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The report analyzes three economic recovery scenarios (V, U, and L-shaped) for Africa, concluding that the pandemic will cause a severe development setback. It forecasts that Africa's economy will be between US$349 billion and US$643 billion smaller by 2030 compared to pre-pandemic projections. While Africa's youthful population may mitigate direct COVID-19 mortality, the report warns that reduced health expenditure and high debt levels could lead to significant indirect deaths and a systemic human development crisis. Key recommendations include urgent debt relief, increased domestic health spending, and accelerated digitisation to build long-term resilience.

The report analyses Tunisia's socio-economic challenges, including stagnant growth, high youth unemployment, and a large informal sector, while projecting development pathways to 2040. It highlights the country's strong human capital but warns that poor governance and an opaque economic system hinder progress. The analysis compares a 'Current Path' with three scenarios: 'Going for Growth', 'Leapfrogging', and 'Sustainability & Equality', concluding that substantive governance reform is essential for any successful transition.

Africa faces a significant ICT infrastructure deficit that hinders its development, requiring an estimated $3 billion annual additional investment. While the private sector has led deployment, challenges remain regarding rural access, high costs, and limited policy capacity. The document advocates for incentivising local providers, upgrading regulatory frameworks, and expanding the technical skills base to fully realise the benefits of digital transformation.

The report analyzes three economic recovery scenarios (V, U, and L-shaped) for Africa following the COVID-19 pandemic. It finds that while the continent's youthful population may mitigate direct mortality, the economic shock will likely erase years of progress in poverty reduction and hinder the achievement of 2030 SDGs. The analysis emphasizes that the primary suffering will stem from economic contraction and a resulting debt crisis rather than direct virus mortality. Key recommendations include urgent debt relief, increased health spending, and investment in water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) infrastructure to build long-term resilience.

The Clean Air Task Force (CATF) supports the European Commission's goal of at least 55% emissions reductions by 2030 and argues that achieving carbon neutrality by mid-century requires a diverse portfolio of advanced technologies beyond wind and solar. CATF recommends optimizing the EU ETS to fund commercial-scale demonstrations of carbon capture and hydrogen, implementing mandatory leak detection and repair for oil and gas systems, and using the EU's purchasing power to pressure major gas suppliers like Russia and Qatar to reduce methane emissions.

The author contends that the European Green Deal lacks necessary provisions to address methane leakage from the oil and gas sector. While some European companies have committed to a "near-zero methane" future, the author argues that voluntary efforts are insufficient and that the EU should implement enforceable regulations and performance standards for both domestic operators and gas importers to drive global reductions.

The European Union is urged to move beyond a "measure first, act later" approach to methane emissions, instead implementing mandatory Leak Detection and Repair (LDAR) and equipment upgrades domestically while using its purchasing power to pressure gas suppliers like Russia and Norway to reduce emissions.

The research paper examines Turkey's efforts to re-assert regional influence through military and economic engagement in North and East Africa. It highlights Turkey's support for the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya, its strategic energy interests in the Mediterranean, and its long-term development and diplomatic presence in the Horn of Africa, particularly Somalia. The text notes the complex interplay between Turkey, Russia, and the EU in managing the Libyan crisis, as well as Turkey's rivalry with a bloc including Saudi Arabia and Egypt.

The report finds that the EU is proposing or building gas infrastructure worth €99 billion, which would increase import capacity by over 30% despite existing capacity already being nearly double current consumption. This expansion contradicts EU climate goals to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, which require a sharp reduction in fossil gas use. The author highlights that many of these projects, including those on the European Commission's 4th list of Projects of Common Interest (PCI), are unnecessary for energy security and risk becoming stranded assets. Additionally, the report notes that EU gas-fired power plants are currently underutilized compared to global averages and are increasingly uncompetitive against renewable energy portfolios.

The document analyzes the scale and nature of food export restrictions during the COVID-19 crisis compared to the 2007/08 period. It finds that while 22 countries imposed restrictions in 2020, the overall impact on globally traded calories and monetary value is significantly lower than in 2008. The brief notes that current food availability challenges are driven more by logistical disruptions than the supply shortages and high energy prices that characterized the previous crisis.

The document examines the shortcomings of current border security reforms in North and West Africa, noting that they often ignore the unique needs of borderland communities and the complexity of overlapping security mandates. It recommends a shift toward community consultation, the reduction of military roles in favour of law enforcement, and increased cross-border cooperation between neighbouring states.

The report analyzes the fragmented state of Libya, characterized by a stalemate between General Khalifa Haftar's Libyan National Army (LNA) and the UN-recognized Government of National Accord (GNA). It details how the conflict has evolved into a proxy war involving regional powers like Turkey, Egypt, the UAE, and Russia, and examines the resulting humanitarian crises, including mass migration and the resurgence of jihadist networks. Additionally, it highlights the geopolitical tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean triggered by a maritime delimitation agreement between Turkey and the GNA.

The report argues that framing migration as a security threat—driven largely by EU policies to stem migration to Europe—leads to restrictive border controls and the criminalisation of smuggling. Using Agadez, Niger, as a case study, the author demonstrates that these securitised approaches do not stop irregular migration but instead increase local insecurity, empower high-level smugglers, expose migrants to greater risks, and erode trust between citizens and governments. The document recommends shifting the narrative toward evidence-based migration management and expanding legal pathways for movement within Africa and between Africa and the EU.

The proposed programme aims to protect North African oases from climate change impacts, such as extreme heat, drought, and water scarcity. It focuses on establishing a regional management framework, implementing adaptation and mitigation measures (including solar energy for irrigation), and strengthening stakeholder capacity. The initiative seeks to transition from top-down to bottom-up, participatory decision-making to safeguard biodiversity and rural livelihoods.

The report examines the risks of increased arms sales to Africa, the fragile peace negotiations in Sudan and Mozambique, and the role of the AfCFTA in addressing structural drivers of conflict. It also critiques the AU Peace and Security Council for its lack of meeting records and discusses security threats in the Sahel.

The report describes Africa as a 'resilient but marginal player' in a global order where multilateralism is eroding and power is shifting toward a polycentric model. It identifies key barriers to African agency, including structural economic dependence, internal political fragmentation among 55 diverse states, and limited capacity at UN missions. The authors argue that Africa can increase its leverage by pooling resources through the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic Communities (RECs), and by leveraging the 'Big 5' powers (Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, Algeria, and Ethiopia) to unify continental positions. While the report notes the risks of great power competition—specifically the 'new Scramble for Africa'—it highlights that African states have successfully exercised agency in relations with China through the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).

The document examines Russia's return to Africa through the lens of its 'multi-vector' foreign policy, which seeks to establish a multipolar world order and reduce dependence on the West. It details Russia's focus on niche markets—specifically nuclear energy, arms, and extractives—and its use of 'state champions' like Rosatom and Rosneft. The paper highlights Russia's military-security cooperation, including the use of private military companies in the Central African Republic and Libya, and its strategic relationship with South Africa via the BRICS framework. It concludes that while Russia offers an alternative to Western conditionalities, its engagement often prioritizes elite networks and resource extraction over broad development.

The document examines the trade-offs for African nations joining the AIIB, noting that while the bank offers a new source of low-cost finance to address an annual infrastructure deficit of $68 to $108 billion, its lack of technical capacity-building and specific instruments for low-income countries outside Asia limits its appeal. It concludes that middle-income African countries are better positioned to benefit from membership than low-income countries.

The August 2019 Peace & Security Council Report examines the African Union's (AU) struggle to define 'unconstitutional changes of government' in the context of popular uprisings in Algeria and Sudan. It highlights the risks of increasing foreign military presence, particularly in the Horn of Africa, and the resulting rivalry between global powers like the US and China. The report also advocates for the inclusion of women in Sudan's peace process and warns of potential political instability in Côte d’Ivoire ahead of the 2020 elections. Finally, it discusses the limited access civil society organizations have to AU and regional economic community structures.

The report examines the actions of 14 African countries at the UN Human Rights Council in 2017. It finds that the African Group is no longer a unified voting bloc, with significant divergence in how members approach human rights. Botswana, Ghana, and Rwanda are identified as the strongest defenders of international human rights among the group, while Burundi, Egypt, and Nigeria are characterized as the most antagonistic. The analysis highlights a recurring tension between the principle of national sovereignty and the universality of human rights, particularly regarding 'item 4' resolutions that mandate investigations into specific countries without their consent.