Search Climate Insights Directory

Between 20–22 June 2026, the Gulf of Guinea coast experienced severe flooding following intense rainfall, with over 140 mm falling in less than 24 hours in some areas. The event caused significant fatalities in Côte d’Ivoire (59 since May), Ghana (at least 34), and Togo (five). An attribution study found that observed 3-day rainfall intensity in the region has increased by approximately 23% since records began, making such events about five times more likely in the current climate (1.4°C warmer than pre-industrial levels) than in a cooler climate. While climate models support the trend of increasing precipitation, they systematically underestimate the observed increase, with models showing only a 4% increase in intensity. The study highlights that rapid urbanisation, the expansion of settlements into floodplains, and sea level rise exceeding the global average have compounded flood risks. Under a future warming scenario of 2.8°C, these heavy rainfall events are expected to become common occurrences.

The document introduces ECOWAS as a regional economic community established in 1975 to promote economic integration and stability in West Africa. While it has achieved some success in facilitating free movement for citizens, the bloc currently faces significant threats from terrorism, climate change in the Sahel, and infrastructure deficits. The document highlights a critical geopolitical crisis where Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger have announced their intention to exit the bloc by January 2025, citing sanctions and a failure to combat insecurity.

The report analyzes Cameroon's economic potential and challenges, arguing that while the country shows gradual progress, it remains hindered by dependence on extractive sectors and governance weaknesses. It recommends a coordinated approach to structural reforms focusing on manufacturing, agricultural transformation, and governance to reduce poverty and informality. Specifically, it emphasizes the need for climate-smart agriculture, the utilization of hydroelectric and solar capacity to become a regional energy hub, and the strategic use of the AfCFTA to boost trade and industrialization.

The document describes a 'pragmatic' security integration between the US and Nigeria that avoids formal military treaties by using civilian instruments. By leveraging Section 126 of AGOA and the 'Safe Skies for Africa' initiative, the US provides decommissioned FAA equipment and technical assistance to modernize Nigerian airspace. This creates a 'shared awareness' corridor that serves both aviation safety and counter-insurgency monitoring, effectively replacing lost US surveillance capacity in the Sahel. However, the author warns that this operational deepening is contradicted by increasing political uncertainty in Washington regarding the future of AGOA, which some legislators seek to turn into a discretionary disciplinary tool.

The document examines the critical infrastructure gaps in West Africa, highlighting how deficiencies in energy, transport, digital connectivity, and water management hinder economic growth and the goals of ECOWAS's Vision 2050. It details specific initiatives like the Abidjan-Lagos Corridor Highway and the West African Power Pool (WAPP), while identifying barriers such as corruption, regulatory fragmentation, and a regional infrastructure funding gap estimated between USD 20 billion and USD 36 billion per year. The paper advocates for Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), innovative financing like green bonds, and the inclusion of youth and SMEs to drive sustainable development.

The policy brief argues that Africa's maritime security efforts are hindered by institutional fragmentation, chronic underfunding, and a gap between high-level policy and operational capacity. It highlights that while regional bodies like SADC and ECOWAS have made progress, the African Union (AU) lacks a permanent coordinating body and a tested naval component for the African Standby Force. To address this, the authors recommend establishing an African Maritime Security Expert Group, convening a permanent Committee of the Heads of African Navies and Coastguards (CHANS), and conducting the AMANI Africa III maritime exercise to validate naval command-and-control.

The briefing highlights three priority areas for the 79th UN General Assembly and Climate Week: the High-Level Meeting on Sea-Level Rise, climate finance negotiations, and the Summit of the Future. It emphasizes the security implications of sea-level rise for Pacific Island states, the critical funding gap for developing nations facing debt crises, and the potential for the 'Pact for the Future' to address the climate-security nexus in UN peace operations.

The Forest Territories Facility (FTF) is a proposed USD 160 million programme targeting 15 countries in Central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea. Managed by the Agence Française de Développement (AFD), the facility aims to maintain the extent and functionality of tropical forests through four paradigm-shift pathways: protecting biodiversity, promoting inclusive sustainable forest management, intensifying agriculture to achieve 'zero deforestation', and stabilizing land use. The programme employs a programmatic approach, combining national-level regulatory support with local landscape-based pilot projects. Funding is requested primarily from the Green Climate Fund (USD 120 million), utilizing a mix of grants and senior loans over a 20-year lifespan.

The report analyzes the security landscape of West Africa, identifying a complex interplay of weak governance, economic inequality, and emerging threats like violent extremism and transnational crime. It highlights how these factors undermine regional stability and development, particularly in the Sahel. While Ghana is relatively stable, it faces risks from porous borders and internal community tensions. The document recommends pursuing economic integration via the AfCFTA, addressing youth unemployment, and strengthening regional security alliances to combat terrorism and trafficking.

Nigeria aims to produce nuclear energy by 2025 and reach 4,800 megawatts of capacity by 2035, primarily through a 'build-own-operate' model with potential partners like Russia and China. However, the document warns that these plans are complicated by severe climate risks—including desertification in the north and sea-level rise in Lagos—and persistent security threats from groups like Boko Haram and ISWAP. While Nigeria has successfully removed highly enriched uranium from its research reactor with international help, the briefing argues that the government must better integrate climate and security risks into the design and transport of future nuclear facilities to avoid vulnerabilities.

The report examines the 'gathering storm clouds' of political and economic uncertainty in the Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC) region. It argues that a combination of commodity price collapses, neo-patrimonial governance, and rapid population growth is creating a volatile environment. The analysis highlights a critical gap between population growth and the provision of basic services, alongside a history of 'pseudo-democratic' regimes that resist genuine political transition. The authors warn that without strategic diversification of economies and significant investment in human capital, the region's large youth population could become a catalyst for further instability and violence.

Togo has significantly reduced piracy since 2012 through increased naval patrols and international cooperation, recording no acts of piracy in 2015. However, the country faces ongoing challenges, including a struggling fisheries sector plagued by overfishing and poor resources, and an international ship registry that provides few local jobs and is linked to illicit fishing. While the Autonomous Port of Lomé maintains ISPS Code compliance and serves as a key transit hub for landlocked countries like Burkina Faso, it suffers from space constraints and poor internal road infrastructure. To sustain security, Togo established the National Organisation for State Action at Sea (NOSAS) in 2014, though hierarchical ambiguities persist between the maritime prefect and the advisor for the sea.

The document examines how political instability, corruption, and a focus on onshore security led to 'sea blindness' in the Gulf of Guinea, creating a security gap exploited by pirates and transnational criminal networks. It details the region's vast natural resources, including oil, gas, and minerals, and analyzes the shift toward maritime security since 2012. The author evaluates various responses, from national naval upgrades in Nigeria and Ghana to regional frameworks like the Yaoundé Declaration and international support from the EU and UN, concluding that the primary challenge remains translating high-level policy into operational action.

The policy brief examines the emergence of the Blue Economy as a central priority for African policymakers, specifically through the AU's 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (2050 AIM Strategy). It identifies a significant challenge of fragmentation, where maritime ambitions span a complex array of sector-specific institutions and programmes. The author suggests that the 2050 AIM Strategy should link with the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), which has recently undergone institutional renewal and adopted the Blue Economy as its top priority. The brief emphasizes that for these initiatives to succeed, they must avoid duplicating sector-specific efforts and instead focus on high-level integrated planning, improved communication platforms, and bolstered institutional capacity.

The report evaluates the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and its peace and security architecture, specifically the Central African Early Warning Mechanism (MARAC) and the Central African Multinational Force (FOMAC). It finds a significant gap between the organization's ambitions and its operational reality, noting that conflict prevention is hampered by a highly centralized, state-focused structure and a narrow military approach to security. The document highlights critical regional threats, including the Boko Haram insurgency, maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, and the instability in the Central African Republic (CAR). It concludes that ECCAS lacks a credible regional lead nation and a shared vision, remaining heavily dependent on external funding, primarily from the European Union, which undermines regional ownership of the peace and security process.

The policy brief proposes that South Africa shift its Latin American engagement from a Brazil-centric approach to a broader 'South Atlantic Zone' framework. This strategy aims to leverage shared developmental trajectories and maritime interests to bolster the 'blue economy' and regional security. The authors highlight the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) as a key mechanism for collaboration, alongside maritime exercises like IBSAMAR and Atlasur. While trade between South Africa and Latin American South Atlantic countries remains low, the document identifies significant potential for growth in ocean economics, specifically through initiatives like Operation Phakisa, and cultural ties via the Community of Portuguese Language Countries (CPLP).

The research paper argues that South Africa can bridge the conceptual divide between its 'Latin American' and 'African' foreign policy by treating the South Atlantic Zone as a single entity. It highlights the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic (ZPCSA) as a framework for security and economic collaboration. Key drivers for this engagement include the 'Operation Phakisa' blue economy initiative, the need to combat piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, and the exploitation of untapped oil and gas reserves. While trade between South Africa and Latin American partners like Brazil and Argentina remains low due to similar commodity exports, the document identifies significant growth potential and the role of South Africa as a strategic gateway between Latin America and Asia.

The research examines the potential for a 'resource curse' in four African nations soon to become oil-dependent. Using a game-theoretic model and the concept of 'limited access orders,' the author argues that oil rents typically disrupt political incentives, undermining economic performance and potentially destabilizing the state. While Ghana is identified as a potential exception due to its robust democracy and lower projected oil-to-tax revenue ratio, the other cases show higher risks of repression or predatory behavior. The paper concludes that radical policy interventions like 'cash-to-citizen' transfers are implausible because they ignore the domestic political equilibria and patronage networks that maintain stability.

The document analyzes the shift in piracy activity from the Horn of Africa to the Gulf of Guinea. While international efforts led to a dramatic decline in Somali piracy, West African piracy increased in 2012, driven primarily by the theft of refined petroleum products linked to illegal oil bunkering in the Niger Delta. The author highlights the regional approach to security in West Africa, including the 2050 Africa’s Integrated Maritime Strategy (AIMS) and the establishment of an Inter-regional Coordination Centre in Yaoundé, while noting persistent challenges in intelligence gathering and inter-operability.

Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, Nigeria has shifted its foreign policy to prioritize domestic economic development and political stability over the pursuit of regional prestige. The country has pursued a 'charm offensive' to remove its pariah status and has balanced strategic partnerships with traditional powers (US, UK, France, Russia) and emerging powers (China, India, Brazil). Key priorities include debt relief, infrastructure development, and security cooperation, with a particular emphasis on 'exchanging oil for development' in its relations with China and Brazil.