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The document outlines the challenges of verifying legal compliance in global agricultural supply chains under the EUDR. It argues that official documentation and third-party certifications are often insufficient due to systemic corruption, land-grabbing, and informality. Through case studies of Brazil, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Indonesia, it highlights specific risks such as illegal deforestation in the Amazon and Cerrado, child labour in cocoa production, and the widespread lack of mandatory ISPO certification in Indonesia's palm oil sector. It recommends that EU operators consult local experts and civil society to verify the 'reality on the ground'.

The guide evaluates four green bank models—standalone green banks, green-focused policy development banks (PDBs), green facilities within PDBs, and country platforms—based on a country's economic position, governance, and product needs. It specifically highlights that country platforms are most suitable for low-income countries (LICs) and debt-distressed nations due to international financial institution (IFI) support. Additionally, the guide proposes three international support mechanisms: a new green bank design accelerator providing technical and seed funding, the expansion of existing platforms like the FiCS Innovation Lab, and the formation of a coalition of existing initiatives for knowledge exchange.

The report examines the role of green banks in bridging the USD 7.4 trillion annual climate funding gap. It identifies four main structures: standalone de novo banks, enhanced public development banks (PDBs), green facilities within PDBs, and country platforms. While standalone banks are more common in advanced economies, EMDEs frequently utilize green facilities as transitional mechanisms. The report emphasizes that success depends on financial, environmental, and political sustainability, and proposes three international support options: a new design initiative, expanding the FiCS Innovation Lab, or forming a coalition of existing initiatives.

The report examines Indonesia's energy transition through a lens of national interest, highlighting a significant gap between the high investment needs for Net Zero Emissions (NZE) and the limited availability of domestic and international funding. It argues that foreign climate finance often arrives as debt rather than grants, potentially exacerbating Indonesia's chronic fiscal deficits and public debt. The document analyzes the capacity of the Indonesian banking sector to fund renewable energy projects, finding that while capital adequacy is generally high, systemic bottlenecks in foreign exchange liquidity and long-term stable funding persist. It also evaluates the nascent Indonesian carbon market, noting a lack of clear emission caps (PTBAE) and low carbon prices. The authors propose 'The Indonesian Way,' a strategy focusing on eight action paths, including the dekarbonization of transport and electricity, targeted subsidies, and the development of a domestic green manufacturing ecosystem to reduce technological dependency.

The report examines Indonesia's path toward net-zero emissions by 2060, highlighting a significant gap between current investment levels and the estimated annual need of USD 73–76 billion. It argues that foreign climate finance is often debt-heavy and unreliable, urging a shift toward domestic funding and structural reforms. The analysis covers the banking sector's limited capacity to finance renewable energy, the underperformance of the national carbon market, and the socioeconomic disparities in energy access. It proposes an "Indonesian Way" consisting of eight strategic actions, including targeted subsidies and the development of a domestic clean-tech ecosystem, to ensure a just and sovereign transition.

The report argues that the Korean Emissions Trading Scheme (K-ETS) is undermined by a reliance on low-quality international carbon credits, which lead to over-crediting and depressed carbon prices. Using the EU ETS as a benchmark, the authors demonstrate how the EU phased out international credits to prioritize domestic reductions. A specific analysis of cookstove projects eligible for K-ETS finds they likely overestimate emission reductions by a factor of 18.3. The report also highlights systemic issues with hydropower and gas leak reduction projects, including lack of additionality and environmental harm. It recommends that South Korea ban international credits from the K-ETS, strengthen emission caps, and avoid using unreliable bilateral cooperation projects under Article 6.2 of the Paris Agreement to meet its 2030 Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC).

The report details how climate change drives biodiversity loss through mechanisms like ocean acidification and species range shifts, while biodiversity loss weakens the planet's carbon sinks. It critically assesses 'false solutions'—including monoculture tree plantations, carbon offsetting, and geoengineering—arguing that these policies often cause further ecological damage and land grabbing. The document calls for a systemic shift toward agroecology, energy sufficiency, and the protection of Indigenous Peoples' land rights to address the polycrisis holistically.

The document analyzes how climate change accelerates biodiversity loss and how the loss of ecosystems further destabilizes the climate. It critiques 'false solutions' such as monoculture tree plantations, carbon offsets, and geoengineering, arguing they often cause more harm than good. The report calls for a systemic shift toward agroecology, community-led energy transitions, and the protection of Indigenous rights.

In 2024, global coal capacity saw a net increase of 18.8 GW despite the lowest number of new commissions in 20 years, driven primarily by record construction activity in China and India. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK eliminated coal entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to expand capacity. The report highlights a stark divide between OECD countries, where projects have plummeted, and Asia, where China and India account for 92% of new projects.

In 2024, global new coal capacity reached its lowest level in two decades, though China and India continued significant expansions. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, Indonesia experienced a surge in 'captive' coal plants for industrial use, contradicting its stated transition goals.

In 2024, global coal capacity saw a net increase of 18.8GW, driven by record construction in China (94GW) and high proposals in India (38GW), despite the lowest new capacity additions in 20 years (44GW). While the EU27 quadrupled its closures and the UK fully phased out coal, Japan and South Korea are pursuing ammonia co-firing to extend the life of coal plants, a strategy the report describes as costly and inconsistent with the Paris Agreement.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years (44 GW), though global capacity still saw a net increase of 18.8 GW. While the EU27 quadrupled its retirements and the UK closed its last coal plant, China and India saw record construction starts and proposals, respectively. Outside these two nations, development capacity has fallen for ten consecutive years. In Latin America, new proposals are nearly zero, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep existing plants operational despite the competitiveness of renewables.

In 2024, global coal power reached a 20-year low in new capacity additions (44 GW), though the total global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW. While the EU27 saw a fourfold increase in decommissioned capacity and the UK closed its last coal plant, China saw record construction starts (94 GW) and India proposed record new capacity (38 GW). Russia has emerged as a leading developer of new coal projects, ranking fifth globally for development capacity, with plans focused on Siberia and the Far East to support energy demand and the domestic coal industry.

In 2024, global coal-fired power capacity additions reached their lowest level in 20 years at 44 GW, though net capacity still increased by 18.8 GW due to continued growth in China and India. While the EU saw a fourfold increase in retired capacity and the UK became the sixth country to fully exit coal since the Paris Agreement, China and India saw record-high numbers of new plant starts and proposals. In OECD countries, planned coal plants have dropped from 142 in 2015 to five today, with Turkey and Australia remaining among the few with active projects. Turkey specifically is noted as the only OECD country actively increasing coal-based electricity production, despite a 2053 net-zero target and the recent approval of an expansion at the Afşin-Elbistan complex.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal capacity in twenty years, though a net increase in the global fleet occurred due to record construction starts in China and new proposals in India. While the EU27 saw coal retirements quadruple and the UK eliminated coal power entirely, other regions like Russia, Central Asia, and Mongolia continue to seek new plants. In Latin America, proposals are declining, though Brazil continues to provide significant government subsidies to keep coal plants operational.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements (25.2 GW). While the UK became the sixth country to phase out coal entirely and EU27 retirements grew fourfold, China and India dominated new developments, accounting for 92% of all newly proposed coal capacity. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). In the OECD, proposals dropped to five, but annual retirements must more than triple to 70 GW to align with 1.5C pathways. Other trends include a surge in captive coal plants in Indonesia, the promotion of ammonia co-firing in Japan and South Korea, and continued coal pursuit in Russia, Mongolia, and Central Asia.

In 2024, the world commissioned the lowest amount of new coal power capacity in twenty years (44 GW), yet the global fleet still grew by 18.8 GW because additions exceeded retirements. While OECD countries and the EU are accelerating phaseouts—with the UK becoming the sixth country to eliminate coal entirely—China and India continue to drive global expansion. China saw its highest construction starts since 2015 (94 GW), and India recorded its highest year for new proposals (38.4 GW). Outside these two nations, coal development has declined for ten consecutive years. However, the report notes that current retirement rates in OECD countries must more than triple to meet 1.5°C warming targets.

Southeast Asia is facing a potential surge in gas production, with 14 projects potentially reaching final investment decisions (FIDs) in 2025. If approved, these would add over 20 bcm/y of capacity, an 18% increase over current output. However, many projects have a history of delays, and the expansion threatens ecologically sensitive areas like the Coral Triangle and Mekong Delta. The report highlights contradictions between these extraction plans and the net-zero commitments of Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Brunei.

The document analyzes sovereign debt in the Global South as a tool of neocolonial control that perpetuates structural dependencies in food, energy, and manufacturing. It critiques existing G20 restructuring mechanisms for treating debt as a liquidity issue rather than a structural one. Drawing on the failure of the 1980s Cartagena Initiative, the authors advocate for a Global South Debtors’ Coalition to leverage collective bargaining power. This coalition would pursue 'The Bargain of the Century,' proposing that Global South nations use their strategic mineral wealth and market size to secure technology transfers from major powers like China, the US, and the EU. The paper specifically urges South Africa to use its G20 Presidency to advance this framework, linking debt justice to food sovereignty, renewable energy independence, and regional industrial policies.

This guide explains how model contracts—both generic and nationally tailored—can help governments ensure responsible investment in agriculture. It details how these templates can integrate international standards, prevent problematic omissions, flag risky clauses like stabilization provisions, and promote transparency and legal harmonization.