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The report argues that public development banks (PDBs)—including national, regional, and multilateral institutions—are uniquely positioned to overcome structural and market barriers to climate risk insurance in EMDEs. It identifies key barriers such as data gaps, underdeveloped local capital bases, and fragmented regulatory frameworks. The document proposes a tiered approach where National Development Banks (NDBs) focus on local market development and project pipelines, Regional Development Banks (RDBs) coordinate risk pooling and shared data infrastructure, and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) provide catalytic capital and credit enhancement. Key recommendations include the use of targeted premium subsidies with sunset clauses, the bundling of insurance with loans, and the creation of regulatory sandboxes to foster innovation in parametric insurance.

The report details a framework for assessing climate risks to India's power sector, distinguishing between chronic stresses (e.g., temperature, drought) and acute extremes (e.g., floods, cyclones). It introduces the Asset-Specific Climate Risk Factor (ACRF) for spatial screening and Expected Annual Impact (EAI)—measured as Expected Annual Loss (EAL) for generation and Energy Not Served (ENS) for networks—to quantify operational disruptions in MWh. The methodology includes a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) framework to evaluate the economic viability of resilience measures by comparing investment costs against avoided energy losses and repair expenditures.

The paper introduces the Climate Risk Assessment Framework (CRAF), a structured approach to quantify physical climate risks for India's power infrastructure. It addresses gaps in existing literature by moving from qualitative risk ratings to energy-denominated impact estimates, specifically Expected Annual Loss (EAL) and Energy Not Served (ENS). The methodology distinguishes between chronic stressors (causing performance derating) and acute events (causing sudden failure), providing a pathway for cost-benefit analysis of resilience investments to avoid stranded assets and unplanned retrofitting costs.

The document argues that the traditional carbon offsetting model is fundamentally flawed and misleading, urging companies to adopt Beyond Value Chain Mitigation (BVCM). Unlike offsetting, which claims to 'cancel out' emissions, BVCM involves supporting external climate projects as a contribution to global goals without claiming carbon neutrality. The guide outlines the legal and reputational risks of offsetting—including a September 2026 EU ban on product-level offsetting claims—and provides a five-step implementation framework for BVCM. It suggests diversifying contributions beyond carbon credits into durable carbon removals (CDR), 'high-hanging fruit' technology research, and climate impact funds, while emphasizing that external action must not replace internal decarbonization aligned with a 1.5°C trajectory.

Carbon Market Watch proposes that the EU replace 'net' climate targets with three distinct targets for emissions reductions, land-based sequestration, and permanent carbon dioxide removals (CDR). The guide argues that current EU governance is inadequate, noting that the Carbon Removal and Carbon Farming (CRCF) Regulation lacks rigour and the Net-Zero Industry Act's goal of 50 Mt of geological CO2 storage does not specify the volume for permanent removals. To implement this, the author suggests integrating permanent removal targets into the Effort Sharing Regulation and strengthening the Governance Regulation to require credible feasibility and sustainability assessments by March 2027. Proposed target designs include a 'floor' for minimum delivery and a 'ceiling' to prevent over-reliance on CDR, with targets expressed in absolute volume (MtCO2) and as a percentage of 1990 gross emissions. Financing should be shared between the public sector and high-polluting companies through progressive taxation or direct removal obligations.

The report analyzes the potential demand response to an EU ETS scope expansion for extra-EEA flights. It finds that demand effects are generally small at current price levels, particularly for high-emitting segments such as long-haul flights, business travel, and private aviation, which exhibit low price elasticity. The study highlights that cost pass-through rates are higher in competitive markets and at uncongested airports. Non-price factors, including value of time, airline loyalty, and airport attractiveness, are identified as primary drivers of the observed differences in price sensitivity across market segments.

The report argues that the Article 6.4 Sustainable Development (SD) Tool is primarily procedural and fails to protect Indigenous Peoples and local communities due to an overreliance on national laws, narrow definitions of Indigenous status, and a restrictive approach to Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). Geospatial analysis reveals that hundreds of projects in the Article 6 pipeline—including both new notifications and transitioning Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) projects—overlap with or are in close proximity to Indigenous and community lands, particularly in Asia. Documented cases in India, Kenya, Colombia, and Brazil demonstrate that these gaps have already led to involuntary resettlement, inadequate compensation, and long-term land conflicts.

The report argues that the proposed Turkish ETS is fundamentally weak due to its reliance on an intensity-based cap, broad unconditional free allocation, and the use of offsets. These design choices are expected to prevent the system from generating a meaningful carbon price signal, thereby failing to drive emissions reductions aligned with the Paris Agreement and leaving Turkish exporters exposed to significant CBAM fees. The authors recommend transitioning to an absolute declining cap, phasing out offsets, and shifting toward auctioning to retain climate revenues domestically.

The report asserts that capital markets are essential for African economies to finance climate adaptation, infrastructure, and demographic shifts amidst declining foreign aid and FDI. It argues that while public equity markets have limited utility for smaller or frontier markets due to high costs and information asymmetries, corporate bond markets and hybrid structures—combining public disclosure with private flexibility—offer more practical pathways. The author emphasizes that macroeconomic stability and pension reforms are foundational to increasing the domestic savings base. The document recommends using guarantees, pooled investment vehicles, and project preparation platforms to increase institutional investor confidence and develop bankable projects in infrastructure, housing, and MSMEs.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as coal plants increasingly serve as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record-high new capacity is being offset by the rapid expansion of wind and solar energy. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, significant expansion continues in China and India, which together account for 95% of global coal capacity under construction. In the US and EU, energy security concerns and government interventions have delayed planned retirements of coal units.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as new plants are increasingly built for backup reliability rather than primary generation. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting most new demand. While the number of countries developing coal projects fell to 32, political interventions in the US and energy security concerns in the EU have delayed planned closures. The EU continues a terminal decline in coal, with solar and wind producing more energy than all fossil fuels combined for the first time in 2025.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while production fell by 0.6%, as coal is increasingly used as 'system insurance' rather than a primary energy source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where renewables are meeting new demand despite record coal plant commissioning. Globally, the number of countries proposing new coal plants dropped to 32. In Indonesia, coal expansion continues through 'captive' plants for nickel and aluminium industries, reaching 20 GW, while national energy plans (RUKN and RUPTL) are criticized for maintaining fossil fuel dependency and lacking a clear phase-out roadmap despite official net-zero commitments.

The report highlights a growing gap in 2025 where global coal capacity increased by 3.5% despite a 0.6% decrease in generation, signaling a shift where coal serves as a backup rather than a primary power source. While China and India continue to expand capacity for energy security, the total number of countries proposing or building new coal plants fell to 32 in 2025. The document specifically contrasts the policies of South Korea, which has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out and joined the Powering Past Coal Alliance, with Japan, which maintains a large coal fleet and focuses on abatement technologies like ammonia co-firing and CCS without a binding national phase-out date.

In 2025, global coal power capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants act as 'system insurance' rather than primary power sources. This gap is most prominent in China and India, where record-high completions coexist with falling generation due to rapid wind and solar expansion. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects decreased from 38 in 2024 to 32 in 2025, and Latin America reached a state of no new proposals, some regions like the US and EU delayed planned closures due to energy security and political intervention. South Korea has committed to a 2040 coal phase-out, contrasting with Japan's more gradual approach focused on ammonia co-firing and efficiency improvements.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, as new plants in China and India are increasingly used as system insurance rather than primary generation. While the number of countries proposing new coal plants decreased to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Latin America and the Caribbean achieved a status of 'No New Coal Plants' in 2025, though several countries, including Brazil and Chile, experienced setbacks in their decommissioning schedules.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal plants are increasingly used as backup reserves rather than primary energy sources. This divergence is most acute in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling generation due to the rise of wind and solar power. While the number of countries proposing new coal projects declined from 38 to 32, political interventions in the US and EU delayed planned retirements. Regionally, Latin America reported no new projects, while Russia and Kazakhstan continue to integrate coal into their long-term energy security strategies despite international financing constraints and sanctions.

In 2025, global coal capacity grew by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, reflecting a trend where coal is increasingly used as system 'insurance' rather than a primary energy source. While Latin America achieved a 'No New Coal' status in 2025, several countries in the region, including Brazil and Chile, experienced delays or reversals in planned plant retirements. China and India continue to lead global capacity expansions, accounting for 95% of all coal capacity under construction worldwide.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while coal-generated electricity decreased by 0.6%, reflecting a shift where coal serves as backup capacity rather than a primary source. This trend is most prominent in China and India, where record capacity additions coexist with falling production due to the rise of renewables. While the number of countries planning new coal projects fell to 32 in 2025, some nations like the US and EU delayed plant closures for energy security. In Turkey, planned coal capacity has plummeted from 57.5 GW in 2015 to 0.7 GW by 2025, though tensions remain between social demand for transition and government policies such as guaranteed purchase mechanisms for coal plants through 2030.

In 2025, global coal capacity increased by 3.5% while generation fell by 0.6%, driven largely by record additions in China and India. These countries are building coal plants for system reliability and energy security, even as renewables displace coal's role in meeting demand. The report notes a geographic narrowing of coal expansion, with only 32 countries proposing or building new plants, and highlights the specific challenges facing Ukraine's energy recovery following Russian attacks on its infrastructure.

The global iron and steel industry faces a 'coal lock-in crisis' as blast furnace (BF) capacity continues to expand despite decarbonization targets. While electric arc furnace (EAF) and direct reduced iron (DRI) capacities are growing, the transition is slowed by massive legacy assets in China and aggressive new coal-based developments in India. Green hydrogen remains a critical but underutilized bottleneck, with only 2% of operating DRI capacity using it as a primary reductant. The report highlights a significant gap between announced net-zero goals and actual industrial investment, particularly regarding the relining of existing blast furnaces.