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The 2022 Forest Declaration Assessment finds that global forest governance is currently insufficient to meet 2030 targets. While some countries have successfully reduced deforestation through moratoria and strengthened enforcement, these gains are often fragile or being reversed by legislative rollbacks. The report highlights persistent tenure insecurity for Indigenous Peoples and local communities, widespread corruption in the timber trade, and significant gaps in the implementation of demand-side regulations in importing nations.

The 2022 Forest Declaration Assessment finds that no global indicator is currently on track to meet the 2030 goals of halting forest loss and restoring 350 million hectares of landscape. While Tropical Asia is on track to halt deforestation, other regions like Tropical Latin America and Africa are not. The report highlights a massive funding gap, with current mitigation finance at less than 1% of the estimated USD 460 billion annual need. It also notes that commodity-driven deforestation declined by 6% in 2021 but remains far from the trajectory needed for the 2025 private sector target. Governance remains a critical weakness, with persistent tenure insecurity for Indigenous Peoples and local communities and widespread corruption in the timber trade.

The report finds that global forest finance is not on track to meet 2030 goals, with current mitigation finance averaging USD 2.3 billion per year—less than 1 percent of the estimated USD 460 billion annual requirement. It highlights a stark imbalance where 'grey finance' (harmful investments) significantly outweighs 'green finance,' and notes that Indigenous Peoples and local communities remain severely underfunded. While 2021 pledges could quadruple annual finance to USD 9.5 billion, this remains insufficient. The report also analyzes the limited impact of voluntary and compliance carbon markets and the slow progress of REDD+ frameworks.

The document outlines Africa's objectives for COP27, focusing on the African Group of Negotiators' (AGN) demands for increased climate finance and the recognition of the continent's special circumstances. It highlights a tension between the African Union's (AU) support for natural gas as a transition fuel and the goals of renewable energy activists. The brief also details the roles of specific 'climate champion' countries and the impact of global geopolitical tensions, such as the US-China standoff and the Russia-Ukraine war, on climate negotiations.

The report identifies the Green Guarantee Company (GGC) as a private sector project categorized as Environmental and Social Safeguards (ESS) Category I-2. It lists the disclosure of an Environmental and Social Management System (ESMS), Gender Assessment, Gender Action Plan, and Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework in multiple languages to accommodate target countries including Bangladesh, Brazil, Gabon, India, Indonesia, Lao PDR, the Philippines, and Trinidad and Tobago. Physical disclosure locations for stakeholders were established on June 15, 2022, in each of these countries.

The document explores the evolving relationship between Korea and Africa, focusing on how Korea's carbon-neutrality goals and technological expertise can support Africa's climate resilience. It identifies key areas for partnership, including renewable energy, green minerals for batteries, smart city development, and climate-resilient agriculture, while emphasizing the need for these initiatives to be African-led and aligned with the AU's strategic framework.

Global Witness analysis indicates that industrial rubber plantations in West and Central Africa caused nearly 520km2 of deforestation between 2000 and 2020. The report highlights that the EU imports over 30% of rubber from six key African producers, yet rubber was excluded from proposed EU anti-deforestation laws following tyre industry lobbying. The study links this deforestation to three multinational companies—Olam, Halcyon Agri, and Socfin—which are financed by major European banks. Additionally, the report documents severe impacts on local and indigenous communities, including land loss, lack of water, and violent repression in countries like Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria.

Central Africa has experienced warming between 0.75°C and 1.2°C since 1960, leading to widespread losses in health, food security, and economic growth. Future risks include lethal heat exposure, severe biodiversity loss above 2°C, and significant GDP reductions. Adaptation requires increased finance, nature-based solutions, and improved climate services, though the region faces severe data constraints and funding gaps.

The document defines 'critical minerals' as raw materials essential for renewable energy and clean technology, noting that criticality is context-specific and varies by country. It identifies two primary perspectives on criticality: security and control of supply (emphasized by the US, EU, and Japan) and value capture (emphasized by China, Australia, and Canada). The guide highlights the role of rare earth elements (REEs) in permanent magnets and lists key demand drivers such as e-mobility and decarbonization. It also discusses supply sources, including the significant role of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) for cobalt and tantalum, and emerging sources like deep-seabed mining. Finally, it outlines the macroeconomic and geopolitical risks associated with mineral dependency, such as 'Dutch disease' and supply chain concentration.

The document provides a comprehensive overview of critical minerals, which are essential for renewable energy and low-carbon technologies. It distinguishes between two primary perspectives on criticality: supply security (emphasized by the US, EU, and Japan) and value capture (emphasized by China, Australia, and Canada). The text details the importance of rare earth elements, the drivers of demand—such as electric mobility and decarbonization—and the role of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM). It also highlights the significant increase in mineral requirements for electric vehicles and the global demand projections for 2050, while warning governments about supply risks, macroeconomic volatility, and the 'Dutch disease'.

The document provides a comprehensive overview of critical minerals, which are essential for clean energy technologies and a low-carbon future. It explains that 'criticality' is context-dependent, defined either by supply security (import dependence) or strategic valuation (leveraging abundance). The text highlights the specific role of rare earth elements (REEs), the massive increase in mineral demand for electric vehicles and decarbonization, and the growing importance of artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) alongside emerging sources like deep-sea mining and phytomining. It concludes by weighing the economic opportunities of value chain development against risks such as production concentration, price volatility, and the 'Dutch disease'.

The policy brief examines the severe fiscal constraints facing African countries during COVID-19 recovery, noting that while advanced economies mobilised about 6% of GDP, African countries mobilised barely 1%. It highlights the inadequacy of current debt relief mechanisms like the DSSI and the Common Framework, and the high cost of borrowing from international capital markets due to unfair credit ratings. The author proposes five policy priorities: establishing national donor coordination frameworks, reallocating public investment to de-risk private projects, extending the DSSI for two years with partial debt cancellation, creating a transparent multilateral framework for debt resolution involving commercial creditors, and exploring the establishment of independent, publicly owned credit rating agencies.

The document investigates whether Russia exerts significant influence over African states in the UN Security Council (UNSC) by analyzing voting patterns between 2014 and 2020. It argues that Russia's influence over the A3 is often exaggerated, as statistical evidence shows that African member states remain more aligned with the P3 (US, UK, and France) and are largely independent of Russian vetoes and abstentions. While the A3 have increasingly sought to present unified positions on African peace and security issues, their voting behavior on non-African files shows a declining coincidence with Russian positions over time.

The document investigates whether Russia exerts significant influence over African states in the UN Security Council (UNSC) by analyzing voting patterns between 2014 and 2020. It argues that Russia's influence over the A3 is often exaggerated, as statistical evidence shows little coordination and a trend of increasing divergence. While the A3 are increasingly presenting unified positions on African issues, their voting behavior remains more aligned with the P3 (US, UK, and France) than with Russia. The brief concludes that Russia's role as a 'loud dissenter' has not translated into a strategic alliance with the African grouping.

Based on a quantitative mapping of OECD data from 2014 to 2018, the document identifies five primary failures in climate adaptation finance for Africa: insufficient funding levels compared to mitigation and actual needs, a lack of strategic targeting toward the most vulnerable countries, over-concentration in agriculture and water sectors, low disbursement rates of committed funds, and an over-reliance on loans rather than grants.

The document reviews digital policies across Africa, finding that while most countries have strategies focusing on infrastructure, e-government, and cybersecurity, there is a lack of continental harmonization. It highlights the significant role of external actors, noting that China provides much of the physical infrastructure (e.g., 70% of 4G base stations via Huawei) while the EU exerts regulatory influence through development assistance and agreements like the EU-ACP, which incorporates GDPR standards. The authors argue for an Africa-led, harmonized digital strategy to avoid fragmented standards and better leverage the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).

The Subnational Climate Fund (SnCF), approved by the GCF in 2020 and running through 2028, aims to mobilize USD 750 million to support approximately 40 subnational projects with deal sizes between USD 5 million and 75 million. The fund utilizes a Technical Assistance Facility and USD 150 million in concessional equity from the GCF to attract USD 600 million in commercial equity, targeting subnational governments that lack fiscal autonomy or the ability to borrow from international capital markets. The fund involves 42 countries, including 16 in Africa, and focuses on projects aligned with NDCs that incorporate Nature-based Solutions.

The Africa Sustainable Forestry Fund II (ASFFII) is a USD 150 million private equity fund managed by Criterion Africa Partners that invests in sustainable forestry value chains in Africa. The fund utilizes a blended equity structure comprising one commercial investor, Calvert Impact Capital, and five development finance institutions (DFIs): AfDB, BIO, EIB, FinDev, and FMO. ASFFII focuses on plantation rehabilitation, expansion, sustainable downstream manufacturing, and biomass, requiring investees to adhere to Forest Stewardship Council guidelines. The fund provides both mitigation and adaptation benefits through reforestation, sustainable harvesting, and conservation set-asides. Current investments are located in eSwatini, Gabon, South/Southern Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda, with Botswana, Kenya, and Rwanda identified as potential future markets.

The document describes Cooling as a Service (CaaS) as a pay-per-service model that removes upfront costs for customers by having service providers own and maintain energy-efficient cooling equipment. It highlights the role of sale-leaseback arrangements with banks to scale financing and identifies Nigeria's ColdHubs as a practical application for solar-powered cold storage. The text also notes the importance of legal frameworks, national energy efficiency policies, and the potential for CaaS implementation in 21 countries that prioritized urban planning in their NDCs.

The Abu Rawash Wastewater Treatment Plant project, costing USD 390 million, is funded through a combination of Egyptian government public budget (USD 237 million) and concessional debt from development finance institutions (USD 150 million from AfDB and AGTF). The project aims to enhance adaptive capacity and water supply through infrastructure expansion and institutional support. The document highlights that accessing such concessional finance requires robust climate data, strong sovereign credit ratings, and a supportive policy environment, noting that Egypt is one of six African countries receiving the majority of DFI water adaptation finance.