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The document analyzes the evolution of BRICS, specifically the 2023 addition of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE, and the 2024 introduction of a 'partner countries' category. Using Susan Strange's framework of structural power, it argues that BRICS is not seeking to create a rival system but to reshape global governance to be more representative of the global South. The analysis highlights the bloc's economic growth—surpassing the G7 in PPP terms around 2015—and its efforts to create alternative financial mechanisms like the New Development Bank (NDB) and local currency trade to reduce reliance on Western systems. It concludes that while internal diversity and regional rivalries challenge cohesion, the 'agree to disagree' principle allows BRICS to function as a catalyst for South-South cooperation.

The NAP Global Network's 2024 report details its progress in supporting developing countries with National Adaptation Plan (NAP) processes through technical assistance, South-South peer learning, and knowledge production. The Network has supported 70 countries to date, with over 60% of technical assistance directed toward Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS). Key 2024 achievements include the launch of a new peer learning strategy, the publication of over 180 knowledge products, and the implementation of a monitoring, evaluation, and learning (MEL) framework. The report highlights specific 'stories of change' in countries like Costa Rica, Rwanda, and Côte d’Ivoire, demonstrating the transition from planning to implementation and the integration of gender and social inclusion.

The document analyzes the factors driving the high demand for BRICS membership, introducing the concept of 'magnetic pull'—where ideas about development and systemic reform act as coalition magnets. It traces the group's expansion from South Africa's entry in 2010 to the 2023 enlargement (adding Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE) and the 2024 introduction of a 'Partner Country' category. While the group's appeal is rooted in South-South cooperation and de-dollarization, the author notes challenges to internal cohesion and the limits of its attraction, as seen in Argentina's rejection of membership.

The ninth FOCAC Beijing Summit signaled a recalibration of China-Africa relations, moving toward a partnership defined by African agency and a focus on quality outcomes over quantity. Despite a period of declining lending since 2016, China committed USD 50.7 billion over three years, focusing on agricultural market access, mineral processing, and infrastructure. The summit highlighted Africa's desire for value addition and industrialization, as well as China's assertive push to promote its governance model and Global South leadership through the Global Development, Security, and Civilization Initiatives. This shift poses a competitive challenge to the EU and US, as African nations increasingly prioritize partnerships that offer tangible utility and respect for sovereignty.

The report finds that while climate finance in Africa grew by 48% to USD 43.7 billion in 2021/22, it remains severely insufficient, meeting only 23% of the annual needs required for NDC implementation. Public finance dominates the landscape, providing 82% of total flows, while private finance is heavily concentrated in energy systems and a small number of countries. The document highlights a critical 'trilemma' where climate-vulnerable countries are also debt-distressed and conflict-affected, further hindering their ability to attract investment. Key recommendations include scaling the use of guarantees, improving domestic capital market regulations, and enhancing the transparency and equity of voluntary carbon markets.

The NAP Global Network Peer Learning Strategy establishes a framework for South-South knowledge exchange to enhance the development and implementation of National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) in developing countries. Moving away from one-off events, the strategy prioritizes sustained, continuous learning through four primary activity types: Peer Learning Forums, Peer Exchanges, Peer Learning Cohorts, and 1:1 Peer Learning Partnerships. The approach integrates technical, relational, reflexive, and experiential components, while emphasizing gender equality and social inclusion (GESI). The strategy also links peer learning with national-level action and knowledge generation to create a 'value chain' of support for adaptation practitioners.

China has positioned itself as a leader in green technology transfer to the Global South, utilizing the Belt and Road Initiative and the South–South Climate Cooperation Fund to deploy renewable energy, green agriculture, and electric vehicle technologies. While achieving significant scale—including exporting photovoltaic modules to over 100 countries—the brief identifies critical challenges: a gap between environmental commitments and actual impacts, deficiencies in ESG disclosure, geopolitical tensions, and limited local operational capacity. To improve sustainability, the document recommends enhancing transparency, aligning with global ESG standards, and fostering locally led innovation ecosystems through active partner ownership and capacity building.

The report analyzes the competition between Western and Chinese narratives in Africa, specifically debunking the 'debt-trap' narrative and arguing that African states exercise strategic agency by viewing both the US and China as viable partners rather than choosing one in a zero-sum game.

The report identifies a significant gap between global solar panel manufacturing capacity and projected deployment, resulting in 'spare' capacity of 3,837 GW between 2024 and 2030. Utilizing this surplus could enable the world to exceed the COP28 target of tripling renewable energy capacity by 2030, reaching 13,345 GW (a 21% excess). The document argues that deploying just one-seventh of this spare capacity could meet the electricity demand growth and extend basic energy access to the entire populations of 88 analyzed Global South countries. It highlights that 80-85% of manufacturing is based in China, where companies are already facing investment delays and layoffs due to under-deployment. The report suggests a 'win-win-win' scenario where China maintains its industry, Global South nations gain energy independence and access, and developed nations fulfill their climate finance responsibilities.

The report argues that transition indicators can bridge the 'ambition gap' and 'implementation gap' by articulating the tangible socio-economic benefits of climate neutrality and resilience. Through case studies in Germany, South Korea, China, India, Indonesia, Kenya, and the Netherlands, the authors propose specific metrics for the power, industry, transport, building, and agricultural sectors. These indicators are designed to facilitate inclusive social dialogue, improve governance by clarifying sectoral responsibilities, and encourage international mutual learning, particularly within the Global South.

The IAI and COIBA-AIP have agreed to a five-year partnership to strengthen regional capacities for addressing global change. The cooperation focuses on biodiversity, climate change, and the inclusion of indigenous and local communities, with a specific emphasis on the Coiba National Park World Natural Heritage Site. Key activities include sharing technical information, developing joint funding proposals, and facilitating COIBA-AIP's participation in the Belmont Forum.

The briefing reorganizes the 10 elements and 44 negotiation options identified by the Co-Chairs of the Ad-Hoc Work Programme (AHWP) for the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) into a condensed format. It covers critical dimensions of the goal, including temporal scope, quantum, structure, and potential sources of finance, aiming to streamline the complex set of options for stakeholders ahead of the 2024 negotiation sessions.

Turkey has expanded its influence in sub-Saharan Africa by leveraging a combination of humanitarian diplomacy, shared religious identity, and an anti-colonial narrative to establish soft power, which has subsequently paved the way for hard power interests. A key pillar of this strategy is the relationship with Somalia, recently solidified by a 10-year Defence and Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement granting Turkey authority over the management and defence of Somali waters. While Turkey positions itself as an alternative to Western powers, it faces competition from other middle powers like the UAE, Qatar, and Egypt. The document notes that Turkey's future engagement will be heavily influenced by its domestic economic crisis, potentially shifting priority toward high-yield economic activities such as defence exports and construction contracts over humanitarian aid.

The document examines the systemic barriers preventing developing countries from moving beyond simple technology acquisition to endogenous climate technology development. It analyzes the role of the UNFCCC and WTO frameworks, the impact of intellectual property rights (IPR), and the limitations of trade liberalization. The author argues that effective technology transfer requires a combination of financial support, technical know-how, and 'green industrial policy' to ensure sustainable low-carbon structural transformation.

The document outlines a five-year agreement between the IAI and CICAG to strengthen scientific cooperation in the Americas. The partnership focuses on exchanging knowledge regarding climate change, biodiversity, and the role of indigenous and local communities in sustainable development. It specifies areas of cooperation including science diplomacy, open science, and South-South cooperation, while clarifying that the agreement does not create a legal partnership or joint venture.

The document analyzes the 'structural disjuncture' between the European Union's bilateral approach to international relations and the BRICS bloc's pursuit of an inclusive, South-South multilateral model. It argues that BRICS challenges the EU's historical hegemony in global governance, economic power, and trade policies. While the Russia-Ukraine war has further polarized the EU and BRICS, the author suggests opportunities for cooperation on the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) and the energy transition.

The document analyzes the economic relationship between South Africa and the BRICS nations, noting that while trade has grown, it remains unbalanced and dominated by raw material exports to China. It identifies three primary 'enablers' for deepening these ties: the African Continental Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA), the shift in global manufacturing due to US-China rivalry (including 'friend-shoring' and 'Chexit'), and the potential expansion of BRICS membership. The author recommends that South Africa use its 2023 BRICS chairship to promote Special Economic Zones (SEZs) and business-to-business engagements to attract diversified investment into Africa.

The document outlines how Aid for Trade (A4T) can be leveraged as a policy tool to address biodiversity loss, climate change, and pollution. It proposes six complementary pathways to 'green' A4T, emphasizing the need for alignment with the priorities of developing and least developed countries and the integration of trade considerations into environmental funding.

The document proposes six pathways to 'green' Aid for Trade (A4T), emphasizing that developing countries must lead the prioritization of resources to ensure a just transition. It highlights a significant gap between reported environment-related A4T and projects with clear environmental purposes, while calling for updated monitoring systems and increased financing to align trade policy with the UN SDGs and the Paris Agreement.

The document examines the disparity in green finance between developed and developing nations, noting that while the EU and other developed markets have integrated substantial green recovery measures into their COVID-19 stimulus packages, developing countries often lack explicit green budgets and remain heavily dependent on North-South financial flows. It highlights challenges in the global South, including infrastructure deficits, governance issues, and a 'dependency syndrome' regarding international aid. The brief recommends institutional reforms to enhance capital markets, increased South-South cooperation, and globally coordinated efforts to improve the design and monitoring of green projects.