Future Oil Revenues and Political Dynamics in West and East Africa: A Slippery Slope?

The research examines the potential for a 'resource curse' in four African nations soon to become oil-dependent. Using a game-theoretic model and the concept of 'limited access orders,' the author argues that oil rents typically disrupt political incentives, undermining economic performance and potentially destabilizing the state. While Ghana is identified as a potential exception due to its robust democracy and lower projected oil-to-tax revenue ratio, the other cases show higher risks of repression or predatory behavior. The paper concludes that radical policy interventions like 'cash-to-citizen' transfers are implausible because they ignore the domestic political equilibria and patronage networks that maintain stability.

• The nominal existence of democracy is insufficient to ensure economic dynamism or political inclusion; stability is likely only when oil rent to government revenue ratios are low and institutions are relatively strong.
• Oil rents generally disrupt political incentives, which tends to undermine economic performance across most cases.
• Ghana is viewed as a potential exception to the resource curse due to its robust democracy and lower projected oil dependency, though youth unemployment and limited non-extractive economic opportunities remain risks.
• In Uganda, the history of military repression and a high future oil dependency ratio increase the likelihood of a 'repression effect' and political instability.
• Tanzania exhibits a predatory state dynamic where ruling elites may use side payments to prevent citizen revolt, though this results in sub-optimal economic performance.
• In Liberia, oil rents are expected to amplify the 'rentier effect,' but the current equilibrium may remain robust because citizens are dependent on the same patronage networks operated by the ruling coalition.
• The 'cash-to-citizen' model of distributing oil revenues directly to citizens is deemed implausible because it violates political incentive compatibility constraints and ignores the role of patronage in maintaining stability.
• External rents distort state incentives by removing the material need for governments to tax their populations, which severs the link of citizen-state accountability.

APA

Harvey, R. (2014). Future Oil Revenues and Political Dynamics in West and East Africa: A Slippery Slope? South African Institute of International Affairs. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Occasional-Paper-188.pdf

Chicago

Harvey, Ross. Future Oil Revenues and Political Dynamics in West and East Africa: A Slippery Slope? South African Institute of International Affairs, 2014. https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Occasional-Paper-188.pdf.

Wikipedia

{{cite report |last1=Harvey |first1=Ross |title=Future Oil Revenues and Political Dynamics in West and East Africa: A Slippery Slope? |publisher=South African Institute of International Affairs |date=June 2014 |url=https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Occasional-Paper-188.pdf |access-date=17 August 2026 |via=Climate Insights Directory}}

BibTeX

@techreport{harvey2014future, author = {Harvey, Ross}, title = {{Future Oil Revenues and Political Dynamics in West and East Africa: A Slippery Slope?}}, institution = {South African Institute of International Affairs}, year = {2014}, month = jun, url = {https://saiia.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/Occasional-Paper-188.pdf}, urldate = {2026-08-17}, note = {Indexed by Climate Insights Directory} }