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Thailand's draft revised power development plan (RPDP) targets a 51% renewable energy share by 2037, up from a previous target of 36%. Despite plans to phase out up to 8 GW of fossil fuel capacity by 2037, the RPDP still includes 6.3 GW of new gas capacity. The report warns that increasing reliance on imported liquefied natural gas (LNG)—which is projected to reach 60% of the gas mix by 2035—exposes Thailand to price volatility and geopolitical risks, as evidenced by a 141% surge in the import bill between 2021 and 2022. The document suggests that Thailand could be more aggressive in transitioning away from fossils to avoid economic vulnerability and stranded assets.

The report proposes a cost-optimal energy pathway for Thailand that exceeds the Revised Power Development Plan (RPDP) targets by adding 32 GW of solar and 6 GW/15 GWh of battery storage by 2037. This shift would result in cumulative cost savings of $1.8 billion and avoid 147 million tonnes of CO2 emissions. The analysis suggests that Thailand can meet its demand without adding 2 GW of planned natural gas capacity, as solar and batteries can cover growth from data centres and EV charging. While wind power is deemed financially unviable unless capital expenditures drop by 10% annually, the report suggests importing hydropower from Lao PDR as a cost-effective alternative to wind, despite risks related to import dependency and climate-driven droughts.

The report proposes a cost-optimal energy pathway for Thailand through 2037, suggesting that increasing solar capacity by 89% and battery storage by 60% relative to the draft revised power development plan (RPDP) 2024 can save $1.8 billion in power generation costs. This pathway aims to meet rising electricity demand from data centres (projected 10 TWh increase) and electric vehicles (projected 3.3 GW peak load increase) while reducing natural gas imports by 1,815 billion cubic feet. The analysis finds that wind energy is not financially viable without a 10% annual CAPEX reduction, suggesting imported hydropower from Lao PDR as a more cost-effective alternative.

The document introduces the Integrated Forum on Climate Change and Trade, an institutionally independent 'laboratory' designed to foster dialogue between climate and trade experts. It aims to move beyond the diagnosis of problems to the design of technical solutions in areas such as climate criteria, carbon accounting, and the acceleration of renewable energy deployment, without producing binding legal texts.

Chile faces significant renewable energy curtailment due to limited transmission and storage capacity, with 5,642 GWh of solar and wind energy curtailed in 2024. The report recommends a National Curtailment Reduction Plan, the mass installation of Dynamic Line Rating (DLR) systems, minimum storage requirements for new projects in congested areas, and the creation of a formal demand response market. It also suggests strengthening electricity exchange markets with Argentina and Peru to improve system flexibility.

Chile faces significant energy curtailments due to transmission bottlenecks and a lack of system flexibility, with 2024 curtailments reaching 19% of solar and wind generation. The document argues that while large infrastructure projects like the Kimal-Lo Aguirre line are planned for 2029, immediate action is needed through a 'Clean Flexibility Kit' including battery storage, Dynamic Line Rating (DLR), and demand response markets. It compares Chile's situation with other high-renewable systems like China, Ireland, and California to provide a roadmap of short-, medium-, and long-term recommendations to improve grid efficiency and reduce economic losses for investors.

The guide examines how community-based organizations (CBOs) can bridge the gap between solar energy programs and low- to moderate-income (LMI) households in the United States. It identifies systemic barriers to solar adoption—such as high upfront costs, complex applications, and distrust of developers—and proposes seven strategies for CBOs to overcome these obstacles. Through case studies from Georgia, Washington, D.C., and Michigan, the document demonstrates that CBOs' local trust and cultural understanding are critical for ensuring clean energy transitions are equitable and accessible.

The analysis compares four scenarios for Africa's emissions: Business-as-usual (BAU), Net-zero by 2050 (NZ50), Net-zero by 2070 (NZ70), and Net-zero by 2100 (NZ100). While all net-zero pathways see renewables become the dominant energy source and a sharp fall in fossil fuel reliance, the timing of the transition creates significant trade-offs. The NZ50 scenario achieves the fastest emissions decline, reaching -0.33 GtCO₂/yr by 2050, but incurs the highest marginal abatement cost (averaging $78 per ton of CO₂) and causes the most disruption to food systems, including a 31% contraction in cropland and a near doubling of staple food prices. All net-zero scenarios rely on bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), which shifts water demand from agriculture to the energy sector. Regional challenges vary, with Western Africa facing steep decarbonization due to oil and gas reliance, and Southern Africa managing a coal-dependent system.

The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (OBBBA) introduces a mix of incentives and challenges for US advanced energy manufacturing. While it preserves the 45X production credit and introduces 'full expensing' for capital investments, it also imposes stricter foreign entity of concern (FEOC) restrictions and accelerates the phase-out of certain clean energy tax credits, leading to reduced demand projections for solar, wind, and electric vehicles. The report suggests that manufacturers should pivot toward grid equipment, geothermal, nuclear, and upstream components where demand still exceeds domestic capacity.

The analysis argues that fossil fuel producers are overestimating future demand, as oil, gas, and coal are each expected to slow or peak in the coming years due to the rise of electric vehicles and renewable energy.

In August 2025, wind and solar power generated 34% of Brazil's electricity, totaling 19.0 TWh, the highest monthly share on record. This growth has allowed Brazil to maintain low fossil fuel generation (14% in August 2025) despite hydro output hitting a four-year low of 27 TWh due to drought. Between 2014 and 2024, wind and solar generation increased fifteenfold, contributing to a 31% decline in power sector emissions to 79 MtCO2 in 2024. While demand growth has accelerated to 5.3% in 2024, solar capacity additions slowed in the first half of 2025 to 7.1 GW due to grid congestion and regulatory uncertainty.

The author contends that 'net zero' is an uninspiring and technical term that has been weaponised by opposition as an 'elitist' agenda. Instead of focusing on abstract targets, the document suggests communicating climate action through tangible community improvements—such as solar panels on leisure centres and school tree planting—and highlighting achievements like the fact that renewable energy now powers 50% of the UK energy mix. This statement serves as an introduction to the 'Britain Talks Climate and Nature' report, which aims to move away from polarising language toward a blueprint for a prosperous future.

Kotzebue, Alaska, a remote community of 3,000 people, has transitioned from total reliance on diesel generators to a diversified energy mix including wind, solar, and battery storage. By implementing utility-scale wind generation—a first within the Arctic Circle—and a 1 MW solar array, the town has displaced 350,000–400,000 gallons of diesel annually. These efforts aim to insulate the community from volatile global fuel prices and seasonal supply constraints, with a target of 50 to 60 percent renewable generation by 2030.

China is rapidly transitioning its energy system through massive investment in renewables, grid infrastructure, and whole-economy electrification. This shift is moving China toward a peak in fossil fuel use and is driving down the global cost of clean technologies, enabling emerging markets to leapfrog traditional development paths and potentially triggering a structural decline in global fossil fuel demand by 2030.

China is transitioning from a focus on adding renewable capacity to building a "new electricity system" that integrates high levels of variable energy. In 2024, China invested $625 billion USD in clean energy, significantly outpacing other major regions. This shift, combined with expanding electrification in industry, transport, and buildings, is contributing to a structural decline in fossil fuel generation. By the first half of 2025, combined wind and solar generation surpassed the combined output of hydro, nuclear, and bioenergy, and total installed capacity for these sources exceeded that of coal for the first time.

The EU is seeing growth in cleantech manufacturing and solar capacity, but the overall pace of transition remains insufficient. Significant financing gaps, fossil fuel dependencies, and misaligned agricultural policies continue to obstruct the path to climate neutrality.

The workshop, held in September 2025, focused on linking local leadership with global climate frameworks. Through case studies from India, South Africa, and Ethiopia, participants identified the necessity of community ownership, political will at the national level, and the use of the COP30 Action Agenda to scale locally-led solutions. The event concluded that a global Just Transition must be grounded in local realities and supported by international mechanisms for finance and knowledge sharing.

The report analyzes climate finance flows in Southeast Asia, finding a heavy reliance on international capital despite growing domestic interest. It focuses on Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam, identifying that while corporates are the primary local investors, institutional and financial institutions remain underutilized due to risk perceptions and loan tenor mismatches. The document argues that blended finance—through guarantees, technical assistance, and project aggregation—can catalyze local investment in nature-based solutions, adaptation, and utility-scale renewables.

The briefing argues that nuclear power is an impractical solution for near-term climate targets in Europe and Australia due to systemic delays, high costs, and a high rate of project cancellations. In Europe, utility-scale wind and solar capacity under construction or in pre-construction outweighs nuclear by fourteen to one, and solar generation surpassed nuclear in the EU for the first time in mid-2025. In Australia, the document concludes that nuclear is unlikely to replace coal by 2038 because construction timelines—estimated by CSIRO to be at least five years longer than the global average—would require groundbreaking by the end of 2025. Globally, the Global Nuclear Power Tracker indicates that 38% of all proposed nuclear capacity (566 GW) has been cancelled.

In the first half of 2025, record-breaking solar generation in Great Britain offset lower-than-average wind speeds, limiting the increase of gas power. Solar generation rose by 32% to 9.91 TWh, with a peak grid level of 14 GW on 8 July. Analysis shows that low-wind and low-solar days coincide only 2% of the time, demonstrating a natural balance in the British climate. While gas generation increased overall in H1 2025 to compensate for lower power imports, it fell to 21% of electricity generation in June. The report advocates for doubling energy storage capacity by 2030 and transitioning gas and biomass plants to a strategic reserve by the early 2030s to further reduce costs and emissions.