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The report identifies four primary investment opportunities for electric vehicles (EVs) in South Africa: electric micro-mobility for last-mile delivery, electrification of public transportation, electrification of freight and logistics, and local manufacturing of private passenger vehicles. While high capital expenditure (CAPEX) and energy security concerns related to loadshedding remain significant barriers, rising fuel prices are improving the operational business case for fleet electrification. The South African government is supporting the transition through the December 2023 Electric Vehicle White Paper and a planned investment allowance starting March 1, 2026, to encourage local production, with the first battery EVs expected by 2026.

The document assesses the viability of transitioning South Africa's minibus taxi (MBT) fleet to electric vehicles (E-MBTs), highlighting significant operational cost savings and the alignment of vehicle range with current driver patterns. It identifies key barriers, including high upfront costs, inadequate charging infrastructure, and restrictive tax structures. To unlock local manufacturing, the brief proposes a three-step transition: moving from imports to local assembly and finally to scaled-up local production. It emphasizes the Atlantis Special Economic Zone (ASEZ) as a strategic hub for this industry, supported by existing automotive skills and government incentives like the Automotive Investment Scheme.

The document outlines a framework for pricing lithium based on OECD transfer pricing principles, detailing the physical characteristics of brine and mineral deposits, production processes, and the role of price-reporting agencies in establishing market benchmarks for battery-grade and technical-grade lithium.

The report establishes a technical framework for the pricing of lithium chemicals (carbonate and hydroxide) and concentrates (spodumene) using OECD transfer pricing principles. It details the physical characteristics of brine and hard-rock deposits, the production processes for different lithium products, and the economic drivers of demand, primarily linked to the electric vehicle battery market. The document identifies key contractual elements, such as Incoterms and pricing indices, and evaluates the role of Price Reporting Agencies (PRAs) in providing benchmarks for arm's length pricing. It concludes with guidance on comparability adjustments based on product quality, economic circumstances, and contractual terms.

The document outlines a technical framework for the valuation of lithium products—including brines, minerals, and chemicals—to ensure fair taxation in multinational mining operations. It details the physical characteristics of lithium deposits, the production processes for lithium carbonate and hydroxide, and the specific contractual elements that influence pricing. A significant portion of the guide is dedicated to analyzing price indices from major agencies like Argus Media, Fastmarkets, and Benchmark Mineral Intelligence, providing tax administrations with a methodology to adjust for product quality, economic circumstances, and delivery terms.

The report examines how the rivalry between the US and China in the technological domain threatens Indonesia's economic growth and national security. It highlights vulnerabilities in investment flows, market access for electronics and critical minerals, and risks related to cyber-espionage and technological interoperability. The authors argue that Indonesia's current regulatory and institutional framework is inadequate, as it fails to integrate geopolitical and security considerations into its technology strategies. To address these gaps, the report recommends investing in national tech champions, formulating domestic technological norms, and establishing a dedicated office for critical minerals, emerging technologies, and cybersecurity.

The document examines the fiscal burden of Colombia's Fuel Price Stabilisation Fund (FEPC), which saw a deficit of 2.5% of GDP in 2022. It highlights the tension between the government's goal to align fuel prices with global markets and the transport sector's skepticism regarding the feasibility of energy transition alternatives. The brief identifies structural issues in the freight sector, such as a high rate of self-employment (63%) and an aging vehicle fleet (average age of 26 years), as barriers to reform. It recommends resuming stakeholder dialogue, implementing social mitigation programs via Sisbén, and restructuring the transport sector through cooperatives to facilitate the transition to electric and hydrogen-powered vehicles.

The 'Business Action Checklists' by the We Mean Business Coalition offers a practical framework for companies to decarbonize core operations within two to five years. It focuses on three primary areas: logistics, fleet management, and business travel, providing step-by-step guidance from initial energy measurement and auditing to the implementation of zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs) and sustainable travel policies. The document emphasizes a 'start now, improve over time' approach, prioritizing the reduction of energy demand and the continuous improvement of data quality to manage transition risks and enhance competitiveness.

The April 2024 China-US High-Level Dialogue in Beijing served as a venue for experts to discuss decarbonization strategies and identify collaboration opportunities despite challenging national-level relations. Key discussions focused on the differing sources of methane emissions, the scaling of CCUS and renewable energy, and the need for interoperable standards in trade and corporate disclosure. Both nations emphasized the importance of subnational cooperation and the role of the Sunnylands Statement in guiding joint efforts toward COP 29 and COP 30.

The document introduces the China Low-Carbon and Clean Technologies Outlook series, which analyzes 50 promising technologies to support China's carbon neutrality goal. It specifically highlights the need for significant investment in emerging technologies like energy storage and hydrogen, estimating a requirement of 100 trillion Yuan. This particular report presents the first four insight briefs focusing on power batteries, heat pumps, iron ore electrolysis, and flow battery energy storage.

The report evaluates the alignment between international climate commitments and national transport policies in China, India, and Vietnam, highlighting the need for better cross-sectoral coordination and financing to achieve decarbonization.

The report models an 'Added Policy' (AP) scenario where China reaches 100% NEV sales for passenger cars, SUVs, and buses by 2035, and for freight trucks by 2040. This transition is projected to significantly reduce greenhouse gas emissions, prevent tens of thousands of premature deaths—primarily through the electrification of trucks—and create millions of jobs. The analysis also highlights a substantial reduction in China's dependence on imported petroleum, with fuel demand for the modeled vehicle categories falling by 97% by 2060 compared to business-as-usual. The authors recommend that China establish ambitious long-term NEV sales targets for freight trucks and implement a 'Dual Credit'-type policy for commercial vehicles.

The paper argues that the dominant 'Billions to Trillions' agenda, which prioritises private sector mobilisation and de-risking, often conflicts with international human rights standards. It evaluates this architecture through five principle clusters: national responsibilities, national sovereignty, procedural fairness, responsibilities of financial investment, and obligations during crises. The author contends that this model commodifies public goods, undermines state policy autonomy through investment treaties, and lacks transparency. Using South Africa's Just Energy Transition Investment Plan (JET-IP) as a case study, the report highlights gaps in public transport funding and the risks of private-sector dominance. It concludes by proposing a research agenda to bridge the gap between human rights norms and the actual implementation of climate investment plans.

The report explores South Africa's energy transition through 2050, emphasizing the need to move beyond 'used futures' and growth-centric economic models. It identifies critical innovations in governance, technology, and social values, while proposing six alternative framings—ranging from ecomodernism to the 'great simplification'—to inform policy. The analysis highlights high-impact uncertainties such as a severe skills shortage for the decarbonized economy and the 'carbon trap' of meeting rising energy demands while reducing emissions. It concludes with four diverse scenarios for 2050 and recommends a shift toward regenerative economies and inclusive multilateralism.

A survey of 906 registered U.S. voters in October 2023 reveals broad support for clean energy infrastructure and the Inflation Reduction Act, though significant political polarization persists. While majorities support carbon taxes and transitioning to 100% clean energy by 2050, trust in fossil fuel companies remains low, and actual political or consumer activism is limited despite expressed willingness to act.

ASEAN's solar and wind generation grew by 43% annually between 2015 and 2022, largely driven by Viet Nam's Feed-in Tariff policies. However, growth slowed in 2022, and the region currently utilizes less than 1% of its theoretical solar and wind potential. To meet the IEA's 2050 net zero scenario, ASEAN must reach a 23% share of solar and wind in total electricity generation by 2030, requiring the addition of 164 GW of solar and 65 GW of wind capacity. The report argues that achieving this requires removing regulatory barriers like local content requirements, investing in grid modernization and storage, and implementing attractive pricing mechanisms.

The State of Climate Action 2023 finds that global efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C are failing, with 41 of 42 assessed indicators not on track for 2030 targets. While electric passenger car sales show exponential growth and are on track, other areas such as fossil fuel financing and deforestation have seen significant setbacks. The report argues that efforts in most sectors must accelerate at least twofold this decade, including a seven-fold increase in the pace of coal phase-out and an eight-fold increase in the shift toward sustainable diets in high-consuming regions.

Average annual climate finance reached nearly USD 1.3 trillion in 2021/2022, nearly doubling from 2019/2020 levels, though this remains only 1% of global GDP. Growth was primarily driven by mitigation finance in energy and transport, with significant concentration in China, the US, Europe, Brazil, Japan, and India. Adaptation finance, while reaching a record USD 63 billion, remains severely underfunded compared to the USD 212 billion annual need for developing countries by 2030. The report highlights a critical investment gap, noting that annual needs will increase to between $8.1 and $9 trillion through 2030, and over $10 trillion annually from 2031 to 2050.

The document outlines the operational framework for tracking global climate finance, defining mitigation and adaptation finance, and establishing principles to avoid double counting and carbon lock-in. It details the financial instruments captured, the classification of public and private actors, and the data sources used. Additionally, it describes the methodology for estimating annual investment needs across sectors and the framework for calculating the economic and social costs of climate inaction.

Global climate finance reached an annual average of nearly USD 1.3 trillion in 2021/2022, though this represents only 1% of global GDP. Mitigation finance dominates, particularly in energy and transport, while adaptation finance remains critically underfunded and dominated by public actors. Finance is heavily concentrated in developed economies and China, with significant gaps in least developed countries (LDCs) and emerging markets. The report argues that annual needs must increase at least five-fold to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, recommending reforms to international financial institutions and the mobilization of domestic capital.