Search Climate Insights Directory

The 60th meeting of the IAI Executive Council addressed the critical financial impact of the United States' withdrawal from the institute, which could lead to a two-thirds decrease in operational resources. The Council decided to form an ad hoc advisory committee to develop restructuring recommendations and scheduled an Extraordinary Conference of the Parties for March 9, 2026. Despite these challenges, the Directorate reported progress in diversifying funding through agreements with development banks like CAF and FONPLATA, and advancing research on climate-induced migration, the climate-environment-health nexus, and forest-related projects.

The document reports that carbon pricing now covers over 23% of global greenhouse gas emissions through 43 carbon taxes and 38 emissions trading systems. It highlights the vulnerability of specific industrial sectors in Southeast Asia to the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which entered its definitive phase in January 2026, noting that over 20% of Viet Nam’s iron and steel exports and nearly 20% of Indonesia’s aluminum exports are destined for the EU. The briefing also details the expansion of Article 6.2 bilateral agreements, with over 100 announced or formalized, led by purchasing countries such as Japan and Singapore. Regionally, Indonesia is identified as the only Southeast Asian nation with an operational ETS, having aligned its framework with Article 6 via Regulation 110/2025, although its carbon tax under Law 7/2021 remains postponed. Other updates include the Philippines moving toward formal carbon pricing legislation and Viet Nam postponing carbon market trading until the end of 2026.

CAPE NB advocates for the passage of Bill 23 in New Brunswick, arguing that enshrining the right to a healthy environment is a critical preventative health measure that reduces strain on the medical system and protects vulnerable populations.

The Canadian Climate Institute asserts that industrial carbon pricing has a negligible effect on food prices, estimated at most at 0.1 per cent. The author explains that the policy does not apply to individuals, farmers, or transport companies, and is designed to limit costs for large industrial emitters through thresholds and carbon credits. The text identifies the actual drivers of food inflation as supply chain disruptions, labour shortages, U.S. trade policy, and climate-driven weather extremes such as droughts in Western Canada.

The IISD recommends that the EU uphold its commitment to keep oil, coal, and gas in the ground within the Arctic to align with net-zero pathways, reduce geopolitical security risks associated with the Barents Sea, and protect fragile ecosystems from oil spills and noise pollution. The document further suggests a clear phase-out timeline for fossil fuel imports originating from north of the Arctic Circle, including the northern Norwegian and Barents seas, to maintain the EU's credibility as a climate leader alongside partners like Canada and Greenland.

The statement urges WTO ministers at MC14 in Yaoundé, Cameroon, to prioritize sustainable development within the WTO reform agenda and consolidate momentum on environmental initiatives. It highlights the need for a course-correction in WTO reform to address climate change, nature loss, and pollution, while calling for the full implementation of the Agreement on Fisheries Subsidies and the advancement of dialogues on sustainable agriculture and plastic pollution.

The report quantifies how extreme heat and rainfall accelerate the deterioration of Canadian public infrastructure, increasing annual costs by $15.1B on average between 2025 and 2100 if no adaptation occurs. It compares 'reactive' and 'proactive' adaptation strategies, finding that proactive upgrades—implemented at the earliest feasible intervention—reduce average annual climate-related costs to $6.5B, a 57% reduction compared to the no-adaptation scenario. The analysis highlights that municipalities bear the heaviest financial burden, owning over 73% of the infrastructure value. A separate flood-risk assessment indicates that structural protection measures can significantly reduce future damages, though returns vary by region.

The report analyzes a record-shattering heatwave in the southwestern United States and northern Mexico in March 2026, finding that such an event would have been virtually impossible without anthropogenic climate change. Using a combination of observation-based data and climate models, the study estimates that the intensity of 1-in-100-year March heat events has increased by 2.6°C and their likelihood has increased by a factor of approximately 800. The document highlights the extreme vulnerability of non-acclimatized populations and the risk of accelerated snowmelt in the Sierra Nevada and Colorado mountains.

The author contends that while national emission targets under the Paris Agreement are useful for policy, they are not tangible or easily understood by the general public. To make climate progress more visible and accountable, the Canadian Climate Institute will begin tracking specific technology adoption metrics, such as electric vehicle and heat pump sales, which provide a more concrete measure of the energy transition than megatonnes of carbon.

The report argues that rural Canadian communities face disproportionate challenges in climate adaptation due to limited financial and human resources, a lack of technical expertise in nature-based solutions, and gaps in vulnerability data. It highlights that while adaptation planning has increased, implementation often stalls after consultancy phases. To address this, the authors advocate for tailored financing, the integration of climate resilience into all new infrastructure investments, and a 'multi-solving' approach that addresses climate, biodiversity, and housing crises simultaneously.

The author asserts that industrial carbon pricing is designed to provide emissions reduction incentives while maintaining low costs for industry. For Alberta's oil sands, current average out-of-pocket costs are 9 cents per barrel, and are projected to rise to approximately 50 cents per barrel by 2030 if the policy is strengthened to ensure credits trade at $130 per tonne. The Canadian Climate Institute's analysis of 17 years of provincial trade data across 10 provinces and 19 sectors found no statistically significant evidence that carbon pricing caused export contraction.

The document argues that industrial carbon pricing in Canada has a negligible impact on consumer costs and household consumption due to the nature of global commodity markets and the design of the pricing systems. It highlights that these systems target only the largest emitters and that a significant portion of their output is exported, preventing costs from being passed to domestic consumers. Specific examples include minimal price increases for consumer goods like refrigerators and pickup trucks, and low per-barrel costs for oil sands producers.

The Canadian Climate Institute asserts that industrial carbon pricing has almost no impact on average Canadian household spending, with a projected effect on consumption of nearly 0% in 2025 and only a 0.1 percentage point reduction by 2030. The document attributes this to the fact that these systems target large emitters—such as oil sands, steel mills, and cement plants—rather than individuals, and that many of the affected products are exported to global markets. For example, nearly 80% of oil sands production is exported, and the cost added to a refrigerator by carbon pricing on steel mills is estimated at only $0.12. Additionally, the report finds that the policy has almost no effect on food prices or the agricultural sector, with a predicted cumulative GDP effect on agriculture of 0.08% by 2030. For businesses, costs are limited because they only pay for emissions exceeding set limits; for oil sands producers, current costs average 9 cents per barrel, and are projected to remain around 50 cents per barrel by 2050 (inflation-adjusted) under the Canada-Alberta memorandum of understanding.

The Canadian Climate Institute asserts that industrial carbon pricing is designed to incentivize emission reductions while minimizing costs to industry. For oil sands producers, current average costs are 9 cents per barrel, and projected costs under a strengthened policy (targeting $130 per tonne by 2030) would rise to approximately 50 cents per barrel. Analysis of 17 years of provincial trade data across 10 provinces and 19 sectors found no statistically significant evidence that carbon pricing has contracted exports.

The RMI framework establishes rules for the issuance, transfer, and retirement of Book-and-Claim Units (BCUs) for low-emissions iron and steel. It introduces a dual functional-unit system (iron and crude steel) with eligibility thresholds anchored to ResponsibleSteel's Decarbonization Progress Level 3 (DPL3). To prevent fossil lock-in, the framework mandates route-specific criteria, including a 2035/2040 phase-out for BF-BOF eligibility and strict 90% capture rates for CCS/CCUS. It defines rigorous accounting methods—direct and enhanced substitution—to prevent over-claiming and double counting, while prohibiting on-product claims to maintain the incentive for physical green steel procurement.

The report assesses five Canadian industrial carbon pricing systems, noting that while the combination of a federal benchmark and provincial tailoring has been largely effective, design differences can fragment markets. It emphasizes the need for predictable carbon pricing and continuous monitoring to prevent issues like credit oversupply.

The briefing note details the adverse health, social, and environmental impacts of LNG and fracking in British Columbia, highlighting risks to rural and Indigenous communities, the strain on local healthcare systems, and regulatory failures. It calls for a moratorium on new developments until a full health impact assessment is completed and recommends a transition to a clean economy.

The briefing identifies a significant gap in global efforts to reduce agricultural methane, noting that only 4% of NDCs include specific targets for the sector. It argues that current policies rely too heavily on technical 'end of pipe' solutions like biogas and feed additives, while failing to address systemic issues such as overconsumption of animal protein and the need for dietary shifts. The document highlights 'agricultural exceptionalism' as a barrier in high-livestock producing countries and warns that some nations, such as Aotearoa (New Zealand), are weakening their targets. It recommends that NDCs implement mandatory reduction targets aligned with a 1.5°C trajectory and prioritize sustainable diets and agroecology.

The briefing examines the legal implications of the 2025 ICJ Advisory Opinion on climate change, arguing that the provision of fossil fuel subsidies may constitute an internationally wrongful act. It extends this reasoning to other harmful subsidies, such as those in agriculture and plastics, and provides recommendations for states to reduce legal risk through transparent, phased reforms and international coordination via the Coalition on Phasing Out Fossil Fuel Incentives Including Subsidies (COFFIS).

The document argues that the ICJ's 2025 advisory opinion transforms the removal of fossil fuel subsidies from a political commitment into a legal imperative, as such subsidies may constitute an 'internationally wrongful act'. It suggests this reasoning extends to other harmful subsidies, such as those in agriculture and plastics, increasing the legal risk for states. The briefing recommends that governments implement transparent, gradual phase-out plans, prioritize social protection over production subsidies, and coordinate internationally through initiatives like the Coalition on Phasing Out Fossil Fuel Incentives including Subsidies (COFFIS).