonds and Methane Finance Working Group (MFWG) criteria to ensure investments contribute to decarbonization without locking in high-carbon assets.

The document examines the current state of methane abatement financing and provides guidelines for structuring sustainable debt instruments. It analyzes the transition plans of 20 major companies in the oil and gas and agri-food sectors, highlighting a significant gap between the high potential for impact and the current marginal level of private investment. The report promotes the use of Use-of-Proceeds (UOP) and Sustainability-Linked Bonds (SLB) based on new sector-specific criteria from the Climate Bonds Initiative and the Methane Finance Working Group (MFWG) to avoid carbon lock-in and ensure credible decarbonization.

The Production Gap Report 2025 finds that governments are collectively planning more fossil fuel production than in 2023, with 2030 projected levels exceeding 1.5°C-consistent pathways by over 120%. While some countries are developing net-zero aligned scenarios, most continue to expand production and provide substantial financial support for fossil fuels, undermining Paris Agreement commitments.

Russia is attempting to form a non-Western climate coalition through BRICS, the SCO, and the EAEU to define 'sovereign' climate priorities that protect its fossil fuel exports. The document argues that Russia's approach is obstructionist, relying on the recalculation of forest carbon sinks to meet neutrality goals on paper rather than implementing genuine mitigation. While Russia pushes for shared carbon markets and 'technological neutrality' to prolong fossil fuel use, its Asian partners have largely rejected deep regulatory harmonisation. Meanwhile, Russian non-fossil fuel exporters maintain independent ESG agendas to remain competitive against foreign carbon border adjustments, despite the government's lack of a domestic carbon price.

The document analyzes the institutional strain on BRICS caused by its expansion, noting that while the bloc's global influence has grown, its consensus-based governance struggles with divergent member interests. It evaluates Brazil's 2025 presidency, which attempted to prioritize institutional development but saw most structural reforms deferred in the Rio Declaration. The authors contrast the informal nature of the broader bloc with the formal success of the New Development Bank (NDB) and propose six targeted, low-bureaucracy improvements—including a shared document repository and standardized onboarding—to improve operational effectiveness without sacrificing the group's flexible identity.

The guide outlines a framework for sustainable linear infrastructure (LI) development in snow leopard habitats, emphasizing the mitigation hierarchy—avoid, minimize, mitigate, restore, and offset. It details strategies across the project life cycle, from policy development and spatial planning to construction and maintenance, to reduce habitat fragmentation, wildlife-vehicle collisions, and other ecological disturbances. The document highlights critical knowledge gaps regarding snow leopard-specific crossing structures and calls for multidisciplinary collaboration and inclusive community consultation to protect biodiversity and ecosystem services.

The document argues that European banks continue to support Glencore's coal expansion through general-purpose bond issuances, enabled by inadequate exclusion thresholds and policy loopholes regarding metallurgical coal and corporate-level financing.

The report identifies that between January 2024 and April 2025, twenty major banks, including nine European institutions, participated in 12 Glencore bond issuances totaling US$8 billion. These funds, intended for general corporate purposes, can support Glencore's 17 coal mining expansions across Australia, South Africa, Canada, Russia, and Kazakhstan, which contradicts IEA climate scenarios. The report argues that European banks continue this support through policy loopholes such as inadequate exclusion thresholds and restrictions that only apply to new customers or project-level financing.

The report details Glencore's expansion of coal capacity and the role of European banks in financing these activities through bond issuances, highlighting loopholes in bank coal policies.

The briefing contends that the Asian Development Bank (ADB) uses technical assistance (TA) to enable fossil gas infrastructure and planning, despite pledges to align with the Paris Agreement. It highlights how vague terms like 'low-carbon' and 'transition infrastructure' allow the ADB to support gas-related projects in countries such as Pakistan and Indonesia. The document notes that TA for energy projects in 2024 lacked fuel specifications in 45.9% of cases, hindering transparency. It further argues that these projects often ignore gender impacts and risk creating stranded assets. The author recommends that the ADB explicitly exclude fossil gas from its 'clean energy' definitions and phase out all direct and indirect support for midstream and downstream gas infrastructure.

In 2024, fossil-powered capacity fell below half of the total electricity mix for the BRICS group, driven by renewable growth in China, India, and Brazil. However, new BRICS members—including Indonesia, Kazakhstan, and Nigeria—show a stark gap between net-zero pledges and action, currently constructing ten times more fossil fuel capacity (25 GW) than wind and utility-scale solar (2.3 GW). Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are central to this expansion, backing 62% of all power capacity under construction in new member geographies, with particularly high involvement in hydropower (93%) and coal (88%).

The Clean Air Task Force outlines the EU's current reliance on Russian nuclear fuel, particularly for VVER reactors, and proposes strategies to enhance supply chain resilience through alternative suppliers, domestic production, and strategic international cooperation.

In 2024, global electricity generation reached new record highs for solar, wind, hydro, gas, and coal. Solar was the fastest-growing source, increasing by 474 TWh to reach a 6.9% share of the global mix, with China contributing 53% of this growth. Wind generation also hit a record of 2,494 TWh, though growth slowed due to weather conditions. Hydro rebounded to an all-time high of 4,416 TWh following 2023 droughts, largely driven by China. Nuclear generation grew by 2.5% to 2,768 TWh, but its global market share fell to a 45-year low of 9%. Gas and coal both reached record generation levels in 2024, though their shares of the global electricity mix declined to 22% and 34% respectively, as electricity demand grew faster than their production.

A study by World Weather Attribution found that human-induced climate change made a March 2025 heatwave in Central Asia approximately 4 °C hotter and three times more likely. The event saw temperatures exceeding 30 °C even at 1000m altitude, affecting regions including Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The analysis notes that climate models underestimate the recent increase in March temperatures, meaning the reported influence of climate change is a conservative estimate. The heatwave coincided with critical agricultural periods, such as the sowing of spring wheat in Kazakhstan and the flowering of export fruit crops, potentially impacting yields in a region where agriculture employs up to 50% of the workforce.

In 2024, global coal power reached a 20-year low in new capacity additions (44 GW), though the total global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in decommissioned capacity and the UK closed its last coal plant, China saw record construction starts (94 GW) and India proposed record new capacity (38 GW). Russia has emerged as a leading developer of new coal projects, ranking fifth globally for development capacity, with plans focused on Siberia and the Far East to support energy demand and the domestic coal industry.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements (25.2 GW). While the UK became the sixth country to phase out coal entirely and EU27 retirements grew fourfold, China and India dominated new developments, accounting for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). In the OECD, proposals dropped to five, but annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to align with 1.5C pathways. Other trends include a surge in captive coal plants in Indonesia, the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea, and continued coal pursuit in Russia, Mongolia, and Central Asia.