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The report identifies a four-year decline in coal power growth indicators, though global net capacity increased by 34.1 GW in 2019 primarily due to China. While the US and EU continue to retire coal plants, Japan remains a major OECD driver of coal development. Financial support from Western commercial banks has largely ceased, though Chinese state institutions continue to fund projects internationally. The report emphasizes that coal use must drop by 80% by 2030 to meet the 1.5°C target of the Paris Agreement.

The report finds that while global coal capacity saw a net increase of 34.1 GW in 2019, this was driven almost entirely by China. Excluding China, the global coal industry declined for the second consecutive year. The report highlights a significant shift in financing, with Western commercial banks withdrawing direct funding for new coal, while Chinese and Indian state-backed institutions continue to provide critical capital. Regional analysis shows sharp declines in pre-construction capacity in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, though some countries like Japan and Turkey continue to pursue coal development despite international pressure.

The report finds that low-carbon energy transitions do not automatically improve social equity and can replicate existing structural inequalities if power asymmetries are not addressed. While some technologies like household solar provide benefits, others—particularly large-scale hydropower and biofuel plantations—often lead to land loss, displacement, and precarious employment. The authors argue that institutional frameworks and participatory processes, rather than the technology itself, determine whether a transition is just.

Civil society organizations have urged the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) to extend the Phase 1 consultation deadline for its Environmental and Social Framework (ESF) review from February 28 to the end of March 2020. The CSOs argue that the current timeframe is too short to provide informed inputs based on field data and that the bank has failed to clarify its theoretical approach and methodology for the review. Additionally, they note that a scheduled workshop on March 9, 2020, organized by the German government, should be allowed to inform the consultation process.

The document argues that while India's current internal security challenges—such as terrorism in Kashmir and Maoist insurgencies—are primarily driven by non-climate factors, future climate change will likely act as a risk multiplier. By 2050, increased temperature volatility, erratic monsoon patterns, and sea-level rise are projected to heighten human vulnerability. The authors identify three primary security pathways: rural unrest driven by agricultural distress and crop failure; tensions within India's federal structure caused by inter-state migration and river water disputes; and urban violence magnified by heat-induced aggression and food price hikes. The report emphasizes that at a 1.5°C global temperature rise, large portions of India enter a high-risk zone, potentially translating environmental stress into state security threats.

The report evaluates global security threats under two warming scenarios: a 'Near Term' scenario (1-2°C) and a 'Medium-Long Term' scenario (2-4+°C). It concludes that even low levels of warming present high to very high risks, while higher warming levels pose catastrophic and potentially irreversible threats to global stability. The analysis is structured around U.S. Geographic Combatant Command areas, detailing how climate-induced physical shocks and social tensions act as threat multipliers that can lead to state failure, resource conflict, and the breakdown of international alliances.

The paper advocates for a systemic shift in peacebuilding and development, moving away from linear causal models toward resilience thinking to address the interconnected risks of the Anthropocene. It highlights how climate change acts as a risk multiplier, potentially triggering violent conflict through forced migration and resource competition. The authors emphasize that systemic risks, such as hydrological teleconnections and global food system dependencies, require anticipatory management tools and a focus on social capital to sustain peace and prevent system collapse.

The report finds that kerosene subsidies in Bangladesh are largely ineffective, as official price cuts are not passed to consumers and many poor households remain unaware of the subsidies. While women are primarily exposed to the health risks of kerosene and biomass cooking, men dominate energy purchasing and decision-making. The study suggests that instead of reforming the kerosene subsidy, the government should shift support toward clean energy alternatives like solar PV and grid electricity, which 69% of households believe would most benefit women.

The report finds that kerosene subsidies in Nigeria were largely ineffective, as most low-income households paid significantly above the official price and women faced long queues and safety risks from adulterated fuel. The 2016 removal of these subsidies further strained women's budgets, pushing many in rural areas back toward biomass for cooking, which increases exposure to indoor air pollution and time spent collecting wood. While women often control daily energy choices, men typically own the electronic appliances. The report recommends against returning to kerosene or LPG subsidies, suggesting instead a shift toward technology-neutral clean cooking support and social protection programs targeted at female heads of households.

The document argues that the National Adaptation Plan (NAP) process is uniquely suited to support peacebuilding in fragile states because its long-term, holistic, and participatory nature aligns with the timelines and goals of conflict recovery. It highlights that climate risks and conflict often share drivers, such as poverty and weak governance, and that failure to adapt can exacerbate resource competition. The briefing provides examples of countries like Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Palestine that have integrated conflict dynamics into their NAPs, while noting ongoing challenges such as the lack of climate data in conflict zones and the exclusion of refugees from planning processes.

The document argues that for fragile states, climate change and conflict often share drivers and mutually reinforce each other, making the integration of adaptation planning and peacebuilding essential. It highlights how the NAP process, through its long-term, holistic, and participatory nature, can serve as a platform for conflict prevention and trust-building. The text provides examples from countries like Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Palestine where climate adaptation is used to mitigate resource-based conflicts or where active conflict severely hinders adaptation capacity. It concludes by identifying key challenges, including the need for transboundary planning and the inclusion of marginalized populations like refugees.

The document outlines how the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) integrates climate change into its monitoring of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). It details the Committee's use of General Comments, Joint Statements, and State reporting procedures to hold States accountable for climate-related impacts on rights such as health, food, and water. Key findings emphasize that States must implement emissions cuts reflecting the "highest possible ambition," regulate private actors to prevent climate harm, and ensure that high-income States provide climate finance to developing nations beyond existing official development assistance. The briefing also analyzes trends in the Committee's Concluding Observations from 2008 to 2019, noting a higher frequency of climate-related recommendations for developed countries and a strong focus on mitigation, adaptation, and international cooperation.

The report finds a chronic underinvestment in energy access across high-impact countries, with actual finance for residential electricity in 2018 (USD 16.1 billion) reaching less than half of the required annual investment (USD 41 billion). It highlights a concerning trend of increasing fossil fuel finance, particularly in Bangladesh, while financing for grid-connected renewables declined for the first time since 2013. Clean cooking finance remains critically low at USD 131.5 million, far below the estimated USD 4.5 billion needed annually. The report emphasizes that investment is disproportionately concentrated in a few countries, leaving many Sub-Saharan African nations with minimal support. It advocates for policy reforms, the termination of fossil fuel financing, and a more rigorous methodological framework for tracking gender-focused energy finance.

The report finds that donors must double their current annual contributions to food security, adding 14 billion USD per year, while low- and middle-income countries must provide an additional 19 billion USD annually through taxes. These combined investments of 33 billion USD per year would prevent 490 million people from hunger and double the incomes of 545 million smallholders. The analysis emphasizes that Africa has the highest need for these funds and recommends a balanced investment strategy across three categories: enabling inclusion, on-farm productivity, and post-harvest food systems.

The report finds that achieving Sustainable Development Goal 2 (Zero Hunger) targets by 2030 requires an additional 33 billion USD per year in public spending. This total is split between an additional 14 billion USD from international donors and 19 billion USD from low- and middle-income countries through increased taxation. These investments, focused heavily on Africa, would prevent 490 million people from suffering from hunger and double the incomes of 545 million small-scale producers while adhering to Paris Agreement climate commitments. The proposed funding is distributed across three intervention categories: empowering the excluded, on-farm productivity, and food movement.

The report finds that donors must provide an additional USD 14 billion per year, and low- and middle-income countries must provide USD 19 billion per year, to achieve SDG 2 targets by 2030 while respecting climate commitments. This investment would prevent 490 million people from experiencing hunger and double the incomes of 545 million small-scale producers. The authors emphasize that Africa has the greatest need for these resources and that a balanced portfolio of interventions—spanning social protection, on-farm productivity, and market access—is essential for success.

Japan is ranked second among G20 OECD member countries for its low level of support for fossil fuel use, yet it remains the second-highest supplier of public finance for fossil fuel projects. While overall support dropped by 48%, Japan increased public finance for coal production by 944% relative to the 2014–2016 average. The document highlights significant transparency gaps and the continued funding of coal and LNG projects in countries like Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Indonesia.

The report analyzes the shift of global environmental governance to virtual formats during the 2020 pandemic, noting that while operational decisions (like budgets) were achieved via the 'silence procedure', substantive negotiations on climate and biodiversity were largely delayed. It highlights that pandemic-related emission drops were temporary and structural, and warns that the crisis exacerbated social inequalities and hindered scientific reporting, such as the IPCC's sixth assessment report. The document concludes by advocating for a 'green and inclusive recovery' and a stronger link between biodiversity protection and pandemic prevention.

The document analyzes the scale and nature of food export restrictions during the COVID-19 crisis compared to the 2007/08 period. It finds that while 22 countries imposed restrictions in 2020, the overall impact on globally traded calories and monetary value is significantly lower than in 2008. The brief notes that current food availability challenges are driven more by logistical disruptions than the supply shortages and high energy prices that characterized the previous crisis.

The 2020 State of Global Environmental Governance report details the shift of international environmental negotiations to virtual platforms due to the COVID-19 pandemic. It analyzes the adoption of the 'silence procedure' for decision-making, the delays in scientific advice from bodies like the IPCC, and the temporary nature of pandemic-related emission dips. The document argues that the pandemic highlighted the interconnectedness of human health, biodiversity loss, and climate change, while warning that structural inequalities and nationalist responses to the pandemic could hinder the global cooperation necessary for a green and inclusive recovery.