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The report finds that by 2030, private sector demand for near-zero emissions steel in the analyzed Asia-Pacific countries will reach 6.1 million tons, with an additional 11.5 million tons possible through aligned public procurement. However, the projected clean steel supply pipeline of 2.5 million tons is insufficient to meet this demand, creating a gap that could be filled by new projects or green iron imports from Australia. Scaling this market requires overcoming barriers such as unclear product standards and price premiums through government incentives and demand aggregation mechanisms.

Colombia is projected to face a gas supply deficit starting in 2030, with domestic production and import capacity unable to meet demand. The report argues that this vulnerability can be mitigated by implementing energy efficiency measures in the industrial sector and electrifying cooking and water heating in the residential sector. Together, these actions could reduce 2030 gas demand by 21,545 GBtu, which is 1.5 times the projected deficit for that year. The authors recommend a planned exit from gas, including a national appliance replacement programme, the reorientation of subsidies toward electrification, and the limitation of new fossil fuel infrastructure to avoid carbon lock-in.

Colombia faces a projected gas supply deficit from 2030 onwards as domestic production declines. The report argues that the country can mitigate this risk and avoid costly imports by implementing energy efficiency in industry and electrifying cooking and water heating in the residential sector. It recommends a planned, just transition that includes a national appliance replacement programme, the reorientation of subsidies, and the limitation of new fossil fuel infrastructure to avoid carbon lock-in.

Colombia faces a projected gas supply deficit starting in 2030, as national production declines and import capacity becomes insufficient. The report argues that this vulnerability can be mitigated by reducing demand through a 14% increase in industrial energy efficiency and the electrification of residential cooking and water heating. Specifically, replacing 10% of gas stoves and 30% of water heaters with electric alternatives could significantly lower demand. The authors recommend a planned, just transition that includes reorienting subsidies toward electrification, implementing a national equipment replacement program, and avoiding long-term fossil fuel lock-ins like fracking.

Thailand's economic strategy to become a regional hub for electric vehicles (EVs) and data centres requires a rapid transition to clean energy to attract foreign investment and meet international low-carbon standards. The energy sector, which accounted for 69% of total emissions in 2019, is central to Thailand's goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 30-40% by 2030 and achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. Projections indicate that EVs could account for 20% of total electricity demand by 2037, while data centre demand is expected to grow at an 8% CAGR from 2025 to 2027, potentially adding 10 TWh by 2037. To support this, the Thai government has introduced a direct power purchase agreement (DPPA) pilot project specifically for data centres of at least 50 MW, allowing them to bypass the single-buyer system and purchase renewable energy directly.

The analysis argues that fossil fuel producers are overestimating future demand, as oil, gas, and coal are each expected to slow or peak in the coming years due to the rise of electric vehicles and renewable energy.

The report identifies a significant gap in India's green hydrogen sector, where announced production capacity exceeds the 2030 target of 5 million metric tons (MMT) by 2.5 times, yet commissioned capacity remains below 0.01 MMT as of 2024. To address barriers like high costs and limited infrastructure, the report outlines five strategies to unlock 2.1–5 MMT of demand by 2030: blending in high-volume sectors (0.8–3.0 MMT), substitution in niche industries (0.04–0.07 MMT), green public procurement for steel (0.4–0.6 MMT), exporting hydrogen and ammonia (0.75–1.1 MMT), and exporting hydrogen-embedded products (0.1–0.2 MMT). It also emphasizes the need for enablers such as viability gap funding, sovereign guarantees, and hydrogen hubs.

The report examines the criticality of six priority minerals—copper, lithium, manganese, neodymium, nickel, and silicon—essential for India's clean energy transition. It analyzes the global value chain, highlighting China's dominance in midstream processing and the geographical concentration of reserves. The document forecasts India's CETM demand up to 2050, identifies systemic gaps in domestic exploration and refining, and evaluates international policy responses. It concludes with strategic recommendations to enhance India's mineral security through domestic exploration, international cooperation via partnerships like the Mineral Security Partnership (MSP), and the promotion of circular economy practices and ESG standards.

The report argues that battery minerals are not like oil because their demand can be managed through six key solutions: changing chemistries, increasing energy density, recycling, extending battery lifetimes, improving vehicle efficiency, and enhancing mobility efficiency. Under a 'continued trend' scenario, virgin demand for lithium, nickel, and cobalt is projected to peak in the mid-2030s. Under an 'accelerated trend' scenario, net-zero mineral demand is achievable by 2050, turning mining into a one-off effort. The report highlights China's leadership in recycling and suggests that the Global South can leverage used vehicle imports to build its own recycling industries. Ultimately, the transition to a circular battery loop offers a path from oil dependence to circular energy independence.

The report provides a detailed market assessment of the refining industry in four key regions, analyzing the transition from traditional crude-based products to low-carbon alternatives like SAF, green ammonia, and e-methanol, while evaluating the impact of regional climate policies.

The report analyzes India's vulnerability in the lithium supply chain, characterized by high import dependence and geographical concentration of production and processing in China. It forecasts a significant surge in lithium demand between 2022 and 2030, driven primarily by electric vehicles and grid storage. To mitigate risks, the report recommends a multi-pronged strategy: streamlining domestic exploration in states like Jammu and Kashmir, forming strategic partnerships with mineral-rich nations such as Australia and Argentina, leveraging state-owned enterprises like KABIL to support private sector offtake, and incentivizing the development of domestic lithium refineries and recycling infrastructure.

The document analyzes global oil demand scenarios from the IEA and CER, concluding that structural shifts in road transport and increasing climate policies will lead to a permanent decline in oil demand starting before 2030. It highlights that while road transport is the primary driver, other sectors like plastics, aviation, and shipping will also contribute to demand destruction in the medium term, creating a shrinking market for Canadian oil producers.

The document identifies water as a critical constraint to development in the Saldanha Bay Municipality (SBM), projecting that a growing water deficit will severely impact the local economy and jobs by 2040. It highlights that urban water requirements are expected to increase by approximately 99% by 2040 due to population and economic growth, while climate change is projected to increase agricultural water requirements by 44% between 2015 and 2040. The report warns that by 2040, the water deficit could cost the local economy R8.7 billion per year and 44,640 jobs annually, with the highest costs stemming from the urban water deficit.

The document highlights that while Cape Town's economy is less reliant on water-intense sectors than others, its massive scale makes it the region's primary water user and the area most affected by supply deficits. By 2040, the water deficit in Cape Town could cost approximately R100 billion in GVA and 403,877 jobs annually, representing 29% of the local economy.

The report projects emissions for the EU, Japan, and other Annex I countries up to 2012 and 2020. It finds that while the EU ETS is likely to have a surplus of allowances up to 2012 at a price of €20/tCO2, the EU-15 and Japan will face overall deficits relative to their Kyoto targets. Conversely, Russia, Ukraine, and new EU member states are projected to have significant emission surpluses. Looking toward 2020, the EU ETS is expected to enter a deficit unless efficiency and renewables targets are met, suggesting a rise in carbon prices post-2012.

The document details the stakeholder engagement process and technical data used to develop a regional tool for integrated water and economic planning in the Berg WMA. It includes records of workshops and meetings with provincial government, local municipalities, and academic institutions. Technical appendices provide marginal values of water by crop, estimated irrigated agriculture water requirements, and forecasts for urban water demand for 2025 and 2040. The text also validates these bottom-up estimations against the WARMS database and Aurecon's Water Resources Simulation Model, while assessing the economic opportunity cost of potential supply deficits in terms of GVA and employment.

The report asserts that existing production and export capacities are sufficient to meet global fossil gas demand, which is expected to peak before 2030. It highlights that demand declines in developed economies, such as the EU, Japan, and South Korea, will offset potential increases in emerging economies. The document concludes by calling for financial institutions to halt all support for fossil gas expansion, including new gas fields and LNG export terminals.